| Matter of Kindred v Monroe County |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05069 [119 AD3d 1347] |
| July 3, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| 1 In the Matter of Dennis H. Kindred et al., Appellants,v Monroe County et al., Respondents. |
Bansbach Zoghlin P.C., Rochester (Mindy L. Zoghlin of counsel), forpetitioners-plaintiffs-appellants.
Merideth H. Smith, County Attorney, Rochester (Mallorie C. Rulison of counsel), forrespondent-defendant-respondent Monroe County.
Harter Secrest & Emery LLP, Rochester (Megan K. Dorritie of counsel), forrespondent-defendant-respondent Monroe County Fair and Recreation Association,Inc.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated judgment/order) of the Supreme Court,Monroe County (Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered July 10, 2013 in a CPLR article 78proceeding and declaratory judgment action. The judgment dismissed thepetition/complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmedwithout costs.
Memorandum: Petitioners-plaintiffs (petitioners) commenced this hybrid CPLRarticle 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, to annul thedetermination of respondent-defendant Monroe County to permit respondent-defendantMonroe County Fair and Recreation Association, Inc. to operate a four-day agriculturalfestival in a County-owned park and to vacate the County's negative declaration issuedwith respect thereto under the State Environmental Quality Review Act ([SEQRA] ECLart 8). Petitioners moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctionenjoining the festival from taking place during the pendency of the litigation.Respondents-defendants (respondents) filed objections in point of law seeking dismissalof the petition/complaint on the ground, inter alia, that petitioners lacked standing.Supreme Court determined that petitioners lacked standing and dismissed thepetition/complaint. We affirm.
Where, as here, the proceeding does not involve a "zoning-related issue. . . , there is no presumption of standing to raise a SEQRA challenge" basedsolely on a party's proximity (Matter of Save Our Main St. Bldgs. v Greene CountyLegislature, 293 AD2d 907, 908 [2002], lv denied [*2]98 NY2d 609 [2002]; see Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post, 115 AD3d1310, 1311 [2014]; Matterof Rent Stabilization Assn. of N.Y.C., Inc. v Miller, 15 AD3d 194, 194-195[2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 709 [2005]). In such a situation, parties seeking toestablish standing must establish that the injury of which they complain "falls within the'zone of interests,' or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected" (Society ofPlastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 773 [1991]), and that they "wouldsuffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large"(id. at 774; see Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency,76 NY2d 428, 433 [1990]). Contrary to petitioners' contention, we conclude that thecourt properly determined that the environmental effects relied on by each petitioner toestablish his or her standing are no different in either kind or degree from that sufferedby the general public (seeMatter of Powers v De Groodt, 43 AD3d 509, 513 [2007]; Matter of Many vVillage of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218 AD2d 845, 845 [1995]). We furtherconclude that the alleged environmentally related injuries are too speculative andconjectural to demonstrate an actual and specific injury-in-fact (see Matter of NewYork Propane Gas Assn. v New York State Dept. of State, 17 AD3d 915,916 [2005]). Thus, the court did not err in concluding that none of the petitioners hasstanding (see Sierra Club, 115 AD3d at 1312-1313; Save Our Main St.Bldgs., 293 AD2d at 908-909). Present—Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Carni,Valentino and Whalen, JJ.