DiBenedetto v Town Sports Intl., LLC
2014 NY Slip Op 03974 [118 AD3d 663]
June 4, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 30, 2014


[*1]
 Jennifer DiBenedetto, Appellant,
v
TownSports International, LLC, Doing Business as New York Sports Club,Respondent.

Killerlane Law Offices, White Plains, N.Y. (David M. Samel of counsel), forappellant.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains,N.Y. (Lorraine M. Girolamo and Donald G. Derrico of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Adler, J.), entered October 2, 2012,which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, a member of the New York Sports Club facility in Dobbs Ferry,allegedly was injured when she stepped onto a treadmill that another member allegedlyvacated but did not turn off. The plaintiff commenced this action, and after thecompletion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint. The defendant argued, among other things, that the plaintiff assumed the riskinherent in using a treadmill and that it did not create or have actual or constructivenotice of the alleged dangerous condition, i.e., the vacated and running treadmill. TheSupreme Court granted the defendant's motion on the ground that the plaintiff assumedthe risk of injury.

The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that a voluntary participant in asporting or recreational activity consents to those commonly appreciated risks which areinherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from suchparticipation (see Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]). Thisencompasses risks associated with the construction of the playing field, the activityengaged in, and the surface and any open and obvious conditions on it (see Perez v New York City Dept.of Educ., 115 AD3d 921 [2014]). The doctrine has been applied in casesinvolving injuries sustained in gyms and fitness centers (see Marcano v City of NewYork, 99 NY2d 548 [2002]; Ramirez v Lucille Roberts Health Clubs, Inc., 110 AD3d975 [2013]; Baccari vKCOR, Inc., 109 AD3d 856 [2013]). Awareness of the risk of engaging in aparticular activity is "to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience ofthe particular plaintiff" (Maddox v City of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 278[1985]). The doctrine, however, does not serve as a bar to liability if the risk isunassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased (see Morgan v State of NewYork, 90 NY2d at 485; seealso Mussara v Mega Funworks, Inc., 100 AD3d 185 [2012]; Toro v New York Racing Assn.,Inc., 95 AD3d 999 [2012]; Joseph v New York Racing Assn., 28 AD3d 105, 108[2006]; cf. Herman v Lifeplex,LLC, 106 AD3d 1050 [2013]).

In support of its motion, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to[*2]judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that theplaintiff, a frequent treadmill user at the facility, had assumed the obvious and inherentrisk of her injuries. The plaintiff testified at her deposition that prior to stepping upon themoving treadmill belt, she had been standing beside the subject treadmill for up to twominutes, conversing with a male patron who wanted to use the same machine. Thedefendant presented evidence that the treadmills at the facility were operated by using"on" and "off" or "start" and "stop" buttons, and the plaintiff testified that before the dayof the subject accident, she exercised at the facility "at least four times a week, if notmore," and that she had used the treadmills at the facility "every day when I could." Asthe risks of using a treadmill were obvious and apparent to the plaintiff, she consented tothem, and the defendant discharged its duty of care by making the conditions as safe asthey appeared to be (see Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 439 [1986]; Perez v New York City Dept. ofEduc., 115 AD3d 921 [2014]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triableissue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).Therefore, we agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff assumed the risk of herinjuries and was barred from recovery by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk.

In any event, the defendant also established prima facie that it neither created thealleged dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of it for a sufficientlength of time to discover and remedy it. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise atriable issue of fact (see Payen vWestern Beef Supermarket, 106 AD3d 710 [2013]; Alami v 215 E. 68th St., L.P.,88 AD3d 924, 925 [2011]; Walker v City of New York, 82 AD3d 966, 967 [2011]; Slintak v Price ChopperSupermarkets, 81 AD3d 808 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and Duffy,JJ., concur.


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