| Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05225 [119 AD3d 1107] |
| July 10, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 In the Matter of Richard Rivera, Appellant, v NewYork State Division of Parole, Respondent. |
Richard Rivera, Dannemora, appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), forrespondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ellis, J.), entered June 18,2013 in Clinton County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denyingpetitioner's request for parole release.
In 1981 and 1982, petitioner was convicted of a number of crimes, the most seriousof which was murder in the second degree arising from his fatal shooting of an off dutypolice officer, for which he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison (People vRivera, 171 AD2d 708 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 957 [1991]). InSeptember 2012, he made his second appearance before the Board of Parole seeking tobe released to parole supervision. The Board denied his request and ordered him held foran additional 24 months. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal and, when it was notdecided within four months, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Followingservice of respondent's answer, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appealensued.
Initially, petitioner contends that the Board failed to comply with the statutorymandate included in recent amendments to the Correction Law requiring thedevelopment of a transitional accountability plan (hereinafter TAP) for inmates in prison,as is set forth in the newly enacted Correction Law § 71-a (see L2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 16-a).The statute [*2]requires the Department of Correctionsand Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS) to devise an individualized TAP foreach inmate "[u]pon admission" to prison based on his or her "programming andtreatment needs" for the purpose of "promot[ing] the rehabilitation of the inmate and [hisor her] successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society upon release"(Correction Law § 71-a [emphasis added]; see Mark Bonacquist,2011 Supp Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 10B, CorrectionLaw § 71-a, 2014 Supp Pamph at 59-60). The language of the statuteclearly applies only to newly admitted prisoners and is prospective in nature. Indeed,inasmuch as the Legislature explicitly postponed the effective date for the newly enactedCorrection Law § 71-a until six months after passage (see L 2011,ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, §§ 16-a,49 [h]), " 'the Legislature evinced its intent that the provision only be appliedprospectively' " (Matterof McCaskell v Evans, 108 AD3d 926, 927 [2013], quoting Matter of Davidson v Evans,104 AD3d 1046, 1046 [2013]; see Matter of Mulligan v Murphy, 14 NY2d223, 226 [1964]; People v Sutton, 199 AD2d 878, 879 [1993]).
Notably, Correction Law § 71-a specifically directs DOCCS, not theBoard, to develop a TAP to facilitate an inmate's eventual transition back into society.The Board is then expected to utilize the TAP, "where available," as part of its evaluationin determining an inmate's suitability for parole release (Matter of Montane v Evans,116 AD3d 197, 203 [2014], lv granted 23 NY3d 903 [2014]). Here,petitioner was admitted to prison some 30 years before the statutory provision tookeffect, and DOCCS did not prepare, nor does the statute require the preparation of, anindividualized TAP for him that the Board could consider in making its determination.The Board nevertheless undertook a risk and needs assessment of petitioner by utilizing aCOMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument (see Executive Law§ 259-c [4]). Accordingly, we reject petitioner's claim that the Board failedto comply with the new statutory requirement.
Petitioner further asserts that he should have been released to parole supervisionbased upon the COMPAS instrument because it indicated that he was at a low risk toreoffend. The COMPAS instrument, however, is only one factor that the Board wasrequired to consider in evaluating petitioner's request (see Executive Law§§ 259-c [4]; 259-i [2] [c] [A]; see also Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 1259[2014]; Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 AD3d at 203). The record discloses thatthe Board considered the other relevant statutory factors, including the nature ofpetitioner's crimes, his criminal history, his prison disciplinary record, his programaccomplishments and his postrelease plans (see Executive Law§ 259-i [2] [c] [A]; Matter of Martinez v Evans, 108 AD3d 815, 816 [2013];Matter of Campbell vEvans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1364 [2013]) and, notwithstanding the favorableCOMPAS instrument, its decision does not reflect " 'irrationality bordering onimpropriety' " (Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d at 1259, quotingMatter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). Wehave considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be lacking inmerit.
Lahtinen, J.P., Stein, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.