| Nicastro v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03381 [117 AD3d 1545] |
| May 9, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| Ryan Nicastro, Respondent, v New York CentralMutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant. |
Rupp, Baase, Pfalzgraf, Cunningham & Coppola LLC, Buffalo (Marco Cerconeof counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Duke, Holzman, Photiadis & Gresens LLP, Buffalo (Elizabeth A. Kraengel ofcounsel), for plaintiff-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y. Devlin, J.),entered June 3, 2013 in a breach of contract action. The order, insofar as appealed from,granted in part the motion of plaintiff and thereby compelled production ofapproximately 200 pages of previously withheld or partially redacted documents.
It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversedon the law without costs and the motion is denied in its entirety.
Memorandum: On appeal from an order that granted in part plaintiff's motion andthereby compelled production of approximately 200 pages of previously withheld orpartially redacted documents, defendant contends that the documents are protected by theattorney-client and attorney work product privileges. We agree. We note at the outsetthat, with respect to other documents, e.g., documents relating to insurance reserveinformation, claims expenses, subrogation interests, expenses incurred by attorneys, anddocuments created after commencement of the action, the order issued by Supreme Courtrequiring disclosure of those documents conflicts with the court's decision denying suchdisclosure. It is well settled that, "[w]here, as here, there is a conflict between an orderand a decision, the decision controls" (Wilson v Colosimo, 101 AD3d 1765, 1766 [2012] [internalquotation marks omitted]).
A party seeking to invoke the attorney-client privilege must show that "theinformation sought to be protected from disclosure was a 'confidential communication'made to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services. . . [, and] the burden of proving each element of the privilege rests uponthe party asserting it" (Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 69 [1980];see generally PCB Piezotronics v Change, 179 AD2d 1089, 1089 [1992];Central Buffalo Project Corp. v Rainbow Salads, 140 AD2d 943, 944 [1988]). "Forthe privilege to apply when communications are made from client to attorney, they 'mustbe made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and directed to an attorney who hasbeen consulted for that purpose.' . . . [F]or the privilege to apply whencommunications are made from attorney to client—whether or not in response to aparticular request—they must be made for the purpose of facilitating the renditionof legal advice or services, in the course of a professional relationship" (Rossi v BlueCross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 73 NY2d 588, 593 [1989]).
It is well settled that "[t]he payment or rejection of claims is a part of the regularbusiness of an insurance company. Consequently, reports which aid it in the process ofdeciding which of the two indicated actions to pursue are made in the regular course ofits business" (Bertalo's Rest. v Exchange Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 452, 454-455[1997], lv dismissed 91 NY2d 848 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted];see Landmark Ins. Co. v Beau Rivage Rest., 121 AD2d 98, 101 [1986]). Notably,"while information received from third persons may not itself be privileged. . . , a lawyer's communication to a client that includes such information inits legal analysis and advice may stand on different footing. The critical inquiry iswhether, viewing the lawyer's communication in its full content and context, it was madein order to render legal advice or services to the client" (Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. vChemical Bank, 78 NY2d 371, 379 [1991]).
Here, defendant did not retain counsel to perform the work of an adjuster orotherwise to handle claims. Defendant itself evaluated plaintiff's claim and determinedthat it was obligated to pay and did pay him in excess of $100,000 as a result of a firethat damaged two insured properties. When it became clear that plaintiff believed that thevalue of his claim was far in excess of what defendant was willing to pay him, defendantretained counsel to protect its rights. Defendant's attorney expressly stated that he wasretained to provide legal services to defendant, to advise defendant of its legalresponsibilities, and to conduct the examination under oath of plaintiff. We thusconclude that counsel was retained to provide legal advice and services to defendant withrespect to plaintiff's claim and, as a result, the court erred when it ordered disclosure ofdocuments of or relating to communications between defendant and its attorney anddocuments that constitute attorney work product. Present—Centra, J.P., Fahey,Lindley, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.