| Amador v City of New York |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05758 [120 AD3d 526] |
| August 13, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Martin Amador, Respondent, v City of NewYork et al., Appellants. |
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Marta Ross and Sullivan& Cromwell LLP [David B. Tulchin, Joshua D. Glickman, and John G. McCarthy],of counsel), for appellants.
Tiger & Daguanno, LLP, East Meadow, N.Y. (James D. Castelli of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated August 21, 2012,which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion isdenied.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when a vehicle he was driving wasstruck in the rear by a vehicle owned by the defendants City of New York and New YorkCity Department of Sanitation (hereinafter together the municipal defendants) andoperated by the defendant Joseph R. Esposito, Jr. The plaintiff commenced this actionagainst the municipal defendants and Esposito to recover damages for his personalinjuries. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and theSupreme Court granted the motion.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie caseof negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring thatoperator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation forthe collision (see Raimondo vPlunkitt, 102 AD3d 851, 852 [2013]; Kertesz v Jason Transp. Corp., 102 AD3d 658 [2013])."One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision is a sudden stop of thelead vehicle" (Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235, 237 [2003]; see Ramos v TC Paratransit, 96AD3d 924 [2012]; Vargasv Luxury Family Corp., 77 AD3d 820 [2010]; Foti v Fleetwood Ride, Inc., 57AD3d 724 [2008]). There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, andthe proponent of a summary judgment motion has the burden of establishing freedomfrom comparative fault as a matter of law (see Burnett v Reisenauer, 107 AD3d 656 [2013]; Jones v Vialva-Duke, 106AD3d 1052, 1053 [2013]).
The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment onthe issue of liability. Although the transcript of the plaintiff's General Municipal Law§ 50-h hearing testimony, which was submitted in support of the motion,demonstrated that his vehicle was struck in the rear as it was coming to a stop, thetranscript of the deposition testimony of Esposito, [*2]which the plaintiff also submitted in support of the motion,failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff was free fromcomparative fault. According to Esposito, the plaintiff's vehicle came to an abrupt stopfor no apparent reason as it was approaching an intersection with the traffic light in itsfavor (see Kertesz v JasonTransp. Corp., 102 AD3d 658 [2013]; Pollard v Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 94AD3d 845 [2012]; Harris vAuto Palace Truck Rental & Leasing, Inc., 81 AD3d 691 [2011]). Since theplaintiff failed to meet his prima facie burden, we need not review the sufficiency of thedefendants' opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64NY2d 851 [1985]). Skelos, J.P., Chambers, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur. [PriorCase History: 2012 NY Slip Op 32665(U).]