Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v New YorkState Dept. of Envtl. Conservation
2014 NY Slip Op 06090 [120 AD3d 1235]
September 10, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, October 29, 2014


[*1]
 In the Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc., et al., Respondents-Appellants,
v
New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation, Appellant-Respondent. (Appeal No. 1.) In the Matter ofNatural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York StateDepartment of Environmental Conservation, Respondent. (Appeal No.2.)

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Cecelia C. Chang andBrian A. Sutherland), for appellant-respondent in Appeal No. 1 and respondent inAppeal No. 2.

Nancy S. Marks, New York, N.Y. (Catherine Marlantes Rahm of counsel), forNatural Resources Defense Council, Inc., respondent-appellant in Appeal No. 1 andappellant in Appeal No. 2, and Reed W. Super, New York, N.Y., for Riverkeeper, Inc.,Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., Soundkeeper, Inc., Save the Sound, Peconic Baykeeper, Inc.,Raritan Baykeeper, Inc., doing business as NY/NJ Baykeeper, and HackensackRiverkeeper, Inc., respondents-appellants in Appeal No. 1 and appellant in Appeal No. 2(one brief filed).

Motion by the petitioners/plaintiffs for leave to reargue (1) appeals from an order andjudgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered January 10,2012, as amended by an order of the same court entered, upon the parties' consent, onApril 18, 2012, and (2) a separate appeal from the order of the same court entered uponthe parties' consent on April 18, 2012, which were determined by a decision and order ofthis Court dated November 13, 2013.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relationthereto, it is,

Ordered that the motion for leave to reargue is granted and, upon reargument, thedecision and order of this Court dated November 13, 2013 (Matter of Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 111 AD3d737 [2013], lv granted 23 NY3d 901 [2014]) is recalled and vacated, and thefollowing decision and order is substituted therefor:

[*2] In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 toreview a determination of the New York State Department of EnvironmentalConservation approving the issuance of state pollutant discharge elimination systemgeneral permit GP-0-10-002 for stormwater discharges from municipal separate stormsewer systems, and action for a judgment declaring that state pollutant dischargeelimination system general permit GP-0-10-002 for stormwater discharges frommunicipal separate storm sewer systems is contrary to certain state and federal laws, (1)the respondent/defendant New York State Department of Environmental Conservationappeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of theSupreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), entered January 10, 2012, asamended by an order of the same court entered, upon the parties' consent, on April 18,2012, as was in favor of the petitioners/plaintiffs and against it declaring that the generalpermit created an impermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure that smallmunicipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," asrequired by section 402 of title IV of the Federal Clean Water Act of 1972, as amendedby Pub L 100-4, § 405, 101 US Stat 7 (Water Quality Act of 1987) (33USC § 1342 [p] [3] [B] [iii]) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), and unlawfullyfailed to provide an opportunity for public hearings on proposed notices of intent beforethey were submitted to it, in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), granted those branches of the petition which were to annul itsdetermination approving the issuance of the general permit on the grounds that it wasaffected by error of law and was arbitrary and capricious to the extent that the generalpermit created an impermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure that smallmunicipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," asrequired by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), andunlawfully failed to provide an opportunity for public hearings on proposed notices ofintent before they were submitted to it, in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a)(1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), and, inter alia, in effect, directed it to issue revisions tothe general permit consistent with the disposition of the causes of action which were fora declaration that the general permit created an impermissible self-regulatory system thatfailed to ensure that small municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the"maximum extent practicable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B)(iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), and unlawfully failed to provide an opportunity for publichearings on proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to it, in violation of 33USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), and thepetitioners/plaintiffs cross-appeal, as limited by their notices of appeal and brief, from somuch of the order and judgment entered January 10, 2012, as amended by the orderentered, upon the parties' consent, on April 18, 2012, as was in favor of therespondent/defendant New York State Department of Environmental Conservation andagainst them, in effect, declaring that the general permit did not fail to ensure that smallmunicipalities complied with state water quality standards and, thus, was not in violationof ECL 17-0811 (5), did not unlawfully fail to ensure that small municipalities monitoredtheir storm water discharges and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC§ 1318 (a), and did not fail to provide for public hearings on proposedstormwater management plans and proposed watershed improvement strategies and, thus,was not in violation of 33 USC § 1251 (e), and (2) the petitioners/plaintiffsseparately appeal from the order of the same court entered upon the parties' consent onApril 18, 2012.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered April 18, 2012 is dismissed, withoutcosts or disbursements, as that order was entered upon the parties' consent, and no appeallies from an order entered on consent (see CPLR 5511; Barry v Barry, 60 AD3d882 [2009]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order and judgment entered January 10, 2012, as amended April 18,2012, is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that the order and judgment entered January 10, 2012 is reversed insofar asappealed from, on the law, those branches of the petition which were to annul thedetermination of the respondent/defendant New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation approving the issuance of the general permit on the groundsthat it was affected by error of law and was arbitrary and capricious to the extent that thegeneral permit created an impermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure thatsmall municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extentpracticable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL17-0808 (3) (c), [*3]and unlawfully failed to provide anopportunity for public hearings on proposed notices of intent before they were submittedto it, in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix),are denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for theentry of an appropriate amended judgment dismissing those portions of the proceedingand declaring, inter alia, that the general permit did not create an impermissibleself-regulatory system that failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced theirpollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," as required by 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), and did not unlawfully failto provide an opportunity for public hearings on proposed notices of intent before theywere submitted to it, as required by 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL17-0805 (1) (a) (ix); and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC §§ 1251 etseq. (hereinafter the Clean Water Act), was enacted to "restore and maintain thechemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" (33 USC§ 1251 [a]). To effectuate this purpose, the Clean Water Act established thenational pollutant discharge elimination system (hereinafter NPDES), which generallyprohibits the discharge of water pollution from point sources into surface waters, exceptin compliance with a NPDES permit issued by the Administrator of the United StatesEnvironmental Protection Agency (hereinafter the EPA) or a state pollutant dischargeelimination system (hereinafter SPDES) permit issued by an EPA-authorized stateagency (see 33 USC § 1342). The Clean Water Act, as implementedby the EPA, authorizes the issuance of individual NPDES and SPDES permits to specificindustrial pollutant dischargers or general NPDES and SPDES permits that covermultiple dischargers within a geographical area (see 40 CFR 122.2, 122.26 [c];122.28, 123.25 [a] [11]).

