| Munion v Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05964 [120 AD3d 779] |
| August 27, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Cherise Munion, Respondent, v Trustees ofColumbia University in City of New York, Appellant. |
Braverman Greenspun, P.C. (Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. [Evan H. Krinick,Cheryl F. Korman, and Merril S. Biscone], of counsel), for appellant.
Burns & Harris, New York, N.Y. (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Siegal, J.), entered November 15, 2013,which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
On March 31, 2011, the plaintiff, an employee of nonparty TemPositions, wasworking as a coat checker at the Faculty House of Columbia University. After arriving atthe Faculty House, while walking to the coatroom, she tripped and fell over the floorsaddle located between the coat room corridor and a reception area. Shortly after theaccident, the plaintiff began receiving workers' compensation benefits under aTemPositions policy. The plaintiff commenced this action against the trustees ofColumbia University (hereinafter the defendant). The defendant moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that it was the plaintiff's specialemployer pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29 (6),and that the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law and, thus, not actionable. TheSupreme Court denied the motion. The defendant appeals.
"[T]he receipt of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy that aworker may obtain against an employer for losses suffered as a result of an injurysustained in the course of employment" (Charles v Broad St. Dev., LLC, 95 AD3d 814, 816 [2012][internal quotation marks omitted]; see Workers' Compensation Law§§ 11, 29 [6]). " 'A person may be deemed to have more thanone employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, a general employer and aspecial employer' " (Alfonso v Pacific Classon Realty, LLC, 101 AD3d 768,769 [2012], quoting Slikas vCyclone Realty, LLC, 78 AD3d 144, 150 [2010]). "A special employee is 'onewho is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another,' andlimited liability inures to the benefit of both the general and special employer" (Fung v Japan Airlines Co.,Ltd., 9 NY3d 351, 359 [2007], quoting Thompson v Grumman AerospaceCorp., 78 NY2d 553, 557 [1991]).
[*2] "[A] person's categorization as a special employee is usually a question of fact"(Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 NY2d at 557). However, "thedetermination of special employment status may be made as a matter of law where theparticular, undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue offact" (id. at 557-558). "Many factors are weighed in deciding whether a specialemployment relationship exists, and generally no single one is decisive . . .Principal factors include who has the right to control the employee's work, who isresponsible for the payment of wages and the furnishing of equipment, who has the rightto discharge the employee, and whether the work being performed was in furtherance ofthe special employer's or the general employer's business . . . The mostsignificant factor is who controls and directs the manner, details, and ultimate result ofthe employee's work" (Schrammv Cold Spring Harbor Lab., 17 AD3d 661, 662 [2005]; see Gonzalez v WoodbourneArboretum, Inc., 100 AD3d 694, 698 [2012]; Digirolomo v Goldstein, 96AD3d 992, 993-994 [2012]).
"The receipt of Workers' Compensation benefits from a general employer precludesan employee from commencing a negligence action against a special employer" (Pena v Automatic Data Processing,Inc., 105 AD3d 924, 924 [2013]; see Hofweber v Soros, 57 AD3d 848, 849 [2008]).
The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawdismissing the complaint. The defendant submitted the affidavit of an attorney employedby the New York State Insurance Fund, who averred that the plaintiff had been receivingWorkers' Compensation benefits under a TemPositions policy since April 8, 2011, thusestablishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff received Workers' Compensation benefitsfrom her general employer. The defendant further demonstrated, through the depositiontestimony and affidavit of the general manager of the Faculty House and the affidavit ofTemPositions' chief executive officer, that the defendant controlled and directed themanner, details, and ultimate result of the plaintiff's work. The defendant also had theauthority to discharge the plaintiff, and the work she performed was in furtherance of thedefendant's business (seeNavallo v R.P. Brennan Gen. Contrs., 87 AD3d 683 [2011]; Giovannucci v Petrone, 51AD3d 632 [2008]). In addition, the plaintiff, at her own deposition, the transcript ofwhich was submitted by the defendant in support of its motion, stated, inter alia, thatTemPositions told her where and to whom to report, but that the defendant's supervisorsinstructed her on her work duties. Thus, the defendant established, prima facie, that itwas the plaintiff's special employer.
In opposition to the defendant's prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise atriable issue of fact (see Navallo v R.P. Brennan Gen. Contrs., 87 AD3d at 684;Giovannucci v Petrone, 51AD3d 632 [2008]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action was barred bythe exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law, since the defendant wasthe plaintiff's special employer, and she received Workers' Compensation benefits fromher general employer.
In light of our determination, we need not address whether the defendant met itsprima facie burden of demonstrating that the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law.Mastro, J.P., Dillon, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.