| Iacono v Iacono |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03797 [117 AD3d 988] |
| May 28, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Joseph R. Iacono, Respondent, v Laura L.Iacono, Appellant. |
Christopher J. Chimeri, Hauppauge, N.Y., for appellant.
Mary Ellen O'Brien, Garden City, N.Y., for respondent.
James E. Flood, Jr., Massapequa, N.Y., attorney for the children.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the mother appeals (1) from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Janowitz, J.), entered August 16, 2013, which, upona decision of the same court dated July 17, 2013, made after a hearing, awarded solecustody of the parties' children to the father, and (2) as limited by her brief, from so muchof an amended order of the same court entered September 5, 2013, which, upon thedecision dated July 17, 2013, reduced her visitation with the parties' son and did notaward her visitation with the parties' daughter.
Ordered that the order entered August 16, 2013, is affirmed, without costs ordisbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the amended order entered September 5, 2013, is affirmed insofar asappealed from, without costs or disbursements.
In adjudicating custody and visitation rights, the court's paramount concern is thebest interests of the children (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171[1982]; Matter of Felty vFelty, 108 AD3d 705, 706 [2013]; Matter of Haimovici v Haimovici, 73 AD3d 1058, 1058[2010]). Where, as here, the court has conducted a complete evidentiary hearing on theissues of custody and visitation, its findings must be accorded great weight, and itscustody and visitation determination will not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound andsubstantial basis in the record (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 173;Matter of Felty v Felty, 108 AD3d at 707; Matter of Waldron v Dussek, 48 AD3d 471, 472 [2008]).The Supreme Court's determination that it was in the best interests of the children toaward sole custody to the father has a sound and substantial basis in the record and,accordingly, we decline to disturb it (see Matter of Guzman v Pizarro, 102 AD3d 964, 965[2013]).
Further, contrary to the mother's contention, the Supreme Court's determination thattherapeutic supervised visitation with the parties' daughter would not be in the bestinterests of the child has a sound and substantial basis in the record and likewise shouldnot be disturbed (see Matter[*2]of Mera v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d 1069, 1070[2010]). The Supreme Court properly considered the wishes of the child, who was nearly14 years old at the time of the hearing and mature enough to express her wishes (see Matter of Mohabir v Singh,78 AD3d 1056, 1057 [2010]; Matter of Mera v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d at1070). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion indenying the mother any visitation with the daughter.
The mother's remaining contention is without merit. Rivera, J.P., Austin, Roman andHinds-Radix, JJ., concur.