Matter of Zlotnick v City of Saratoga Springs
2014 NY Slip Op 08289 [122 AD3d 1210]
November 26, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 31, 2014


[*1]
 In the Matter of Mary M. Zlotnick, Petitioner, v City ofSaratoga Springs et al., Respondents.

Gleason Dunn Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Mark T. Walsh of counsel), forpetitioner.

Harris Beach, PLLC, Albany (Mark J. McCarthy of counsel), for respondents.

Egan Jr., J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Saratoga County) to review a determination ofrespondent Commissioner of Accounts for the City of Saratoga Springs which terminatedpetitioner's employment.

In December 2010, petitioner began working as a real property clerk for respondentCity of Saratoga Springs Department of Accounts. Petitioner was assigned a series ofadministrative tasks that included taking phone calls from members of the public,wherein she was permitted to provide information and answer "basic questions" aboutthe assessment or exemption process. After a few months in this position, petitionerdeveloped concerns regarding the manner in which condominium owners residing in theCity of Saratoga Springs, Saratoga County were being assessed; specifically, petitionerbelieved that a particular individual representing certain condominium owners wasreceiving preferential treatment from the City's Assistant Assessor, Anthony Popolizio,and was obtaining assessment reductions for her clients without going through a formalgrievance process. Petitioner initially expressed her concerns to the City's DeputyCommissioner of Accounts, Sharon Kellner-Chille, who, in turn, contacted respondentCommissioner of Accounts for the City of Saratoga Springs, John P. Franck. TheCommissioner then met with petitioner, explained the difficulties that respondent City ofSaratoga Springs had experienced with condominium assessments in the past and advisedher that the representative in question was participating in an informal—andentirely [*2]permissible—grievanceprocess.[FN1]Petitioner remained unpersuaded, however, and ultimately brought her suspicionsregarding this procedure to, among others, the Saratoga County District Attorney and theAttorney General.

In June 2012, the Commissioner preferred disciplinary charges against petitioner,alleging that she had violated City policy by making personal use of the Internet duringworking hours, and suspended her for a period of one week. A hearing was held inAugust 2012 and, at the conclusion thereof, the Commissioner adopted the HearingOfficer's finding of guilt and imposed a one-week suspension and loss ofpay—said penalty to be satisfied by the previously imposed suspension. Duringthe course of that hearing, petitioner testified as to her ongoing concerns regarding themanner in which condominium assessments were being reduced. Upon reviewing atranscript of petitioner's testimony, the Commissioner again investigated petitioner'sallegations and, in so doing, "looked at every [assessment] reduction from December 27,2010 through mid August 2012 to [ascertain] if they were done properly."

By letter dated August 24, 2012, petitioner was advised of the Commissioner'sintention to take additional disciplinary action against her, and petitioner thereafter wasprovided with a notice of discipline setting forth five specifications of misconduct and/orinsubordination. Petitioner was suspended for 30 days without pay and, following alengthy hearing, the Hearing Officer issued a report sustaining three of the five preferredcharges and recommended that petitioner be terminated from her employment. TheCommissioner upheld the Hearing Officer's recommendation and terminated petitionerfrom her position, prompting petitioner to commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding tochallenge that determination.

Petitioner initially contends that the charges set forth in the underlying notice ofdiscipline were so vague as to deprive her of a fair hearing. As the Hearing Officer in thismatter aptly observed, the notice of discipline and the subsequently furnished bill ofparticulars "could have been more illuminating." That said, the notice of discipline andthe individual charges at issue "need only be reasonably specific, in light of all therelevant circumstances[,] to apprise [petitioner] of the charges and enable. . . her to adequately prepare a defense" (Matter of Rounds v Town ofVestal, 15 AD3d 819, 822 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; see Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323, 332-333 [1989]; Matter of McKenzie v Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of Albany, 100 AD3d 1096, 1098 [2012]; Matterof Orens v Novello, 307 AD2d 392, 392 [2003], appeal dismissed 100 NY2d614 [2003]).

Here, in conjunction with the bill of particulars, respondents included copies of thenewspaper articles and media reports relevant to charge No. 4, as well as that portion ofthe transcript of petitioner's August 2012 disciplinary hearing bearing upon themisconduct alleged in charge No. 2. Viewing the notice of discipline, the correspondingbill of particulars and the materials supplied therewith against the backdrop ofpetitioner's prior disciplinary proceeding, we are satisfied that petitioner was affordedadequate notice of the misconduct alleged with respect to the sustained specifications(charge Nos. 1, 2 and 4). Accordingly, this aspect of petitioner's due process claim mustfail.

Petitioner next asserts that the Hearing Officer should have been disqualified for amyriad of reasons that generally fall under the heading of exhibiting bias or creating the[*3]appearance of impropriety. In this regard, "[b]ecausehearing officers are presumed to be free from bias, an appearance of impropriety isinsufficient to set aside an administrative determination; petitioner must provide factualsupport for [her] claim of bias and prove that the outcome flowed from that bias" (Matter of Compasso v Sheriff ofSullivan County, 29 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2006]; see 10 NYCRR 51.17[a]; Matter of Helmer v New York State & Local Employees' RetirementSys., 305 AD2d 949, 950 [2003]; Matter of Donlon v Mills, 260 AD2d 971,974 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]). Based upon our review of therecord as a whole, we do not find that petitioner made such a showing here.

