Hope v Holiday Mtn. Corp.
2014 NY Slip Op 08704 [123 AD3d 1274]
December 11, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 28, 2015


[*1]
  Andrea J. Hope, Respondent, v Holiday MountainCorporation et al., Appellants.

Roemer Wallens Gold & Mineaux, LLP, Albany (Matthew J. Kelly of counsel),for appellants.

Law Office of Jeffrey S. Altbach, Ferndale (Mark P. Cambareri of counsel), forrespondent.

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Schick, J.), enteredDecember 9, 2013 in Sullivan County, which denied defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint.

At all times relevant, plaintiff was employed as a teacher's assistant at the Center forDiscovery in Sullivan County. The Center houses, educates and assists developmentallychallenged individuals, and plaintiff's job duties included "act[ing] as a one-on-one aideto a student/resident" during recreational field trips. In August 2008, plaintiff was part ofa group of approximately 12 Center staff members and students who traveled to HolidayMountain Ski & Fun Park, a facility owned and operated by defendants in SullivanCounty. The park offered a variety of recreational activities, including go-carts, bumperboats, a rock wall and, as pertinent here, a large slide.

While at the park, plaintiff was assigned to supervise a 16- or 17-year-olddevelopmentally disabled young woman (hereinafter the student). After participating invarious other activities, plaintiff and the student went to the park's "Fun Slide," a large,three-lane slide upon which participants climb numerous steps to the top thereof and thendescend using burlap bags. When plaintiff and the student reached the bottom of theslide, plaintiff attempted to help the student get up and safely exit the area, at which pointplaintiff allegedly was struck by a young boy who had come "flying down the slide"behind them. As a result of this collision, [*2]plaintiffpurportedly fell to the ground and, in so doing, fractured her left wrist.

Plaintiff thereafter commenced this negligence action against defendants, allegingthat they failed to maintain a safe distance between patrons using the Fun Slide in orderto avoid collisions at the termination thereof. Following joinder of issue and discovery,defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending thatplaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. SupremeCourt denied defendants' motion, and this appeal by defendants ensued.

"Under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, by engaging in a sport orrecreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks whichare inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally, and flow from suchparticipation. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, theplaintiff has consented to them and the defendant has performed its duty. However, aplaintiff will not be deemed to have assumed the risks of reckless or intentional conduct,or concealed or unreasonably increased risks" (Fenty v Seven Meadows Farms, Inc., 108 AD3d 588, 588[2013] [citations omitted]; seeCustodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d 83, 88 [2012]; Morgan v State ofNew York, 90 NY2d 471, 484-485 [1997]; Layden v Plante, 101 AD3d 1540, 1540-1541 [2012])."Awareness of the risk of engaging in a particular activity is to be assessed against thebackground of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff" (DiBenedetto v Town Sports Intl.,LLC, 118 AD3d 663, 663-664 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; see Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 486), and application ofthe doctrine generally presents a question of fact for a jury to resolve (see Layden vPlante, 101 AD3d at 1541).

The crux of defendants' argument on appeal is that plaintiff, in violation of postedsigns warning her to remain in her own lane when exiting the Fun Slide,[FN1] crossed into anotherpatron's lane and, in so doing, voluntarily assumed the known and obvious risk of beingstruck by someone else descending the slide; hence, defendants' motion for summaryjudgment should have been granted. The flaw in defendants' argument on this point isthat it ignores the factual dispute as to the manner in which plaintiff's accident occurredand, more to the point, fails to address the issue of whether the park's staffing andoperation of the Fun Slide on the day in question unreasonably increased the risk posedto plaintiff. As the record contains numerous questions of fact that cannot be resolved atthis juncture, defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint wasproperly denied.[FN2]

