| People v Delvillartron |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 06327 [120 AD3d 1429] |
| September 24, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Angel Delvillartron, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Casey Rose Scott and Leila Hull of counsel), forappellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, EllenC. Abbot, and Danielle S. Fenn of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Zayas, J.), rendered June 18, 2012, convicting him of burglary in the second degree andcriminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review an order of the same court (Kohm,J.), dated March 15, 2011, which, upon reargument, adhered to a prior determination inan order of the dated January 7, 2011, denying, after a hearing (Cooperman, J.H.O.), thatbranch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to lawenforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in theinterest of justice, upon reargument, that branch of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials is granted, the count ofthe indictment charging the defendant with criminal possession of stolen property in thethird degree is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, QueensCounty, for further proceedings on the count of the indictment charging the defendantwith burglary in the second degree.
We agree with the defendant that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove hisguilt of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (see People vSpencer, 257 AD2d 638, 638 [1999]; cf. People v Fecunda, 150 AD2d 600,601 [1989]). There was no evidence supporting a conclusion that the defendant everpossessed the stolen property himself or acted in concert with the codefendants KennethMyers and Kevin Santos in their possession of the stolen property. Although thedefendant's claim as to this count is unpreserved for appellate review, we reach it in theexercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; People v Curry, 101 AD3d743, 744 [2012]).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove hisguilt of burglary in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (seeCPL 470.05 [2]; People vHawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v Pitre, 108 AD3d 643, 643 [2013]; People v Cabrera, 85 AD3d942, 942 [2011]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable tothe prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that itwas legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of that crime (see People v Bacote, 107AD3d 641, 641 [2013]; People v Horsey, 304 AD2d 852, 853-854 [2003];[*2]People v Anaya, 206 AD2d 380, 381 [1994];People v Poppel, 143 AD2d 854 [1988]; cf. People v Taylor, 141 AD2d581, 581-582 [1988]). Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence(see People v Delamota, 18NY3d 107, 116-117 [2011]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d240, 241 [2007]).
Despite the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the conviction of burglary in thesecond degree, reversal of the defendant's conviction on that count is required, because,upon reargument, the court should have granted that branch of the defendant's omnibusmotion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. The hearingtestimony established that at approximately 8:00 a.m. on June 10, 2009, the policereceived a radio transmission regarding a robbery in progress, perpetrated by two blackmales, at a Queens residence. The police activated their sirens and lights and went to thespecified house, arriving within two minutes of receiving the transmission. When thepolice arrived, two of the complainants, still gagged and partially bound, were on theporch of the house. The complainants used gestures to direct the officers' attention to twomen, Myers and Santos, who were walking on the sidewalk, about four houses away.Myers and Santos, who were the only civilians on the block, started running, and theofficers chased them. During the chase, Santos discarded an object, which the police laterrecovered and found to be a gun. When Myers and Santos turned a corner several blocksfrom the complainants' house, the officers lost sight of them briefly. When one of theofficers turned the corner, he did not see any people, but saw the rear passenger door on asport utility vehicle being closed. The vehicle was legally parked and the engine was off.The officer ran to the vehicle and peered inside through the tinted windows. Afterspotting Myers and Santos in the rear passenger seat, the officer "punched" the driver'sside window to alert the driver not to drive away. The officer pulled the driver's dooropen and saw the defendant in the driver's seat, "fumbling" with the keys and trying toput them in the ignition. The officer pulled the defendant out of the car, placed himface-down on the ground, and handcuffed him. Eventually, the defendant was placed in apolice car. At some point, one of the complainants, who had arrived at the scene of thearrest, happened to look into the police car and recognized the defendant as anacquaintance of his girlfriend. The defendant was later taken to the precinct, where, afterbeing advised of his rights, he made inculpatory statements.
The judicial hearing officer (hereinafter the JHO) recommended denial of thedefendant's motion to suppress his statements under Dunaway v New York (442US 200 [1979]). The JHO concluded that, under the circumstances, the police hadreasonable suspicion to forcibly detain the defendant and conduct a brief investigation.Further, the JHO concluded that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendantwhen he was recognized by one of the complainants as an acquaintance of his girlfriend.The Supreme Court adopted the JHO's findings of fact and conclusions of law, anddenied suppression. The defendant moved for leave to reargue his motion, and theSupreme Court granted reargument, but adhered to its initial determination.
The evidence at the suppression hearing established that, under the circumstances,the police had probable cause to arrest Myers and Santos when the complainants pointedat them upon the arrival of the police (see People v Collado, 169 AD2d 531,531-532 [1991]). Additionally, based on the presence of Myers and Santos in thedefendant's car after those two men fled, the police reasonably suspected that thedefendant was involved in the crime as a getaway driver (see People v Sanchez,216 AD2d 207, 207 [1995]; People v Gianfrate, 192 AD2d 970, 971 [1993]).Given this reasonable suspicion, the police were permitted to forcibly stop the defendantand detain him briefly for investigative purposes (see People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499 [2006]), butthey did not have probable cause to arrest him at that juncture (see People v Shulman, 6 NY3d1, 25-26 [2005]). When the police first encountered the defendant, he was sitting inthe driver's seat of a lawfully parked car with the engine off and the keys not in theignition, a full avenue away from, and not within sight of, the complainants' house. Thedefendant did not resist the police in any way and there was no evidence that heattempted or intended to evade them. The fact that the defendant fumbled with his keysin trying to place them in the ignition did not elevate reasonable suspicion to probablecause, because that behavior was innocuous. Under the circumstances known to thepolice at that point, it was just as likely that the defendant was not complicit in Myers'sand Santos's criminal activity as that he was a getaway driver (see People v Vandover, 20NY3d 235, 237 [2012]; People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]; People v Cash J.Y., 60 AD3d1487, 1488-1489 [2009]; People v Wade, 143 AD2d 703, 705 [1988]; cf.[*3]People v Bernier, 245 AD2d 137, 137[1997]).