To the extent that petitioner contends that the Hearing Officer should have beendisqualified due to an alleged affiliation between the Hearing Officer's spouse andrespondents' counsel, we note that petitioner did not seek disqualification upon thisground at the administrative hearing and, hence, this issue is unpreserved for our review(cf. Matter of Longton v Villageof Corinth, 57 AD3d 1273, 1276 [2008], lv denied 13 NY3d 709[2009]).[FN2] Inany event, the Commissioner averred that he selected the Hearing Officer based upon arecommendation from a local attorney and that he did not discuss the Hearing Officer'sdesignation with "any attorney or representative" of the law firm representingrespondents in this matter prior to making such designation.

Petitioner further argues that the Hearing Officer should have been disqualifiedbased upon the fact that he presided over both of petitioner's disciplinary hearings.However, absent record evidence that the Hearing Officer may have prejudged the matterunder review, "an administrative decision maker is not deemed biased or disqualifiedmerely on the basis that he or she reviewed a previous administrative determination andruled against the same employee, or presided over a prior proceeding involving a similardefense or similar charges" (Matter of Botsford v Bertoni, 112 AD3d 1266, 1268[2013]; see Matter of Compasso v Sheriff of Sullivan County, 29 AD3d at 1065).Here, a portion of the transcript from petitioner's August 2012 disciplinary hearing wasadmitted into evidence at petitioner's subsequent hearing, and the testimony containedtherein was directly relevant to the allegations of misconduct set forth in charge No. 2 ofthe notice of discipline. Under these circumstances, the Hearing Officer's limited reviewof or reference to such testimony in arriving at his conclusion relative to charge No. 2was entirely proper. More to the point, we find no support for petitioner's blanketassertion that the Hearing Officer otherwise—and improperly—referred tomatters outside the record in rendering his determination as to guilt. To the extent that therecord reflects that the Hearing Officer may have considered petitioner's overallemployment record or the prior disciplinary proceeding in fashioning a penalty, wediscern no impropriety in this regard (see Matter of McKenzie v Board of Educ. ofthe City Sch. Dist. of Albany, 100 AD3d at 1098). Petitioner's remaining allegationsof bias are based upon a selective reading of the hearing transcript and find no factualsupport in the record.

We do, however, find merit to petitioner's claim that theCommissioner—having investigated petitioner's initial allegations of preferentialassessment treatment, concluded that such allegations were unfounded, preferred theresulting charges of misconduct and insubordination against petitioner and testified atpetitioner's disciplinary hearing in support of such charges—should havedisqualified himself from reviewing the Hearing Officer's recommendation and renderinga final determination in this matter. Regardless of whether [*4]disciplinary charges are pursued in the judicial oradministrative realm, "[t]he participation of an independent, unbiased adjudicator in theresolution of disputes is an essential element of due process of law, guaranteed by theFederal and State Constitutions" (Matter of General Motors Corp.—DelcoProds. Div. v Rosa, 82 NY2d 183, 188 [1993]; see Matter of 1616 Second Ave.Rest. v New York State Liq. Auth., 75 NY2d 158, 161 [1990]). Although aparticular individual's involvement or participation in the disciplinary process does notautomatically compel his or her recusal, the case law makes clear that "individuals whoare personally or extensively involved in the disciplinary process should disqualifythemselves from reviewing the recommendations of a Hearing Officer and from actingon the charges" (Matter ofBaker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d 714, 717-718 [2012][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Ashe v Town Bd. of the Town of Crown Point,N.Y., 97 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2012]). Accordingly, "when an officerinstitutes charges of misconduct and testifies at [the] ensuing hearing, that officer, in theinterest of fairness, must disqualify [himself or] herself from reviewing the HearingOfficer's recommendations and rendering a final determination" (Matter of DiMattinav LaBua, 262 AD2d 409, 410 [1999]; see Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County,234 AD2d 764, 767-768 [1996]; Matter of Lowy v Carter, 210 AD2d 408, 409[1994]; Matter of Hicks v Fortier, 117 AD2d 930, 930-931 [1986]; see alsoMatter of Ashe v Town Bd. of the Town of Crown Point, N.Y., 97 AD3d at 1023; Matter of Nicoletti v Meyer, 42AD3d 722, 722-723 [2007]).

