| Matter of Fizzinoglia |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04761 [118 AD3d 994] |
| June 25, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Anthony Frank Fizzinoglia, AlsoKnown as Anthony F. Fizzinoglia and Another, Deceased. Josephine ParadisoFizzinoglia, Appellant; Frank Fizzinoglia, Respondent. |
McCarthy Fingar, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Frank W. Streng, Robert H. Rosh, andSondra M. Miller of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.
Daniels, Porco and Lusardi, LLP, Carmel, N.Y. (Robert C. Lusardi of counsel), forobjectant-respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to SCPA 1001 to obtain letters of administration for theestate of Anthony Frank Fizzinoglia, also known as Anthony F. Fizzinoglia, also knownas Anthony Fizzinoglia, the petitioner appeals from a decree of the Surrogate's Court,Putnam County (Reitz, S.), dated August 10, 2012, which, upon an order of the samecourt dated March 2, 2012, denying her motion for summary judgment, in effect,determining that a certain prenuptial agreement was invalid, after a nonjury trial, andupon an order of the same court dated July 26, 2012, denying her motion to amend thepleadings to conform to the proof and granting the objectant's motion pursuant to CPLR4401, made at the close of her case, for judgment as a matter of law, inter alia, in effect,determined that the prenuptial agreement between her and the decedent was valid,dismissed the petition, and revoked temporary letters of administration that had beenissued to her.
Ordered that the decree is affirmed, with costs payable by the appellantpersonally.
Upon the death of Anthony Frank Fizzinoglia, also known as Anthony F.Fizzinoglia, also known as Anthony Fizzinoglia (hereinafter the decedent), the petitionercommenced this proceeding pursuant to SCPA 1001 to obtain letters of administrationfor the estate of the decedent on the ground that she was the surviving spouse, and toinvalidate a prenuptial agreement under which, among other provisions, she waived herright to elect an intestate share of the decedent's estate. Frank Fizzinoglia, the objectant,appearing individually and as executor of the estate of the decedent's mother, is thedecedent's father. The objectant alleged, inter alia, that the prenuptial agreementdisqualified the petitioner as a distributee of the decedent's estate.
In general, New York has a "strong public policy favoring individuals ordering anddeciding their own interests through contractual arrangements, including prenuptialagreements" (Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d 341, 344 [1998]; see Bloomfield vBloomfield, 97 NY2d 188, 193 [2001]; Cioffi-Petrakis v Petrakis, 103 AD3d 766, 767 [2013])."However, this right is not and has never been without limitation" (Kessler v Kessler, 33 AD3d42, 45 [2006]). "Thus, while 'there is a heavy presumption [*2]that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrumentmanifests the true intention of the parties' (Brassey v Brassey, 154 AD2d 293,295 [1989]), an agreement between spouses or prospective spouses may be invalidated ifthe party challenging the agreement demonstrates that it was the product of fraud, duress,or other inequitable conduct" (Cioffi-Petrakis v Petrakis, 103 AD3d at 767;see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977]; Petracca v Petracca, 101 AD3d695 [2012]; Weinstein vWeinstein, 36 AD3d 797, 798 [2007]; Lombardi v Lombardi, 235 AD2d400 [1997]).
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Surrogate's Court properly denied hermotion for summary judgment, in effect, determining that the prenuptial agreement wasinvalid and unenforceable on the grounds that an essential term was omitted from theagreement and the agreement was procured through overreaching. Notably, an addendumto the signed prenuptial agreement, labeled "Exhibit A," in which the parties weresupposed to set forth their assets and liabilities, was left blank. However, "[a] failure todisclose financial matters, by itself, is not sufficient to vitiate a prenuptial agreement" (Strong v Dubin, 48 AD3d232, 233 [2008]; see Pulverv Pulver, 40 AD3d 1315, 1317-1318 [2007]; Panossian v Panossian, 172AD2d 811 [1991]; Eckstein v Eckstein, 129 AD2d 552, 553 [1987]). Thepetitioner testified at her deposition that she was aware when signing the agreement that"Exhibit A" was blank, but she was not concerned by that omission, and that thedecedent's financial status had made no difference to her before the marriage. Further, therecord indicates that the petitioner was personally acquainted with the nature of thedecedent's assets before signing the agreement, and there was no indication that thedecedent had at any time attempted to conceal or misrepresent the nature or extent of hisassets. Since the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of her entitlement tojudgment as a matter of law determining that the prenuptial agreement was invalid andunenforceable, her motion was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of theobjectant's opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
Moreover, the Surrogate's Court properly granted the objectant's motion pursuant toCPLR 4401, made at the conclusion of the petitioner's case, for judgment as a matter oflaw, as there was no rational process by which the trier of fact could base a finding infavor of the petitioner (see generally Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556[1997]; PAS Tech. Servs., Inc. vMiddle Vil. Healthcare Mgt., LLC, 92 AD3d 742 [2012]). The petitioner failedto establish any fact-based particularized inequality with the decedent so as to shift theburden to the objectant to disprove fraud or overreaching (see Matter of Greiff,92 NY2d at 346; Petracca v Petracca, 101 AD3d at 698). Thus, it remained thepetitioner's burden on her case-in-chief to establish that her execution of the prenuptialagreement was procured through fraud, duress, or other inequitable conduct (seeCioffi-Petrakis v Petrakis, 103 AD3d at 767). Contrary to the petitioner'scontentions, the record is devoid of any evidence of coercion or undue influenceexercised on the part of the decedent, the objectant, or their accountant, who were allpresent at the execution. Moreover, the petitioner did not show that the agreement itselfwas unconscionable or was the product of overreaching.
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Dickerson,Cohen and Duffy, JJ., concur.