| Nucci v Nucci |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04179 [118 AD3d 762] |
| June 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Gary Nucci, Respondent, v Joan A. Nucci, asExecutrix of Frank A. Nucci, Deceased, et al., Appellants. |
Christopher Modelewski, P.C., Huntington, N.Y., for appellants.
Michael G. Leavy, Huntington, N.Y. (James F. Matthews of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud and pursuant to RPAPL article15 to determine claims to certain real property, the defendants appeal, as limited by theirbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), datedJuly 11, 2012, as denied that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of release.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud andpursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine claims to certain real property. The complaintalleged that the plaintiff's brother fraudulently induced their father to transfer title to thesubject property to a trust controlled by the brother, who then effectively transferred theproperty to himself, thereby depriving the plaintiff of his rightful inheritance.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing, among other things, that theaction was barred by a release that had been executed by the plaintiff when he receivedhis share of a certain insurance trust set up by the plaintiff's father. The Supreme Courtdenied the defendants' motion.
Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim that is thesubject of the release (seeCentro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V.,17 NY3d 269, 276 [2011]; Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93,98 [2006]). If the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a releaseis a jural act binding on the parties (see Booth v 3669 Delaware, 92 NY2d 934,935 [1998]; Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 563 [1969]).
"However, a release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not intendto cover" (Desiderio v GeicoGen. Ins. Co., 107 AD3d 662, 663 [2013]; see Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d292, 299 [1959]; Wechsler vDiamond Sugar Co., Inc., 29 AD3d 681, 682 [2006]). "[I]ts meaning andcoverage necessarily depend, as in the case of contracts generally, upon the controversybeing settled and upon the purpose for which the release was actually given" (Cahill vRegan, 5 NY2d at 299; seeBurnside 711 LLC v Amerada Hess Corp., 109 AD3d 860, 861[2013]).
[*2] Here, as the Supreme Courtproperly concluded, the release only served to bar the plaintiff from commencing anaction relating to the administration of the insurance trust or any new trust subsequentlycreated with the assets of the insurance trust (cf. Wechsler v Diamond Sugar Co.,Inc., 29 AD3d at 682). Since this action does not involve the administration of theinsurance trust or any trust containing the assets of the insurance trust, the SupremeCourt properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of release (see Wechsler vDiamond Sugar Co., Inc., 29 AD3d at 682; see generally Burnside 711 LLC vAmerada Hess Corp., 109 AD3d at 861; Desiderio v Geico Gen. Ins. Co.,107 AD3d at 663). Dickerson, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Miller, JJ., concur. [PriorCase History: 2012 NY Slip Op 31931(U).]