| People v Romero |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 09155 [123 AD3d 1147] |
| December 31, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Anthony Romero, Also Known as Robert Rosa,Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Patricia Pazner of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano,Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Brooke E. Barnes of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Griffin, J.), rendered June 18, 2012, convicting him of robbery in the first degree andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches ofthe defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony and astatement he made to a law enforcement official.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The hearing court properly denied suppression of the complainant's confirmatoryidentification of the defendant (see People v Ali, 32 AD3d 522, 522 [2006]; People v Benjamin, 2 AD3d740, 741 [2003]; People v Coleman, 214 AD2d 619, 620 [1995]).
The defendant correctly contends that his statement made to a detective without thebenefit of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436[1966]), and after he had been arrested and subjected to express questioning, should havebeen suppressed (see People vRivera, 91 AD3d 972, 972 [2012]; People v Robinson, 38 AD3d 572, 573 [2007]; People vGuerrier, 291 AD2d 506, 507 [2002]). Nevertheless, the admission of that statementwas harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence of the defendant's guilt,without reference to his pretrial statement, was overwhelming, and there was noreasonable possibility that the error in admitting the statement might have contributed tothe defendant's conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975];People v Rivera, 91 AD3d at 973; People v Tavares-Nunez, 87 AD3d 1171, 1175 [2011];People v Johnson, 277 AD2d 702, 706 [2000]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find thatit was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's identityas the perpetrator. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independentreview of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to viewthe witnesses, hear testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Uponreviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against theweight of the evidence (seePeople v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Green, 107 AD3d 915, 915-916 [2013]; People v Reid, 82 AD3d1268, 1268-1269 [2011]).
The defendant's contention that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the issue of[*2]reasonable doubt were constitutionally inadequate isunpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Washington, 117AD3d 1091, 1092 [2014]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2009]). In any event,the contention is without merit, because the instructions, on the whole, conveyed thecorrect standard to be employed by the jury (see People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821,823 [1995]; People vMorris, 120 AD3d 835, 837 [2014], lv granted 24 NY3d 1045[Nov. 25, 2014]; People v Washington, 117 AD3d at 1092; People vColes, 62 AD3d at 1023). However, the Supreme Court is cautioned to rely on themost recent version of New York's Criminal Jury Instructions rather than recite fromolder versions (see People v Morris, 120 AD3d at 837).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson,Austin and Maltese, JJ., concur.