| Paris v Ferri |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 07993 [122 AD3d 814] |
| November 19, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Dawn Paris et al., Appellants, v Louis Ferri,Respondent. |
Gruenberg Kelly Della, Ronkonkoma, N.Y. (Zachary M. Beriloff of counsel), forappellants.
Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, N.Y. (Jennifer M. Belk and Scott W. Driverof counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal froman order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Spinner, J.), dated April 2, 2013, whichgranted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff Dawn Paris (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was injuredwhen the vehicle she was driving collided with a vehicle owned and operated by thedefendant, at or near an intersection. The defendant moved for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted the motion.
A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other driver willobey traffic laws which require him or her to yield (see Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1141; Wilson vRosedom, 82 AD3d 970 [2011]; Kann v Maggies Paratransit Corp., 63 AD3d 792, 793[2009]). At the same time, a driver who has the right-of-way has a duty to exercisereasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection (see Wilson v Rosedom, 82AD3d 970 [2011]; Cox vNunez, 23 AD3d 427, 427 [2005]).
Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the defendant failed todemonstrate his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties (see LeBlanc v Skinner, 103AD3d 202, 211-212 [2012]), we find that it did not establish, prima facie, that theinjured plaintiff violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 by failing to yieldthe right of way to a vehicle "within the intersection or so close as to constitute animmediate hazard" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141), or that, if she did failto so yield, such violation was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Gause v Martinez, 91AD3d 595 [2012]; Wilsonv Rosedom, 82 AD3d 970 [2011]; Lopez v Reyes-Flores, 52 AD3d 785 [2008]). In light ofthe defendant's failure to meet his prima facie burden, we need not consider thesufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68NY2d 320 [1986]).
[*2] Accordingly, theSupreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.