Gawron v Town of Cheektowaga
2014 NY Slip Op 03051 [117 AD3d 1410]
May 2, 2014
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 2, 2014


[*1]
 Edward Gawron et al., Respondents, v Town ofCheektowaga et al., Appellants.

Chelus, Herdzik, Speyer & Monte, P.C., Buffalo (Martha E. Donovan ofcounsel), for defendants-appellants.

Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent Edward Gawron.

Law Office of Michael D. Hollenbeck, Buffalo (Michael D. Hollenbeck of counsel),for plaintiff-respondent Joanne Gawron.

Appeal from an amended order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph R.Glownia, J.), entered June 11, 2013. The amended order, insofar as appealed from,denied the cross motion of defendants for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint.

It is hereby ordered that the amended order so appealed from is modified on the lawby granting defendants' cross motion in part and dismissing the negligence claims in thefirst cause of action and as modified the amended order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries theysustained when the vehicle operated by Edward Gawron (plaintiff), in which plaintiffJoanne Gawron was a passenger, was struck by a truck owned by defendant Town ofCheektowaga (Town) and operated by defendant David J. Grzybek, an employee of theTown. The truck was equipped with a plow and, at the time of the accident, the plow wasdown and Grzybek was in the process of using that plow to remove accumulated waterand debris from the road. As plaintiffs allege, "the water was propelled onto thewindshield of the . . . truck . . . , blocking [Grzybek's] visionand causing him to cross over into an oncoming lane and into . . .[plaintiffs'] vehicle." Plaintiffs alleged that the accident "was caused as a result of thenegligent, careless, reckless and unlawful conduct on the part of the defendants."

Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' negligenceas well as the affirmative defenses asserted against him, and defendants cross-moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint. As relevant on appeal, Supreme Courtdenied defendants' cross motion in its entirety.

Defendants contend on appeal that the court erred in denying their cross motionbecause [*2]they established that Vehicle and TrafficLaw § 1103 (b) applies as a matter of law and that Grzybek was not actingrecklessly at the time of the accident. We agree with defendants that, as a matter of law,the truck operated by Grzybek was "actually engaged in work on a highway" at the timeof the accident (id.), "and thus that it was exempt from the rules of the roadexcept to the extent that its operation constituted a 'reckless disregard for the safety ofothers' " (Curella vTown of Amherst, 77 AD3d 1301, 1301-1302 [2010]; see generally Riley vCounty of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 462 [2000]). We further conclude, however, thatthere are triable issues of fact whether Grzybek acted with such reckless disregard at thetime of the accident. We therefore modify the amended order by granting only that partof defendants' cross motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the negligenceclaims asserted in the first cause of action.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 "exempts all persons and vehicles'while actually engaged in work on a highway' from the Vehicle and Traffic Lawprovisions (§ 1103 [b]), except for those provisions relating to drivingwhile intoxicated offenses" (Kabir v County of Monroe, 68 AD3d 1628, 1632 [2009],affd 16 NY3d 217 [2011]). A "highway" is defined as "[t]he entire widthbetween the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof isopen to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel" (§ 118).Although the road on which the accident occurred was a service road, it was publiclymaintained and open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel (see generally Groninger v Villageof Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 129 [2011]; People v County ofWestchester, 282 NY 224, 228-229 [1940]). We thus conclude that the service roadconstitutes a highway within the meaning of section 1103 (b) as a matter of law.

As we have recently written, "the inclusion of the language 'actually engaged in workon a highway' indicates that the exemption applies only when such work is in fact beingperformed at the time of the accident . . . To conclude otherwise wouldrender superfluous the phrase 'actually engaged' " (Hofmann v Town of Ashford,60 AD3d 1498, 1499 [2009]). Grzybek was a maintenance janitor whose normal androutine duties included driving a truck, patching roads and snow plowing. Theaccident occurred after Grzybek had taken his lunch break at one Town building and wasreturning to another Town building to continue his work. He took the service road for a"change of scenery." It is undisputed that, on the day of the accident, Grzybek had notreceived any specific assignment to plow the water and debris from the road and that hedid so on his own "initiative." It is also undisputed that, while not a common endeavor,Town maintenance employees such as Grzybek had taken it upon themselves to use theplows attached to their trucks to plow puddles, similar to the one plowed by Grzybek,from highways on other occasions. Plaintiffs contend that, because Grzybek was notperforming his "assigned work," section 1103 (b) does not apply. We are thus calledupon to interpret the word "work" as used in the statute.

"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuatethe intent of the Legislature . . . As the clearest indicator of legislative intentis the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be thelanguage itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof . . . In construingstatutes, it is a well-established rule that resort must be had to the natural signification ofthe words employed, and if they have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity orcontradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add to or takeaway from that meaning" (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91NY2d 577, 583 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, "[t]he function of thecourts is to enforce statutes, not to usurp the power of legislation, and to interpret astatute where there is no need for interpretation, to conjecture about or to add to or tosubtract from words having a definite meaning, or to engraft exceptions where none existare trespasses by a court upon the legislative domain" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY,Book 1, Statutes § 76, Comment at 168). Thus, "new language cannot beimported into a statute to give it a meaning not otherwise found therein"(§ 94, Comment at 190), and "a court cannot amend a statute by [*3]inserting words that are not there" (§ 363,Comment at 525; see Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85NY2d 382, 394 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995]).