[*3] With respect to the accident itself, plaintiff testifiedthat after she and the student ascended the stairs to the top of the slide, they retrievedtheir respective bags and sat down. According to plaintiff, as one sits at the top of theslide looking down, the student sat in the middle of the three available lanes, whileplaintiff sat in the lane to the student's left and the lane to the far right remained empty.Upon reaching the end of the slide, plaintiff stood up and moved to the adjacent middlelane to assist the student, who was sitting at the bottom of the slide "giggling." In theprocess of doing so, plaintiff testified, she was struck by a young boy "who came flyingdown the slide . . . [i]n the middle [lane]," i.e., the same lane in which thestudent had just descended, causing her to fall to the ground. The attendant assigned tothe Fun Slide on the day of the accident, however, could not recall with any degree ofcertainty which lane(s) plaintiff, the student or the young boy used in descending theslide and testified that plaintiff was injured when she tripped over the young boy at thebase of the slide while "coming forward . . . to help her patient." Thisconflicting testimony creates a question of fact as to plaintiff's position on the sliderelative to both the student and the young boy, as well as the manner in which she wasinjured, thereby precluding an award of summary judgment (see generally Ortman vLogsdon, 121 AD3d 1388, 1389-1390 [2014]).

Moreover, even accepting that the risk of colliding with another patron is a riskinherent in the use of the Fun Slide (cf. Mussara v Mega Funworks, Inc., 100 AD3d 185, 192[2012]; Zachary G. v YoungIsrael of Woodmere, 95 AD3d 946, 947 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 857[2013]), the record nonetheless contains a question of fact as to whether the park'semployees unreasonably heightened the risk of a collision at the base of the slide byfailing to adequately staff or supervise the Fun Slide on the day in question. The park'smanager testified that park rules required the attendant assigned to the Fun Slide to bestationed at the bottom of the slide, which is where the attendant was positioned at thetime of plaintiff's accident. The manager further testified, however, that a secondattendant would be stationed at the top of the slide on days when patron traffic was heavyor if "disabled children" were in attendance. In this regard, although the manager statedthat attendance at the park was "dead" on the day of plaintiff's accident, the Fun Slideattendant testified that traffic on the slide that day was "moderate [to] heavy." Similarly,while the manager denied knowing that a group from the Center would be at the park onthe day in question, he acknowledged that groups from the Center and otherorganizations serving developmentally challenged clients were at the park "every day ofthe week." Additionally, the manager's testimony demonstrated that he was aware of boththe potential need for a Center staff member to assist a student in exiting the slide and thepossibility of a collision, stating, "We always let them help their clients, but we makethem stand in front [of the slide] on the green carpet [located at the end of the slide]. . . because you never know if somebody else is going to come downbehind them."[FN3]Finally, the record contains conflicting testimony as to whether Fun Slide patrons couldobtain their burlap bags and proceed to the top of the slide before other participants hadcompleted their run and safely exited the area at the bottom of the slide[FN4] and, further, whether theattendant was adequately supervising the Fun Slide [*4]patrons prior to plaintiff's accident (cf. Huneau v Maple Ski Ridge,Inc., 17 AD3d 848, 849 [2005]; compare Youmans v Maple Ski Ridge, Inc., 53 AD3d 957,959-960 [2008]). In light of the foregoing, defendants' motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint was properly denied (see generally Schmidt v Massapequa High School, 83 AD3d1039, 1039-1040 [2011]).

Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isaffirmed, with costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Although the recordcontains a photograph of a sign warning Fun Slide patrons, "When Getting Off SlideStay In Your Lane," and the park's manager testified that this sign was in place on theday of plaintiff's accident, plaintiff denied seeing this or any other warning/safety sign.

Footnote 2:To the extent thatSupreme Court questioned whether the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk couldapply where, as here, the injured plaintiff was acting in the course of her employment atthe time that the accident occurred, we note that the record is not sufficiently developedto permit consideration of whether plaintiff was operating under an "inherentcompulsion" (Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 658-659[1989]) at the time she was injured.

Footnote 3:Indeed, when askedwhat plaintiff was doing at the base of the slide at the time of the accident, the Fun Slideattendant stated, "She kind of was doing my job where we go over and make sure theyget up and we take their sack."

Footnote 4:The park's managertestified, "Well, the rule is that there [are three] bags, [three] lanes. [The attendant] gives[the patrons] the bag at the gate, they go to the top. No one else can go to the top untilthey come to the bottom, those [three] people come down to get the bag." Plaintiff,however, testified that the bags were at the top of the slide, and the attendant testifiedthat the young boy who allegedly collided with plaintiff ascended the slide "like aminute" after plaintiff and her student had done so. Such testimony raises a question offact as to whether there was a violation of established procedures that, in turn,unreasonably increased the risk posed to plaintiff.


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