| Matter of Rani Z. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05993 [120 AD3d 824] |
| August 27, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Rani Z., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnensheinand Christina Chung of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Rani Z.appeals from (1) an order of fact-finding of the Family Court, Kings County (McElrath,J.), dated March 18, 2013, made after a fact-finding hearing, finding that he committedacts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminalcontempt in the second degree, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court datedOctober 25, 2013, which, upon the order of fact-finding, inter alia, adjudged him to be ajuvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months.
Ordered that the appeal from the order of fact-finding is dismissed, without costs ordisbursements, as that order was superseded by the order of disposition and is brought upfor review on the appeal from the order of disposition; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court properly determined thatthere was probable cause for the arresting officer to take the appellant into custody, since"[t]he facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer would have warranted areasonable person, who possessed the same expertise as the officer, to conclude that acrime was being or had been committed and that the appellant committed it" (Matterof Eric C., 281 AD2d 543, 544 [2001]; see Matter of Uriah M., 107 AD3d 997, 998 [2013]).
Viewed in totality, moreover, the record shows that the appellant receivedmeaningful representation during the probable cause hearing, and there was no showingthat any of counsel's alleged deficiencies constituted anything other than a legitimate,albeit unsuccessful, strategy (seePeople v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; Matter of Dylan Mc. [Michelle M. Mc.], 105 AD3d 1049,1050 [2013]).
The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved forappellate review (see Matter ofKeir B., 115 AD3d 855 [2014]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792,793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonabledoubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would haveconstituted the crime of criminal contempt in the [*2]second degree (see Penal Law§ 215.50 [3]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Javan P., 81 AD3d 833, 834 [2011]; Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d617, 617-618 [2009]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder'sopportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (seeMatter of Javan P., 81 AD3d at 834; Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d at 618).Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-findingdeterminations were not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act§ 342.2 [2]; cf.People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Austin andDuffy, JJ., concur.