Here, the statute exempts "all [municipal] vehicles 'actually engaged in work on ahighway' . . . from the rules of the road" (Riley, 95 NY2d at 461).The statute does not state that it exempts only those vehicles engaged in "assigned" work.Plowing water and debris from a road is work, and that work is within the scope ofGrzybek's duties. Plaintiffs do not suggest otherwise. Rather, their contention is that thestatute applies only when the vehicles are "performing their assigned work" and thatGrzybek was not assigned to plow water and debris from the service road on the day ofthe accident. In our view, interpreting the statute as the dissent and plaintiffs suggestimproperly adds language to the statute by qualifying the word "work." It is not thefunction of this Court to usurp the power of the legislature and rewrite a clear andunambiguous statute. Aside from statutory exceptions not relevant herein, all municipalvehicles actually engaged in work are exempt from the rules of the road. Inasmuch asGrzybek's vehicle was actually engaged in work, albeit unassigned work, the recklessdisregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b)applies as a matter of law.

Defendants further contend that, as a matter of law, Grzybek's conduct did not rise tothe level of reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1103 (b). We reject that contention. Even assuming,arguendo, that defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law onthat issue, we conclude that plaintiffs, in opposition to defendants' cross motion,submitted evidence from which a jury could find that Grzybek "had intentionallycommitted an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk' "that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow" and[did] so with conscious indifference to the outcome' " (Ferreri v Town of Penfield, 34AD3d 1243, 1243-1244 [2006], quoting Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501[1994]).

All concur except Lindley and Sconiers, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in thefollowing memorandum.

Lindley and Sconiers, JJ. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent because we conclude,based on the facts and circumstances of the subject motor vehicle accident, that Vehicleand Traffic Law § 1103 (b) does not apply as a matter of law in this case.We therefore conclude that Supreme Court properly refused to dismiss the negligenceclaims in the first cause of action. Specifically, while we agree with the majority that theaccess road where the accident occurred constitutes a "highway" (see generally Groninger v Villageof Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 129 [2011]; Healy v City of Tonawanda,234 AD2d 982, 983 [1996]), we conclude that the actions of defendant David J.Grzybek, an employee of defendant Town of Cheektowaga (Town), at the time of theaccident are not protected by the statute because he was not "actually engaged in work ona highway" as contemplated by the statute (§ 1103 [b]).

It is undisputed that (1) Grzybek's duties had included plowing snow, but on the dayof the accident he was assigned to perform maintenance and janitorial work at the Town'ssenior center; (2) on this date in late March, the snow plow was on the pickup truck thatGrzybek was driving only because the Town had not yet had the time or opportunity toremove it; (3) Grzybek was returning from lunch at the time of the accident and he hadchosen this route along this access road simply for "a change of scenery"; (4) it was notcommon to use a plow to move water from a road, but it had been done on previousoccasions; (5) there was no proof that plows were ever used to remove debris from aroad; (6) Grzybek was not instructed to remove the water and debris from this accessroad, but did so on his own initiative; (7) he had, in fact, never been instructed by asupervisor to use a plow to remove either water or debris from roads; (8) there is noevidence suggesting that the water or debris posed an immediate hazard on this accessroad; and (9) Grzybek was terminated as a result of this incident. Notably, Grzybektestified that, depending on the nature of the debris, the usual procedure for removingdebris from roads [*4]involved using high lifts orbrooms.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 is a statute in derogation of thecommon law. " 'The Legislature in enacting statutes is presumed to have beenacquainted with the common law, and generally, statutes in derogation or incontravention thereof, are strictly construed, to the end that the common law system bechanged only so far as required by the words of the act and the mischief to beremedied' " (Kirshtein vAmeriCU Credit Union, 65 AD3d 147, 152 [2009], quoting McKinney's ConsLaws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 301 [a], Comment at 459-460). Moreover,given that this statute is " 'in derogation of [a] plaintiff's common-law rights,' thestatute . . . should be strictly construed in the plaintiff[s'] favor" (Goodwin v Pretorius, 105AD3d 207, 216 [2013]).

The majority's overly broad application of section 1103 (b) in this case stands instark contrast to the much narrower scope that courts have afforded to Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1104. Section 1104 applies the reckless disregard standard toan "authorized emergency vehicle," but only if the driver of that vehicle is engaged in an"emergency operation" as that term is defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 114-b and the driver is engaged in one of the specific types of protectedconduct enumerated in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b) (see Kabir v County of Monroe,16 NY3d 217, 220 [2011]; LoGrasso v City of Tonawanda, 87 AD3d 1390, 1391[2011]).

Given the limits that the statute and case law apply to Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1104 for first responders, we conclude that the legislature could notpossibly have intended to apply such a broad interpretation to the phrase "actuallyengaged in work on a highway" in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) asthat applied by the majority here. It is clear that, on the day of the subject accident,Grzybek was not assigned to clear water or debris from this access road or any other roadin the Town. Moreover, he was not assigned that day to use the plow on this pickup inany way whatsoever, and his use of the truck on this day was solely to transport himselfand any equipment necessary to perform maintenance and janitorial work. By applyingVehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) as a matter of law in this case, themajority is effectively holding that the statute applies in every case to all publicemployees, no matter their status, duties or job assignments, who, at any time, decide, intheir sole discretion, to use even the most inept, incompetent and ill-advised methods toperform a task that could possibly be construed as "work on a highway," thereby leavinginjured persons uncompensated for their injuries unless they can satisfy the "recklessdisregard for the safety of others" standard. Such a result extends the scope of Vehicleand Traffic Law § 1103 (b) far beyond what the legislature intended,especially given the corresponding limits that Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1104 places on the police and other first responders. We would thereforeapply the standard of ordinary negligence to defendants in this personal injury action, andwe would affirm the amended order. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Carni,Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.


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