| Matter of Delacruz v Annucci |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 08180 [122 AD3d 1413] |
| November 21, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Genaro Delacruz,Appellant, v Anthony Annucci, Acting Commissioner, New York StateDepartment of Corrections and Community Supervision,Respondent. |
Wyoming County-Attica Legal Aid Bureau, Warsaw (Leah R. Nowotarski ofcounsel), for petitioner-appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), forrespondent-respondent.
Appeal from a judgment or the Supreme Court, Wyoming County (Mark H. Dadd,A.J.) entered December 12, 2013 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. Thejudgment dismissed the petition.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmedwithout costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing his petition pursuant toCPLR article 78 seeking to annul the determination of the Parole Board (Board) denyinghim parole release. We agree with petitioner that his appeal is not moot inasmuch as thedetermination has not expired during the pendency of this appeal, and he has notreappeared before the Board (cf.Matter of Robles v Evans, 100 AD3d 1455, 1455 [2012]). We neverthelessreject petitioner's contention that Supreme Court erred in determining that the Boardproperly denied parole release. "It is well settled that parole release decisions arediscretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutoryrequirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i" (Matter of Gssime v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter ofJohnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]; seegenerally Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790-791[1994]). The Board is "not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors"but, rather, may "place[ ] greater emphasis on the severity of the crimes than on the otherstatutory factors" (Matter ofMacKenzie v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1614 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d815 [2012]).
We conclude that the record establishes that the Board considered the relevantfactors in determining that petitioner's release would be incompatible with the welfare ofsociety and would so deprecate the serious nature of his crimes as to undermine respectfor the law (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]), and petitionerhas made no " 'showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety' " withregard to the determination to warrant judicial intervention (Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; see Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. ofParole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; Matter of Singh v Evans, 107 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2013]).Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Board adequately set forth its reasons for denyinghis application for release (see § 259-i [2] [a] [i]; Matter of Siao-Pao vDennison, 11 NY3d 777, 778 [2008], rearg denied 11 NY3d 885[2008]). We reject petitioner's further contention that the Board failed to comply withrecent amendments to the Correction Law requiring the development of a transitionalaccountability plan for inmates (see § 71-a, L 2011, ch 62,§ 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 16-a). "Thelanguage of the statute clearly applies only to newly admitted prisoners and isprospective in nature" and, here, petitioner was admitted to prison more than 20 yearsbefore the statutory provision took effect (Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d1107, 1108-1109 [2014]; see generally Matter of Freeman v Fischer, 118 AD3d1438, 1439 [2014]).
[*2] Contrary to petitioner's contention, we concludethat the 2011 memorandum issued by Chairwoman Andrea Evans to Board members"sufficiently establishes the requisite procedures for incorporat[ing] risk and needsprinciples into the process of making parole release decisions" (Matter of Byas v Fischer, 120AD3d 1586, 1586 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see ExecutiveLaw § 259-c [4]). In any event, we note that the Board has promulgatedregulations for "parole release decision-making procedures," which became effectiveJuly 30, 2014, that are consistent with the procedures set forth in the 2011 memorandum(see 9 NYCRR 8002.3).
We have reviewed petitioner's remaining contentions and conclude that they arewithout merit. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Carni and Sconiers,JJ.