Matter of Cheryl Z. v Carrion
2014 NY Slip Op 05226 [119 AD3d 1109]
July 10, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 27, 2014


[*1]
1 In the Matter of Cheryl Z., Petitioner, v GladysCarrion, as Commissioner of Children and Family Services, Respondent, et al.,Respondent.

William E. Montgomery III, Glens Falls, for petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), forGladys Carrion, respondent.

McCarthy, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination ofrespondent Commissioner of Children and Family Services which denied petitioner'sapplication to have a report maintained by the Central Register of Child Abuse andMaltreatment amended to be unfounded and expunged.

After petitioner called law enforcement because her grandchild, who was two yearsand four months old, had wandered away from her front yard, police officers respondedto the vicinity of petitioner's home and, shortly thereafter, found the child unharmed andby himself near a parking lot approximately 200 yards from the home. Following aninvestigation, a report was indicated against petitioner for maltreatment of the child.Petitioner thereafter requested that the Office of Children and Family Services amend thereport to unfounded and, upon a denial of her request, an administrative hearing was heldpursuant to Social Services Law § 422 (8). At the conclusion of thathearing, the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) sustained the finding ofmaltreatment and denied petitioner's request to amend and expunge the indicated [*2]report. Petitioner then commenced this proceeding.

Substantial evidence supports the finding of maltreatment. In order to establishmaltreatment, the agency was required "to demonstrate by a fair preponderance of theevidence that 'the child's physical, mental or emotional condition ha[d] been impaired or[was] in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the [caregiver's] failure toexercise a minimum degree of care' " in providing the child with appropriatesupervision (Matter of Anne FF.v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 85 AD3d 1289,1290-1291 [2011], quoting Matter of Tonette E. v New York State Off. of Children &Family Servs., 25 AD3d 994, 995 [2006]; see 18 NYCRR 432.1 [b] [1][ii]). Upon review of such an administrative determination, "this Court's inquiry islimited to whether the decision is rational and supported by substantial evidence"(Matter of Kenneth VV. v Wing, 235 AD2d 1007, 1008 [1997]; see Matter ofGerald G. v State of N.Y. Dept. of Social Servs., 248 AD2d 918, 919 [1998]). Adetermination is supported by substantial evidence "when reasonable minds couldadequately accept the conclusion or ultimate fact based on the relevant proof" (Matterof Kenneth VV. v Wing, 235 AD2d at 1008; accord Matter of Steven A. v NewYork State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 307 AD2d 434, 435 [2003]).

The parties do not dispute that, on the day in question, the child left the front yardwhile under petitioner's care. Although petitioner's home is at the end of a dead-endstreet, testimony by respondent Michelle Kelley, a caseworker for the Saratoga CountyDepartment of Social Services, and photographs introduced into evidence establishedthat the home also faces a four-lane divided highway with a speed limit ranging from 45to 55 miles per hour. Notably, the same evidence showed that there is no fence, or anysimilar physical barrier, directly between petitioner's front yard and this highway.Further, according to Kelley's testimony, a police officer who responded to petitioner'srequest for assistance in locating the child reported that petitioner stated that the child leftthe front yard during a time when petitioner had briefly gone inside the home, leaving thechild alone in the front yard. Although petitioner testified that she did not tell the policeofficer that she went inside the home and further testified that she did not in fact do so,the ALJ explicitly credited Kelley's testimony and discredited petitioner's testimony, andthere is no reason in the record to reject that credibility determination (see Matter of Stephen C. vJohnson, 39 AD3d 932, 933-934 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 804 [2007];Matter of Jeannette LL. vJohnson, 2 AD3d 1261, 1263 [2003]). Finally, petitioner's own testimonyestablished that, at the time of the incident, she had known of a previous occasion uponwhich the child had wandered away from a supervising adult, also prompting lawenforcement involvement. Given the child's young age, his known history of wanderingaway from supervising adults and the close proximity and accessability of a dangerousroadway, and crediting the testimony that petitioner left the child unattended while shewent indoors for a period of time long enough for him to wander from sight, substantialevidence exists to support the determination (see Matter of Archer v Carrion, 117 AD3d 733, 734[2014]; Matter of Susan XX. vTioga County Dept. of Social Servs., 74 AD3d 1543, 1544-1545 [2010];Matter of Stephen C. v Johnson, 39 AD3d at 933-934; Matter of Ribya BB. vWing, 243 AD2d 1013, 1013-1014 [1997]; cf. Matter of Antonio NN., 28 AD3d 826, 827-828 [2006];compare Matter of Anne FF. v New York State Off. of Children & FamilyServs., 85 AD3d at 1290-1291; Matter of Matthew WW. v Johnson, 20 AD3d 669, 671[2005]).

Petitioner's contentions regarding certain evidentiary admissions and the ALJ'squestioning of her are also without merit. Generally, this Court will annul anadministrative determination based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling "[o]nly in theevent that [such a] ruling renders the entire proceeding fundamentally unfair" (Matterof Sunnen v Administrative Rev. Bd. [*3]for ProfessionalMed. Conduct, 244 AD2d 790, 792 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 802 [1998];see Matter of Gonzalez v New York State Dept. of Health, 232 AD2d 886, 889[1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 801 [1997]). Petitioner's various claims that the ALJshould not have admitted hearsay evidence are unavailing because the record reveals thatthe hearsay admitted was sufficiently relevant and probative to the maltreatment inquiryand was not unduly prejudicial (see Matter of Bullock v State of N.Y. Dept. of SocialServs., 248 AD2d 380, 382 [1998]; Matter of Ribya BB. v Wing, 243 AD2dat 1014). In addition, contrary to petitioner's arguments regarding the admission of policereports that post-dated the incident at issue, the ALJ determined that such reports wereinadmissible. Finally, any error in regard to the admission of a map that may haveinaccurately represented the path that the child traveled was not so egregious as to renderthe entire proceeding unfair, especially given the ample cross-examination on that pointby petitioner's counsel (seeMatter of Rigle v Daines, 78 AD3d 1249, 1251 [2010], appeal dismissed16 NY3d 825 [2011]). Further, the ALJ's clarifying questions and instructions directed atpetitioner during her testimony do not support the argument that the ALJ was biased(see Matter of Taylor v Selsky, 242 AD2d 772, 772-773 [1997]) or that theadministrative decision flowed from any alleged bias (see Matter of Harvey v Bradt,81 AD3d 1003, 1004 [2011]; Matter of Parra v Fischer, 76 AD3d 724, 725 [2010], lvdenied 15 NY3d 714 [2010]).

Stein, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.


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