| Perez v New York City Dept. of Educ. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02022 [115 AD3d 921] |
| March 26, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Kevin Perez, an Infant, by His Father and NaturalGuardian, Ricardo Perez, et al., Appellants, v New York City Department ofEducation et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnensheinand Diana Lawless of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal froman order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ash, J.), dated June 13, 2012, whichgranted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The 17-year-old plaintiff (hereinafter the injured plaintiff), and his father suingderivatively, commenced this action against the defendants for injuries that the injuredplaintiff allegedly sustained while playing basketball in a gymnasium owned by thedefendants. The injured plaintiff ran at a fast pace and jumped to block a lay-up. As hedid so, his right arm went through and shattered a pane of glass in one of the entrancedoors to the gymnasium, which was situated beyond the baseline. The Supreme Courtgranted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that "by engaging in a sport orrecreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks whichare inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from suchparticipation" (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]; see Cotty v Town ofSouthampton, 64 AD3d 251 [2009]). This encompasses risks associated withthe construction of the playing field, and any open and obvious conditions on it (see Ziegelmeyer v United StatesOlympic Comm., 7 NY3d 893 [2006]; O'Connor v Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist., 103AD3d 862 [2013]). If the risks are known by or perfectly obvious to the participant,he or she has consented to them and the property owner has discharged its duty of care bymaking the conditions as safe as they appear to be (see Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d432, 439 [1986]; Palladino vLindenhurst Union Free School Dist., 84 AD3d 1194, 1195 [2011]).
Here, based in part on the proximity of the court to the entrance doors, thedefendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstratingthat the injured plaintiff had assumed the obvious and inherent risk of coming intocontact with the pane of glass in the entrance door by electing to play basketball on thatcourt (see Trevett v City ofLittle Falls, 6 NY3d 884 [2006]; Wilkes v YMCA of Greater N.Y., 68 AD3d 542 [2009]; Ribaudo v La Salle Inst., 45AD3d 556 [2007]; cf. Stevens v Central School Dist. No. 1, 25AD2d 871 [1966], affd 21 NY2d 780 [1968]). In opposition, the [*2]plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The affidavitof the plaintiffs' expert that was submitted in opposition to the motion relied onnonmandatory, nonexclusive guidelines with respect to the proximity of the door to thecourt and the door's lack of padding and, thus, was insufficient to raise a triable issue offact (see Charles v City ofYonkers, 103 AD3d 765 [2013]; Zachary G. v Young Israel of Woodmere, 95 AD3d 946,947 [2012]; Kazlow v City of New York, 253 AD2d 411 [1998]; cf.Greenburg v Peekskill City School Dist., 255 AD2d 487 [1998]). Moreover, theincident occurred suddenly, and even the most intense supervision could not haveprevented it (see Zachary G. v Young Israel of Woodmere, 95 AD3d at 947; Weiner v Jericho Union FreeSchool Dist., 89 AD3d 728 [2011]). Hence, any alleged lack of supervision wasnot a proximate cause of the injured plaintiff's injuries.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Hall, Austin and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.