The Environmental Conservation Law established a SPDES permit program toensure that New York had "adequate authority to issue permits regulating the dischargeof pollutants from new or existing outlets or point sources into the waters of the state," inconformance with the Clean Water Act's rules and regulations and to participate in theNPDES created by the Clean Water Act (ECL 17-0801). On October 28, 1975, the EPAauthorized New York to issue NPDES permits through the state's SPDES program, andthe New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC)was empowered to administer the SPDES permit program pursuant to article 17, title 8,of the ECL (see Memorandum of Agreement between the State of New YorkDepartment of Environmental Conservation and the United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency, dated October 28, 1975, as renewed and amended).

In 1987, the Clean Water Act was amended to establish a framework for regulatingmunicipal and industrial storm water pollutant discharges through the NPDES andSPDES permit system (see Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub L 100-4,§ 405, 101 Stat 7 [1987] [codified at 33 USC § 1342 (p)]). Amunicipality's discharge of storm water from a "municipal separate storm sewer system"(hereinafter an MS4) was prohibited unless the municipality obtained an individualNPDES or SPDES permit or obtained coverage under a NPDES or SPDES generalpermit (see 33 USC 1342 [p] [3] [B]; 40 CFR 122.26 [a] [5]; 123.25 [a] [9], [11];122.28 [a] [2] [i]; ECL 17-0808, 70-0117 [6] [b] [i]; 6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [b] [5];750-1.4 [b]).

On April 29, 2010, the DEC issued state pollutant discharge elimination systemgeneral permit GP-0-10-002, effective May 1, 2010, for stormwater discharges fromMS4s (hereinafter the General Permit). By its own terms, the General Permit is set toexpire on April 30, 2015.

The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) commenced this hybridproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination of the DECapproving the issuance of the General Permit, and action for a judgment declaring thatthe General Permit was contrary to certain enumerated state and federal laws.

