| Matter of Birch v County of Madison |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 08892 [123 AD3d 1324] |
| December 18, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Karen Birch, Appellant, v County ofMadison et al., Respondents. |
Jonathan Lovett, White Plains, for appellant.
Hancock & Estabrook, LLP, Syracuse (Janet D. Callahan of counsel), forrespondents.
Lahtinen, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Dowd, J.), enteredFebruary 3, 2014 in Madison County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Boardof Supervisors of the County of Madison terminating petitioner's employment.
Petitioner began employment in 2006 with respondent County of Madison asDirector of the Probation Department. In 2011, Joanne Swidowski—who hadrecently resigned from the Department—filed a personnel complaint andthreatened litigation regarding actions by petitioner, prompting respondent Board ofSupervisors of the County of Madison to commence an investigation. In November 2011,petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave and, in February 2012, she wasoffered a severance package that included, among other things, six months' pay if shevoluntarily resigned. Petitioner rejected the offer and, in April 2012, the Board broughtfive disciplinary charges against her pursuant to Civil Service Law§ 75.
The first three of the five charges arose from circumstances that occurred whenSwidowski, an employee with less than two years' experience, had been assigned to ahigh profile case involving Stanley Derdzinski. Derdzinski had a pattern of domesticviolence, stalking and harassment, and he reportedly obtained personal information aboutSwidowski and made repeated threats against her. Petitioner refused to permitSwidowski to be relieved from the assignment. The three charges pertaining toSwidowski alleged that petitioner exercised poor judgment involving a probation officerwhose life had been threatened, failed to remove an officer from writing a presentencereport after a conflict of interest had developed, and created a [*2]risk of violating relevant regulations regarding impartialityand fairness in a probation investigation and report. The fourth charge allegedmismanagement of a different workplace incident and the fifth charge asserted poorleadership of the Department as reflected by, among other things, high staff turnoverduring her short tenure.
After a hearing over the course of five days, the Hearing Officer issued a detailedwritten decision in which he determined that petitioner was guilty of the first threecharges of misconduct, but that charges four and five had not been proved. The HearingOfficer recommended a penalty of termination. The Board adopted the findings of theHearing Officer and petitioner was dismissed from employment in May 2013. Thisproceeding seeking to annul the Board's determination ensued. Supreme Court dismissedthe petition and petitioner now appeals.
Petitioner contends that the Board prejudged the charges against her and engaged inimpermissible ex parte communications regarding those charges.[FN1] "Involvement in the disciplinaryprocess does not automatically require recusal" (Matter of Ernst v SaratogaCounty, 234 AD2d 764, 767 [1996] [citations omitted]), and a Board may "serv[e] adual investigatory and adjudicatory function" (Matter of Donlon v Mills, 260AD2d 971, 974 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]). However, "individualswho are personally or extensively involved in the disciplinary process should disqualifythemselves from reviewing the recommendations of a Hearing Officer" (Matter of Baker v PoughkeepsieCity School Dist., 18 NY3d 714, 717-718 [2012] [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]; see e.g. Matterof Botsford v Bertoni, 112 AD3d 1266, 1268-1269 [2013]; Matter of Ashe v Town Bd. of theTown of Crown Point, N.Y., 97 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2012]; Matter ofMemmelaar v Straub, 181 AD2d 980, 981 [1992]).
Here, after receiving Swidowski's complaint about petitioner, the Board retainedoutside counsel (John Corcoran) and authorized an independent investigation. As a resultof the investigation, the Board offered petitioner a severance package if she resigned.The offer was made by the Assistant County Attorney (Tina Wayland-Smith) in ameeting also attended by Corcoran, the Chair of the Board (John Becker) and the Chairof the Criminal Justice Committee of the Board (Darrin Ball). During the course ofmaking the offer, Wayland-Smith indicated to petitioner that the Board had lostconfidence in her and that she could not continue in her current job. The offer wasrejected and disciplinary charges ensued. A Hearing Officer was appointed, and there isno evidence that he was biased or otherwise unqualified. Petitioner had a full opportunityto defend against the charges, cross-examine the witnesses and present her proof. TheHearing Officer found sufficient evidence as to three of the five charges andrecommended termination. Significantly, Becker and Ball disqualified themselves fromconsideration of the Hearing Officer's recommendation because they had participated inthe investigation and the negotiations to have petitioner resign. The remaining membersof the Board considered the matter over the course of two meetings and ultimatelyadopted the Hearing Officer's recommendation.