The hearing record established, however, that even if the defendant was not underarrest when he was first taken out of his car and handcuffed, he was certainly under arrestby the time the police transferred him to a police car (see People v Brnja, 50NY2d 366, 372 [1980]; People v Hairston, 117 AD2d 618, 620 [1986]). Sincethat arrest was not supported by probable cause, the resulting inculpatory statements atthe precinct should have been suppressed. Moreover, inasmuch as the evidence of thedefendant's guilt without regard to his inculpatory statements was not overwhelming,there is no basis for consideration of the harmless error doctrine (see People vCrimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]).
The People's remaining contention is without merit.
We need not address the defendant's remaining contentions, which have beenrendered academic in light of our determination. Balkin, J.P., Austin and Barros, JJ.,concur.
LaSalle, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and votes to modify the judgmentwith the following memorandum: I agree with majority to the extent that they hold thatthe evidence was legally insufficient to prove the defendant's guilt of criminal possessionof stolen property in the third degree. However, I respectfully dissent, and vote to modifythe judgment, because I conclude that the police officer had probable cause to arrest thedefendant for the crime of burglary in the second degree.
The events leading to the defendant's arrest are not in substantial dispute. On June10, 2009, at approximately 8:00 a.m., the police received a radio transmission of anarmed robbery in progress at a residence, perpetrated by two black males. Police officersarrived at the location of the home invasion within minutes of the radio transmission.Upon the officers' arrival at the residence, they observed two of the complainants on theporch, still gagged and partially bound. The complainants used gestures to direct theofficers' attention to two men, later identified as Kenneth Myers and Kelvin Santos, whowere walking on the sidewalk. Myers and Santos starting running, and three of the policeofficers, including Officer Soto, chased them. During the chase, Santos discarded anobject which Officer Soto observed to be a gun when he ran past it, but Officer Soto didnot stop to retrieve the gun at that time. Myers and Santos turned a corner, and OfficerSoto lost sight of them for two to three seconds. Upon turning the corner, Officer Sotoobserved no one on the street, but saw a rear door to a vehicle being closed. Officer Sotoapproached the vehicle, and saw Myers and Santos in the back seat. Officer Sotoapproached the driver's side door, and observed the defendant fumbling with the car keysand attempting to put the key in the ignition. Officer Soto opened the driver's side door,pulled the defendant out, laid him on the ground, and handcuffed him. Myers washandcuffed by another officer. Santos started running again, but was soon apprehendedand taken into custody. The defendant was placed in the police car. Later, one of thecomplainants arrived at the scene of arrest, observed the defendant in the police car, andindicated that he recognized him as an acquaintance of his girlfriend. The defendant wassubsequently taken to the precinct where, after being advised of his rights, he madeinculpatory statements.
The issue presented in this case is whether Officer Soto had probable cause to arrestthe defendant. I disagree with the majority, and would hold that under the undisputedfacts and circumstances of the case, probable cause existed to arrest the defendant.
"Probable cause to arrest requires the existence of facts and circumstances which,when viewed as a whole, would lead a reasonable person possessing the same expertiseas the arresting officer to conclude that an offense has been or is being committed, andthat the defendant committed or is committing that offense" (People v Wright, 8 AD3d304, 306 [2004]; see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; People v Capela, 97 AD3d760, 760-761 [2012]). When determining whether a police officer has probablecause for an arrest, "the emphasis should not be narrowly focused on . . .any[*4]. . . single factor, but on anevaluation of the totality of circumstances, which takes into account the realities ofeveryday life unfolding before a trained officer who has to confront, on a daily basis,similar incidents" (People v Bothwell, 261 AD2d 232, 234 [1999] [internalquotation marks omitted]; see People v Graham, 211 AD2d 55, 58 [1995];People v Cabot, 88 AD2d 556, 557 [1982]; People v Wright, 8 AD3d at307). A determination of whether probable cause existed for an arrest is to be made "afterconsidering all of the facts and circumstances together . . . Viewed singly,these may not be persuasive, yet when viewed together the puzzle may fit and probablecause found" (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d at 423).
In this case, an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances fully supports theconclusion that probable cause existed for Officer Soto to arrest the defendant. Afterresponding to a call for an armed robbery in progress, Officer Soto and his fellowofficers found two individuals bound and gagged gesturing toward Myers and Santos,who began to flee on foot. Officer Soto observed Santos discard an object, which hemoments later observed to be a handgun. Myers and Santos then entered the rear of anearby vehicle, and Officer Soto observed the defendant fumbling with the keys,attempting to put them in the ignition.
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, in evaluating the totality of thecircumstances, I do not believe the defendant's behavior can be viewed as "innocuous."Indeed, in my view, the totality of the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonableperson possessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that thedefendant was acting in concert with Myers and Santos, in attempting to assist them toflee the scene of the home invasion (see People v Wright, 8 AD3d at 307;People v Attebery, 223 AD2d 714, 715 [1996]). Therefore, I would hold that thehearing court properly determined that there was probable cause for the defendant'sarrest, and no basis to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
Accordingly, because I conclude that there was probable cause for the defendant'sarrest, and because I determine the defendant's remaining contentions, apart from thecontention that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt of criminalpossession of stolen property in the third degree, are without merit, I would vote tomodify the judgment, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating theconviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and the sentenceimposed thereon, and to dismiss that count of the indictment.