Here, the Commissioner spoke with petitioner in April 2011 regarding her concernsrelative to the manner in which Popolizio was granting reductions in condominiumassessments and, after questioning Popolizio in this regard, "satisfied" himself that"everything was being done above board." When petitioner continued to press herconcerns, the Commissioner, among other things, "looked at every [assessment]reduction from December 27, 2010 through mid August 2012 to [ascertain] if they weredone properly," ultimately concluding "that the reductions made were done in a legalmanner." Thereafter, the Commissioner preferred disciplinary charges against petitioner,appointed the Hearing Officer to conduct petitioner's disciplinary hearing and testified atpetitioner's hearing. While it is true that "[n]ot all testimony will require disqualification"(Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d at 718) and,further, that the Commissioner was called as a witness by petitioner, it is clear from areview of the Hearing Officer's decision that the Commissioner's testimony was reliedupon and credited by the Hearing Officer in sustaining the charges against petitioner. Asthe Commissioner's testimony "directly support[ed] . . . the establishment ofthe charges preferred" (id.), and given the Commissioner's otherwise extensiveinvolvement in the disciplinary process, his disqualification was required (see Matterof Nicoletti v Meyer, 42 AD3d at 722-723; Matter of DiMattina v LaBua,262 AD2d at 410; Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County, 234 AD2d at 767-768;Matter of Lowy v Carter, 210 AD2d at 409; Matter of Hicks v Fortier,117 AD2d at 930; compare Matter of Hussey v Incorporated Vil. of Farmingdale,251 AD2d 579, 580 [1998]; Matter of Ost v Supervisor of Town of Woodstock,251 AD2d 724, 726 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 817 [1998]).

In an effort to nonetheless sustain the underlying determination, respondents seek toinvoke the "rule of necessity," which provides a limited exception to the requirement ofan unbiased adjudicator by "requiring a biased adjudicator to decide a case if and only ifthe dispute cannot otherwise be heard" (Matter of General MotorsCorp.—Delco Prods. Div. v Rosa, 82 NY2d at 188; see Matter of Baker vPoughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d at 718; see generally Matter of McComb vReasoner, 29 AD3d 795, 799-800 [2006]). Such necessity, however, "must beconstrued strictly, in favor of delegating [adjudicatory] authority to others wheneverpossible" (Matter of General Motors Corp.—Delco Prods. Div. v Rosa, 82NY2d at 188). According to respondents, the only individual to whom the Commissionercould have [*5]delegated review of the Hearing Officer'sdecision was Kellner-Chille, who—the record reflects—also providedextensive and detailed testimony in support of the charges against petitioner. AsKellner-Chille would be equally disqualified from reviewing the Hearing Officer'sdecision and rendering a final determination, respondents' argument continues, the ruleof necessity permitted the Commissioner to undertake that task here. We do notagree.

Civil Service Law § 75 (2) provides that where, as here, an officerhaving the power to remove an employee designates someone else to conduct theunderlying disciplinary hearing, the record of such hearing "shall . . . bereferred [back] to such officer . . . for review and decision." In construingthis provision, the Court of Appeals has observed that "[i]t makes sense that the decisionwhether sanctions against an employee are warranted should be made by an official thathas knowledge of the employee's duties and responsibilities, as well as an understandingof what disciplinary measures have been previously imposed on other employees forsimilar types of infractions" (Matter of Gomez v Stout, 13 NY3d 182, 186 [2009]).Although acknowledging that the statute does not expressly address what the affectedofficer should do where, as here, a disqualifying conflict exists, the Court of Appeals hasinterpreted Civil Service Law § 72 (2) to "require[ ] that the power todiscipline be delegated, if necessary, within the governmental department's chain ofcommand" (Matter of Gomez v Stout, 13 NY3d at 187). Whether a particulardelegation will fall within the affected department's chain of command and, hence, ispermissible appears to turn upon whether the body or official to whom review power isdelegated possesses either supervisory authority over the employee at issue oradministrative responsibility over the affected department and its personnel (compareMatter of Gomez v Stout, 13 NY3d at 187, and Matter of Roosa v Belfiore, 69 AD3d 945, 946-947[2010], with Matter of Guynupv County of Clinton, 74 AD3d 1552, 1554 [2010]).

The parties, in a somewhat conclusory fashion, debate whether—consistentwith the provisions of the Saratoga City Charter—there is a body or officer towhom the Commissioner validly may delegate the power to review the report andrecommendation issued by the Hearing Officer. Inasmuch as respondents have failed todemonstrate—on this record—that no such body or officer exists, we areunable to conclude that the rule of necessity may be properly invoked here. Accordingly,we remit this matter to the City "for a de novo review of the present record and theHearing Officer's recommendations by a qualified and impartial individual [or body]" tobe designated by the Commissioner (Matter of Botsford v Bertoni, 112 AD3d at1269). In light of this conclusion, we need not reach petitioner's remaining argumentsregarding the sufficiency of the proof adduced at the hearing and/or the penaltyimposed.

Peters, P.J., Stein, Garry and Devine, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isannulled, without costs, and matter remitted to respondent City of Saratoga Springs forfurther proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:In conjunctiontherewith, the Commissioner conducted an initial investigation, spoke with Popolizio and"satisfied" himself that "everything was being done above board."

Footnote 2:We discern no exceptionto the preservation requirement under the facts presented here (compare Matter of Ashe v TownBd. of the Town of Crown Point, N.Y., 97 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2012]).


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