Hiring an investigator and being aware of the result of that investigation beforebringing charges did not disqualify the entire Board (see Matter of Donlon vMills, 260 AD2d at 974). [*3]The two Boardmembers who were actively involved in prehearing matters pertaining to petitioner did,in fact, disqualify themselves (compare Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County, 234AD2d at 768). Wayland-Smith's general characterization of the Board's concern aboutpetitioner's continuing employment made during an effort to settle the matter, whichoccurred after the investigation but before a hearing, does not compel the conclusion thatthe Board could not fairly consider the evidence and recommendation resulting from thehearing. Nor does Corcoran's involvement with the Board following the hearing reveal afailure by the Board to independently consider the evidence. In such regard, the Boardhas a "presumption of integrity" and petitioner did not overcome that presumption(Matter of Donlon v Mills, 260 AD2d at 974; see Withrow v Larkin, 421US 35, 47 [1975]).
The remaining arguments, which were fully addressed by Supreme Court, do notrequire extended discussion. The minor amendment made to the first charge part waythrough the hearing, and at a time when petitioner had ample opportunity to respond tothe amendment, did not deprive her of due process (see Matter of Sachs v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd.,Div. of Harness Racing, 1 AD3d 768, 771-772 [2003], lv denied 2NY3d 706 [2004]; Matter of Groff v Kelly, 309 AD2d 539, 540[2003]).[FN2]Becker, as Chair of the Board, did not exceed his authority in authorizing the minoramendment to the charges or in suspending petitioner for 30 days without pay(see Civil Service Law § 75 [3]). Valid reasons were set forth in therecord regarding the concern for the safety of one witness as well as a nonparty tosupport the decision to close the hearing during the testimony of one witness(compare Matter of Mosher v Hanley, 56 AD2d 141, 142 [1977]). The recordcontains substantial evidence supporting the Board's determination (see Matter of Covert v SchuylerCounty, 78 AD3d 1309, 1310 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 706 [2011])and the penalty does not, under the circumstances, "shock[ ] the judicial conscience" (Matter of Ellis v Mahon, 11NY3d 754, 755 [2008]; seeMatter of Kuznia v Adams, 106 AD3d 1227, 1231 [2013]). The remainingarguments have been considered and are unavailing.
Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur.
McCarthy, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. We should annul the determinationof respondent Board of Supervisors of the County of Madison. "[W]here, as here, there isevidence indicating that the administrative decision maker may have prejudged thematter at issue, disqualification is required" (Matter of Botsford v Bertoni, 112 AD3d 1266, 1269[2013]). Tina Wayland-Smith, an Assistant County Attorney, testified that she and othersmet with petitioner, prior to disciplinary charges being proffered, to offer her a separationfrom employment agreement. Referring to her talking points from that meeting,Wayland-Smith testified that the Board had "lost faith and confidence in [petitioner's]ability to continue to manage the activities and staff of the Probation Department" basedon evidence adduced from the investigation. The source of information for that statementwas the Board itself and its Criminal Justice and Government Operations Committees.When asked if any member of any of those groups told her "that they did not lose faithand confidence in [petitioner's] ability," Wayland-Smith testified, "Not that I recall."Wayland-Smith also testified that the Board had taken a position on the separationagreement and "it was the feeling of, at least, the Government Operations Committee andthe [*4]Board of Supervisors that [petitioner] could notcontinue in her . . . employment based on what the investigation hadrevealed."
This testimony indicates that the entire Board not only believed that the informationfrom the investigation was true, but also believed that termination was the properpenalty. These beliefs were formed and expressed to petitioner before any formal chargeswere ever brought. Due to this apparent prejudgment of the facts by the entire Board, theBoard should have recused itself, and its failure to do so rendered its determination inpetitioner's disciplinary proceeding affected by an error of law (see Matter of 1616Second Ave. Rest. v New York State Liq. Auth., 75 NY2d 158, 161-164 [1990];Matter of Botsford v Bertoni, 112 AD3d at 1269). For that reason alone, weshould not permit the determination to stand, but instead should "remit the matter for a denovo review of the present record and the Hearing Officer's recommendations by aqualified and impartial individual" (Matter of Botsford v Bertoni, 112 AD3d at1269; see Matter of Memmelaar v Straub, 181 AD2d 980, 982 [1992]).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Footnote 1:Petitioner made similarallegations in a federal action that she commenced while this disciplinary proceeding waspending, and the defendants in that action successfully moved for summary judgment(Birch v Becker, 2014 WL 2510565, 2014 US Dist LEXIS 75882 [ND NY June4, 2014, No. 5:12-CV-999]).
Footnote 2:Although an amendmentwas also made to the fifth charge, petitioner was found not guilty of such charge.