To the extent that the petitioners sought relief pursuant to CPLR article 78, the [*4]petition/complaint (hereinafter the petition), in effect,alleged that the determination approving the issuance of the General Permit "wasaffected by an error of law" (CPLR 7803 [3]) since it violated the enumerated state andfederal laws, and was arbitrary and capricious since the public hearing protocol adoptedby the DEC was based, in part, on a misinterpretation of what constitutes a "permitapplication" within the meaning of the Clean Water Act and the ECL that would triggerthe need for a public hearing. To the extent that the petitioners sought declaratory relief,the petition, in effect, sought a judgment declaring that the General Permit was contraryto each of the enumerated state and federal laws.

The petition organized the alleged violations of state and federal law into fourgeneral groups, asserting that:

(1) the General Permit failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced theirpollutant discharges to the maximum extent practicable, in violation of 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c);

(2) the General Permit failed to ensure that small municipalities complied with statewater quality standards, in violation of ECL 17-0811 (5) and ECL 17-0813;

(3) the General Permit failed to ensure that small municipalities monitored theirstorm water discharges, in violation of 33 USC § 1318 (a) and ECL17-0815 (8); and

(4) the General Permit did not provide for public participation in the permit process,in violation of 33 USC §§ 1251 (e); 1342 (a) (1) and (j) and ECL17-0805 (1) (a) (ix).

An order and judgment (one paper) was entered by the Supreme Court on January10, 2012, in favor of the petitioners and against the DEC declaring, inter alia, that theGeneral Permit created an impermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure thatsmall municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extentpracticable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL17-0808 (3) (c), and that the General Permit unlawfully failed to provide an opportunityfor a public hearing on proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to theDEC, in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a)(ix).

However, the order and judgment was in favor of the DEC and against thepetitioners declaring that the General Permit did not fail to ensure that smallmunicipalities complied with state water quality standards and, thus, was not in violationof ECL 17-0811 (5), did not fail to ensure that small municipalities monitored their stormwater discharges and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC § 1318 (a), anddid not fail to provide for public hearings on proposed stormwater management plansand proposed watershed improvement strategies and, thus, was not in violation of 33USC § 1251 (e).

In light of its determination that the general permit violated, among other things, 33USC §§ 1342 (a) (1) and (p) (3) (B) (iii); ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix) and17-0808 (3) (c), the Supreme Court also granted that branch of petition which was, ineffect, pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3) to annul the DEC's determination to approve theissuance of the General Permit on the ground that the determination was affected by errorof law. Accordingly, the court, in effect, directed the DEC to issue revisions to theGeneral Permit consistent with its determination of the causes of action for a declaratoryjudgment.

The order and judgment was subsequently amended by an order entered April 18,2012, upon the parties' consent. The substance of the amendment is not relevant to thisappeal.

The DEC appeals from so much of the order and judgment, as amended by the ordermade upon the parties' consent, as was adverse to it. The petitioners cross-appeal from,inter alia, [*5]the portions of the order and judgment,which were adverse to them.

Initially, since the parties charted a summary judgment course in addressing theseveral declaratory judgment causes of action, which present no factual disputes andinvolve only the legal interpretation of various statutes and regulations, it was notinappropriate for the Supreme Court, under the unique circumstances presented here, toreach the merits of those causes of action (see O'Hara v Del Bello, 47 NY2d 363,367-368 [1979]; Hendrickson vPhilbor Motors, Inc., 102 AD3d 251, 258-259 [2012]).

Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the General Permit did not violate 33USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) or ECL 17-0808 (3) (c). Under state andfederal law, "[p]ermits for discharges from municipal storm sewers . . . shallrequire controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable,including management practices, control techniques and system, design and engineeringmethods, and such other provisions as the Administrator or the State determinesappropriate for the control of such pollutants" (33 USC § 1342 [p] [3] [B][iii]; compare ECL 17-0808 [3] [c]).

Accordingly, the "[m]aximum extent practicable . . . is the statutorystandard that establishes the level of pollutant reductions that operators of regulatedMS4s must achieve" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754 [1999]; see 40 CFR 122.34 [a]).The "EPA has intentionally not provided a precise definition of [maximum extentpracticable] to allow maximum flexibility in MS4 permitting" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754[1999]). It has determined that "MS4s need the flexibility to optimize reductions in stormwater pollutants on a location-by-location basis" (id.). The "EPA envisions thatthis evaluative process will consider such factors as conditions of receiving waters,specific local concerns, . . . MS4 size, climate, implementation schedules,current ability to finance the program, beneficial uses of receiving water, hydrology,geology, and capacity to perform operation and maintenance" (id.).

