| Thibodeau v Martin |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04996 [119 AD3d 1015] |
| July 3, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 Joseph Thibodeau et al., Respondents, v RichardMartin et al., Defendants, and Jodi D. Aubin, Appellant. |
Ianniello Anderson, PC, Clifton Park (Matthew I. Mazur of counsel), forappellant.
Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Maloney & Laird, PC, Albany (John H.Pennock Jr., Clifton Park, of counsel), for respondents.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), enteredApril 22, 2013 in Saratoga County, upon a decision of the court declaring the rights ofthe parties as to certain real property and permanently enjoining defendants' obstructionof a certain right-of-way.
The parties own neighboring parcels of property in the Town of Halfmoon, SaratogaCounty. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, among other things, a declaration thatthey held a right-of-way over an approximately 67-by-50-foot rectangular portion ofdefendants' real property (hereinafter the turnaround) and an order that defendantsremove certain alleged obstructions from the turnaround. After a trial, Supreme Courtfound, among other things, that plaintiffs maintained a right-of-way over the turnaroundand ordered that, as relevant here, defendants remove various obstructions to plaintiffs'use of the turnaround, including a gravel driveway.[FN1]Defendant Jodi D. Aubin (hereinafterdefendant) and defendant Richard Martin [*2]appeal.[FN2]
On appeal, defendant challenges only the portion of Supreme Court's order requiringdefendants to remove the gravel driveway installed on the turnaround. "[W]here theintention in granting an easement is to afford only a right of ingress and egress, it is theright of passage, and not any right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to theeasement holder" (Lewis v Young, 92 NY2d 443, 449 [1998]; accord Sullivan v Woods, 70AD3d 1286, 1287 [2010]). Accordingly, "in the absence of a demonstrated intent toprovide otherwise, a landowner burdened by an express easement of ingress and egressmay narrow it, cover it over, gate it or fence it off, so long as the easement holder's rightof passage is not impaired" (Lewis v Young, 92 NY2d at 449; accord Sambrook v Sierocki,53 AD3d 817, 818 [2008]).
Here, the deed establishing the right-of-way states that it is "for the purpose ofingress and egress to" plaintiffs' property. The uncontroverted evidence established that,while the turnaround was previously comprised of hard-packed dirt, defendant installed agravel driveway on the turnaround. Plaintiffs did not submit any evidence establishingthat the gravel driveway impeded their use of the turnaround. Although plaintiffsestablished that they had a right of passage for the purpose of ingress and egress, theyfailed to further establish that defendant's addition of a gravel driveway impaired thatright to any extent. Accordingly, Supreme Court erred in ordering defendants to removethe gravel driveway (see Sambrook v Sierocki, 53 AD3d at 818; Chekijian v Mans, 34 AD3d1029, 1032 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 806 [2007]; Mester v Roman, 25 AD3d907, 908 [2006]; compare Marek v Woodcock, 277 AD2d 864, 865-866[2000], lv dismissed 96 NY2d 792 [2001]).
Stein, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified,on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as required defendants to removethe gravel driveway, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1:Defendant Agnes Martindied during the pendency of this action. Although there is no indication in the record thatthe action was stayed or that a personal representative was formally substituted for her(see generally CPLR 1015 [a]; 1021), the action survives as to the otherdefendants because the three took title to the turnaround as tenants in common(see EPTL 6-2.2 [a]). Accordingly, the action "can proceed without a substitutionwith the death simply being noted on the record" (Bova v Vinciguerra, 139 AD2d797, 799 [1988]; accordAdamec v Mueller, 94 AD3d 1212, 1213 n 2 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d856 [2013]; see CPLR 1015 [b]).
Footnote 2:This Court thereaftergranted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Richard Martin's appeal as a result of his default.However, the undisputed record establishes that defendant and Richard Martin own thereal property at issue as tenants in common (see n 1, supra) and, therefore,any determination regarding the rights or obligations associated with such real propertyalso affect him.