| Matter of Jayden T. (Amy T.) |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04099 [118 AD3d 1075] |
| June 5, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Jayden T. and Others, PermanentlyNeglected Children. Broome County Department of Social Services, Respondent; AmyT., Appellant, et al., Respondent. |
Samuel D. Castellino, Big Flats, for appellant.
Thomas Coulson, Broome County Department of Social Services, Binghamton, forrespondent.
Alena E. Van Tull, Binghamton, attorney for the children.
Garry, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Connerton,J.), entered February 27, 2013 which, in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law§ 384-b, among other things, granted petitioner's motion to revoke asuspended judgment, and terminated the parental rights of respondent Amy T.
Respondent Amy T. (hereinafter respondent) is the mother of five children (born in2000, 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2007) who were temporarily removed from her custody andplaced with petitioner in June 2007. Respondent was adjudicated to have neglected thechildren in November 2007, and was directed to obtain certain services, including angermanagement and parenting classes. In 2011, this permanent neglect proceeding wascommenced and, following respondent's admission that she had delayed in obtaining andcompleting the court-ordered [*2]services, Family Court(Pines, J.) adjudicated the children to be permanently neglected. The court issued asix-month suspended judgment with conditions that again included the completion ofparenting and anger management classes. Petitioner thereafter moved for an orderrevoking the suspended judgment on the ground that respondent had not complied withthe conditions. Family Court (Connerton, J.) conducted a two-day hearing; respondentappeared for the first day, but, upon her failure to appear for the second day, the courtdenied her counsel's request for an adjournment, completed the hearing and closed theproof. Subsequently, the court denied respondent's motion to reopen the proof, andrevoked the suspended judgment. Following a dispositional hearing at which respondentappeared and testified, the court terminated her parental rights and freed the children foradoption. Respondent appeals.
Initially, respondent contends that Family Court improperly denied her counsel'srequest to adjourn the revocation hearing. Such a request may be granted in the trialcourt's discretion "for good cause shown" (Family Ct Act § 626 [a]; see Matter of Elias QQ. [StephanieQQ.], 72 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2010]). Here, at a permanency hearing onSeptember 27, 2012, the participants, including respondent's counsel, were given writtennotice that the revocation hearing—scheduled to begin on October 3,2012—would continue one week later, on October 10. Respondent was notpresent at this permanency hearing, but written notice of the further hearing date wasmailed to her home. During the course of the hearing on October 3, and in respondent'spresence, Family Court announced that the hearing would continue on October 10 and, ifnecessary, on the day after. On October 10, all participants except respondent appeared;the court allowed respondent's counsel to attempt to reach her by telephone and reorderedthe proof to permit him to enter certain records into evidence before declining his requestfor an adjournment. In her subsequent motion to reopen the proof, respondent claimedthat she missed both the permanency hearing and the second hearing date because shehad not received the mailed notices. Upon this record, we find no abuse of discretion indenial of the requested adjournment, as it arose from respondent's failure to exercise duediligence (see Matter of StevenB., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Braswell v Braswell, 80 AD3d 827, 829[2011]).
Next, although termination of respondent's parental rights was not required as aconsequence of her failure to comply with the conditions of the suspended judgment,such a failure "is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of thechildren" (Matter of Clifton ZZ.[Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d 683, 685 [2010]). Here, the record reveals multiplefailures of compliance. Although respondent did complete a parenting program, she wasconsistently late to class and scored lower on a test of parenting skills given aftercompleting the program than she had on the same test before the class began. Shelikewise eventually completed an anger management class—a requirement thathad first been imposed in 2007—but failed without explanation to attend an initialevaluation and did not enroll until after the application to revoke the suspended judgmenthad been filed. She further failed to comply with conditions requiring her to keeppetitioner informed of changes in her address, sign releases and attend the children'smedical appointments, and she did not consistently attend parent-teacher conferences,meetings with other service providers, or visits with the children. Under thesecircumstances, Family Court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the suspendedjudgment and addressing the children's best interests (see Matter of Leala T., 55 AD3d 997, 998 [2008]).
The three older children have been in petitioner's care since June 2007. For most ofthat time, they have resided with the maternal grandparents approximately three hoursaway, where all three children testified that they have many friends, do well in school,and strongly prefer to remain. The grandparents have regularly transported the childrento Broome County for [*3]visits, but respondent hasnever visited them at their home, and maintains only sporadic telephone contact withthem. The younger two children reside with foster parents who wish to adopt them andare actively engaged in addressing the significant special needs of one of the children,who is diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome. In December 2012, respondent gave birthto a sixth child, having concealed the pregnancy from the children and petitionerbecause, as she testified, she was concerned about petitioner's reaction; the childrenlearned about her pregnancy only indirectly following the birth, when respondentannounced it in a social media post. In view of all of the foregoing, Family Court'sfinding that it is in the children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rightsand free them for adoption is fully supported by a sound and substantial basis in therecord (see Matter of Cole WW.[Amanda WW.], 106 AD3d 1408, 1410 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 865[2013]; Matter of Alexandria A.[Ann B.], 93 AD3d 1105, 1107 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805 [2012];Matter of Ronnie P. [DanielleQ.], 85 AD3d 1246, 1247 [2011]).
Lahtinen, J.P., Stein and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.