To assist in this process, the EPA has "outline[d] six minimum control measures thatconstitute the framework for a storm water discharge control program for regulated smallMS4s that, when properly implemented, will reduce pollutants to the maximum extentpracticable" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68752 [1999]; see 40 CFR 122.34 [a]). TheEPA has determined that, in most cases, the "[p]roper implementation of the measureswill significantly improve water quality" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68753 [1999])."[H]owever, small MS4 permittees should modify their programs if and when availableinformation indicates that water quality considerations warrant greater attention orprescriptiveness in specific components of the municipal program" (id.).

"In issuing the general permit, the NPDES permitting authority" is to "establishrequirements for each of the minimum control measures" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754[1999]). The minimum control measures are to be addressed by a municipality throughthe identification of "best management practices," which are to be utilized to addresseach of the minimum control measures (see 40 CFR 122.34 [a]). "Permitstypically will require small MS4 permittees to identify in their [notices of intent] the [bestmanagement practices] to be performed and to develop the measurable goals by whichimplementation of the [best management practices] can be assessed" (64 Fed Reg 68722,68754 [1999]).

"Upon receipt of the [notice of intent] from a small MS4 operator, the NPDESpermitting authority will have the opportunity to review the [notice of intent] to verifythat the identified [best management practices] and measurable goals are consistent withthe requirement to reduce pollutants under the [maximum extent practicable] standard, toprotect water quality, and to satisfy the appropriate water quality requirements of theClean Water Act" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754 [1999]). "If necessary, the NPDESpermitting authority may ask the permittee to revise their [sic] mix of [best managementpractices], for example, to better reflect the [maximum extent practicable] pollutionreduction requirement" (id.). "If, after implementing the six minimum controlmeasures there is still water quality impairment associated with discharges from the MS4,after successive permit terms the permittee will need to expand or better tailor its [bestmanagement practices] within the scope of the six minimum control measures for eachsubsequent permit" (id.).

[*6] TheGeneral Permit at issue on this appeal is consistent with the scheme for general permitsenvisioned by the EPA, and is designed to meet the maximum extent practicable standardprescribed by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c). TheGeneral Permit requires entities seeking coverage to "develop, implement and enforce" astormwater management plan designed to address pollutants of concern and "reduce thedischarge of pollutants from the small MS4" to the maximum extent practicable, so as "toprotect water quality, and to satisfy the appropriate water quality requirements of theECL and the Clean Water Act" (see General Permit at 14, 95). A stormwatermanagement plan must, inter alia, identify and describe the chosen best managementpractices and include measurable goals for each such practice (see General Permitat 95). The General Permit provides applicants with resources, including examples ofsuccessful stormwater management plans, a "menu" of best management practices, andsuggested measurable goals (see General Permit at 95).

It is noted in the General Permit that "[i]f a covered entity chooses only a few of theleast expensive methods, it is likely that [the maximum extent practicable standard] hasnot been met" (General Permit at 91). "On the other hand, if a covered entity employs allapplicable [best management practices] except those where it can be shown that they arenot technically feasible in the locality, or whose cost would exceed any benefit to bederived, it would have met the standard" (General Permit at 91). The maximum extentpracticable standard requires covered entities to choose effective best managementpractices, and to reject applicable best management practices only where other effectivebest management practices that could be used to eliminate or control the discharge ofpollutants will serve the same purpose, the best management practices would not betechnically feasible, or the cost would be prohibitive (see General Permit at91).

The petitioners nevertheless argued, and the Supreme Court concluded, that theGeneral Permit creates a self-regulatory system that does not ensure that entitiesoperating under the General Permit have satisfied the maximum extent practicablestandard articulated in 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3)(c). Specifically, the petitioners contended that the General Permit does not require anyreview of the notices of intent submitted by municipalities seeking coverage so as toensure that the selected best management practices do, in fact, represent measures thatwill reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable (seeEnvironmental Defense Ctr., Inc. v United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 344 F3d832 [9th Cir 2003]; see also Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v United States Envtl.Protection Agency, 399 F3d 486 [2d Cir 2005]).

Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the General Permit does include a variety ofenforcement measures that are sufficient to comply with the maximum extent practicablestandard, as described in state and federal statutes (see 33 USC§ 1342 [p] [3] [B] [iii]; ECL 17-0808 [3] [c]).

