| People v Miranda |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05262 [119 AD3d 1421] |
| July 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| 1 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vReynaldo D. Miranda, Appellant. |
Erickson Webb Scolton & Hajdu, Lakewood (Lyle T. Hajdu of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Reynaldo D. Miranda, defendant-appellant pro se.
David W. Foley, District Attorney, Mayville (Laurie M. Beckerink of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Chautauqua County Court (John T. Ward, J.),rendered March 19, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofcriminal mischief in the third degree (two counts), criminal mischief in the fourth degree,resisting arrest and unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the thirddegree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a juryverdict of, inter alia, two counts of criminal mischief in the third degree (Penal Law§ 145.05 [2]). The charges arose from an incident in which defendant ledofficers of the Fredonia and Dunkirk Police Departments on a highspeed car chase andthen crashed his vehicle into a utility pole. Defendant was apprehended after fleeing thescene of the crash on foot, and he then damaged the windows of two police cars bykicking them after he was arrested and placed in one police vehicle and then in another.Defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction ofboth counts of criminal mischief because the People failed to establish with respect toeach count that the property damage exceeded $250. We reject that contention. ThePeople presented the testimony of a witness who repaired the damage to the Fredoniapolice car at a cost of $1,178.09, and who testified that his estimate was based on his 25years of experience in auto collision work (see People v Butler, 70 AD3d 1509, 1509 [2010], lvdenied 14 NY3d 886 [2010]; People v Detwiler, 187 AD2d 973, 974 [1992],lv denied 81 NY2d 787 [1993]). The People also presented the testimony of amechanic employed by the city of Dunkirk, who repaired the damage to the Dunkirkpolice car with an existing part, and who testified that he had previously purchased thepart in his capacity as a city mechanic at a cost of $612.45 (see Butler, 70 AD3dat 1509; see also People v Mu-Min, 172 AD2d 1022, 1022 [1991], lv denied78 NY2d 924 [1991]). Moreover, viewing the evidence in light of the elements ofthe crime of criminal mischief in the third degree as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of theevidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Welikewise reject defendant's challenge to the severity of the sentence.
[*2] Defendant's remaining contentions are raised in his prose supplemental brief. Because, as we have determined, the conviction is supported bylegally sufficient evidence at trial, defendant's contention concerning the allegedinsufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury is not reviewable on appeal(see CPL 210.30 [6]; People v Freeman, 38 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2007], lvdenied 9 NY3d 875 [2007], reconsideration denied 10 NY3d 811 [2008]).Defendant's further contention that the grand jury proceeding was defective isunpreserved for our review (seePeople v Shol, 100 AD3d 1461, 1462 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1103[2013]), and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in theinterest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We reject defendant's contention thatCounty Court erred in denying defendant's CPL 30.30 motion inasmuch as "the Peopledeclared their readiness for trial . . . well within the six-month limit" (People v Sweet, 98 AD3d1252, 1253 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1015 [2013]). Also contrary todefendant's contention, he was not prejudiced by the People's failure to preserve his caror its broken taillight as evidence that the initial stop of his vehicle by the police waslawful (see generally People vBernard, 100 AD3d 916, 917 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1096 [2013])."Assuming, arguendo, that the police illegally attempted to stop defendant's vehicle inthe first instance, any taint resulting from such a stop was dissipated by defendant'sindependent and calculated act of speeding away from the police, causing an accidentand fleeing on foot" (People vDennis, 31 AD3d 810, 811 [2006]; see People ex rel. Gonzalez v Warden ofAnna M. Cross Ctr., 79 NY2d 892, 894-895 [1992]).
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions in his pro se supplementalbrief and conclude that none requires reversal or modification of the judgment.Present—Centra, J.P., Lindley, Sconiers, Valentino and DeJoseph, JJ.