In order to come within the ambit of the General Permit, a municipality must submita "complete and accurate" notice of intent (General Permit at 8). The public must begiven notice of each notice of intent that is submitted to the DEC, and public commentsare received for a minimum of 28 days thereafter (see General Permit at 8). "Afterthe public comment period has expired, the [DEC] may extend the public commentperiod, require submission of an application for an individual SPDES permit oralternative SPDES general permit, or accept the [notice of intent] or [stormwatermanagement program] as complete" (General Permit at 8). Operators who submit acomplete notice of intent in accordance with the requirements of the General Permit areauthorized to discharge stormwater from small MS4s, under the terms and conditions ofthe General Permit, "upon written notification from the [DEC] that a complete [notice ofintent] has been received" (General Permit at 9).

DEC regulations further provide that "[p]ermits may include and the permittee shallcomply with such other terms, provisions, requirements or conditions as may benecessary to meet the requirements of ECL Article 17 and 40 CFR 122 . . .including but not limited to requirements to implement best management practices plans"(6 NYCRR 750-1.14 [f]). Morover "[g]eneral permits may be issued, modified, andreissued, or terminated" by the DEC (6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [d]). In addition, the DEC"may require any discharger authorized to discharge in accordance with a general permitto apply for and obtain an individual SPDES permit or apply for authorization to [*7]discharge in accordance with another general permit"where, inter alia, "[t]he discharger is not in compliance with the conditions of the generalpermit" (6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [e] [1] [i]).

Under the General Permit itself and state implementing regulations in general, theDEC is vested with sufficient authority to enforce the statutory mandates of 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c) to reduce pollutiondischarge to the maximum extent practicable. Although the General Permit allows amunicipality to identify and develop the best management practices it will utilize in lightof the particular circumstances facing it, the ultimate determination of whether thatmunicipality's discharges are covered by the General Permit lies with the DEC, sincecoverage is not afforded until the DEC accepts the notice of intent or stormwatermanagement plan as complete, and issues written notification (see General Permitat 8-9). The DEC may refuse to accept a notice of intent that fails to set forth bestmanagement practices adequately addressing the six required minimum control measuresor otherwise failing to comply with the maximum extent practicable standard (seeGeneral Permit at 14, 95). Even after a notice of intent has been accepted as complete,the DEC may modify the General Permit or require an entity covered under the GeneralPermit to apply for a special individual permit on the ground that the entity has failed toreduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable (6 NYCRR750-1.21 [e] [1] [i]).

The petitioners have not demonstrated, nor have they even asserted, that thepermitting scheme implemented through the General Permit necessarily results incoverage of municipalities whose stormwater management plans do not meet themaximum extent practicable standard. Indeed, the petitioners have not demonstrated asingle instance where the General Permit has authorized discharges of pollutants incontravention of the maximum extent practicable standard.

The petitioners' argument that the entire permitting scheme is flawed constitutes asystemic challenge to the General Permit. The DEC adequately rebutted this allegation byestablishing that it had the power to review the best management practices enumerated ina municipality's notice of intent and to reject a municipality's stormwater managementplan by exercising its power to reject a notice of intent as incomplete. The determinationof the DEC to exercise its authority to require compliance with the maximum extentpracticable standard in any particular case must necessarily be evaluated with referenceto the particular circumstances of that case, since a determination of what constitutes themaximum extent practicable will vary depending on the circumstances facing eachmunicipality. Since the petitioners have not challenged the DEC's assessment of anyparticular stormwater management plan on the ground that it does not comply with themaximum extent practicable standard, such issues are not before this Court.

Since the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the General Permit violated 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) or ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), the Supreme Court shouldhave awarded judgment in favor of the DEC declaring that the general permit did notcreate an impermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure that smallmunicipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," asrequired by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c).Furthermore, the court erred to the extent that it relied on alleged violations of 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) or ECL 17-0808 (3) (c) in annulling the DEC'sdetermination approving the issuance of the General Permit on the ground that it wasaffected by error of law.

We disagree with the Supreme Court's determination that the General Permit wasissued in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix).Congress did not explicitly define "permit application" to refer only to applicationssubmitted for an individual permit or to notices of intent submitted to obtain coverageunder an existing general permit (see Texas Ind. Producers & Royalty OwnersAssn. v Environmental Protection Agency, 410 F3d 964, 978 [2005]). Accordingly,unless the DEC's interpretation of "permit application" is arbitrary and capricious, it isentitled to deference in this regard (see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Inc., 467 US 837, 843 [1984]; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town ofSoutheast, 9 NY3d 219, 232 [2007]; Matter of 427 W. 51st St. Owners Corp. v Division of Hous. &Community Renewal, 3 NY3d 337, 342 [2004]). It was not arbitrary andcapricious for the DEC to limit the opportunity for public hearings to those situations inwhich a new general permit is proposed or an [*8]existing general permit is renewed, since any modificationsto a draft general permit resulting from public comment and hearings will extend to allcovered entities (see Texas Ind. Producers & Royalty Owners Assn. vEnvironmental Protection Agency, 410 F3d at 978). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtshould have awarded judgment in favor of the DEC declaring that the General Permit didnot unlawfully fail to provide an opportunity for a public hearing on proposed notices ofintent before they were submitted to the DEC and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC§ 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix). Furthermore, the court erred tothe extent that it relied on alleged violations of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) orECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix) in annulling the DEC's determination to approve the issuance ofthe General Permit on the grounds that it was affected by error of law or was arbitraryand capricious.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the General Permit does not fail to ensurecompliance with State water quality standards (see ECL 17-0811 [5]; 17-0813).Federal law requires the EPA and the States to develop water quality standards forinterstate and intrastate waters, respectively (see 33 USC § 1313 [a];Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Fox, 909 F Supp 153, 156 [1995]),and allows the EPA and States discretion in the development of a program to meet thosestandards (see 33 USC § 1313 [e]). Moreover, although Congressspecifically provided that permits issued to industrial dischargers must be conditioned oncompliance with effluent limitations set forth in 33 USC § 1311 (see33 USC § 1342 [p] [3] [A]; Defenders of Wildlife v Browner, 191F3d 1159, 1164-1165, amended on other grounds 197 F3d 1035 [1999]), itspecifically provided that permits for municipal dischargers with respect tomunicipal storm sewers "shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to themaximum extent practicable" (33 USC § 1342 [p] [3] [B] [iii]), withoutreference to any numerical limitation established under the Clean Water Act inconnection with any particular effluent. Accordingly, with respect to the municipaldischargers covered under the General Permit, Congress, rather than imposing specificeffluent limitations, vested the EPA and the States with discretion in imposing pollutioncontrols sufficient to meet water quality standards which could, but are not required to,incorporate effluent limitations. Thus, the provisions of the General Permit challenged bythe petitioners in their cross appeal with respect to effluent limitations and water qualitystandards are not contrary to law (see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Inc., 467 US at 843; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd.of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d at 232; Matter of 427 W. 51st St. Owners Corp. vDivision of Hous. & Community Renewal, 3 NY3d at 342; ParamountCommunications v Gibraltar Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 507, 513-514 [1997]).

Furthermore, Congress did not specifically address the nature or extent of the publicparticipation that is required for the establishment of any effluent limitations that theEPA or the States, in the exercise of their discretion, seek to promulgate (see 33USC § 1251 [e]). The DEC's determination to provide for publicparticipation in the establishment of effluent limitations at the general permit issuanceand renewal stages, but not after the issuance of the general permit, is not contrary to 33USC § 1251 (e) (see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, Inc., 467 US at 843; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. ofTown of Southeast, 9 NY3d at 232; Matter of 427 W. 51st St. Owners Corp. vDivision of Hous. & Community Renewal, 3 NY3d at 342; ParamountCommunications v Gibraltar Cas. Co., 90 NY2d at 513-514).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, those branches of the petition which were to annul the determination ofthe respondent/defendant New York State Department of Environmental Conservationapproving the issuance of the General Permit on the grounds that it was affected by errorof law and was arbitrary and capricious to the extent that the General Permit created animpermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure that small municipalitiesreduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," as required by 33USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), and unlawfully failedto provide an opportunity for public hearings on proposed notices of intent before theywere submitted to it, in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), should have been denied, and judgment should have been awardedto the DEC declaring that the General Permit did not create an impermissibleself-regulatory system that failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced theirpollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," as required [*9]by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL17-0808 (3) (c), and did not unlawfully fail to provide an opportunity for public hearingson proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to it, as required by 33 USC§ 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Austinand Miller, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 35 Misc 3d 652.]


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