| People v Karuzas |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00252 [124 AD3d 927] |
| January 8, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vTina Karuzas, Appellant. |
Cynthia Feathers, Glens Falls, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Gerald A. Dwyer of counsel), forrespondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County(Hoye, J.), rendered January 18, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimeof manslaughter in the first degree.
Defendant and the victim became embroiled in an argument, during which defendantfatally stabbed the victim. Defendant was charged by indictment with manslaughter inthe first degree and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. County Courtsentenced defendant to a prison term of 20 years followed by five years of postreleasesupervision. Defendant now appeals.
Addressing first defendant's argument that the conviction was against the weight ofthe evidence, such analysis requires us to view the trial evidence in a neutral light andaccord "appropriate deference to the jury's ability to view the witnesses and determinecredibility" (People vMateo, 101 AD3d 1458, 1459-1460 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 913[2013]; see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d1369, 1370 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 1019 [2013]). The victim anddefendant were neighbors residing in the same apartment building. On the night at issue,the victim became enraged by the loud music coming from a party taking place indefendant's apartment. She banged on defendant's apartment door and allegedly tolddefendant that she wanted to engage in a fight outside. At one point, people insidedefendant's apartment could also hear the victim on her cell phone, threatening to fightdefendant. One witness averred that defendant, upon hearing a knock at her door,grabbed a knife from her bedroom and rushed to the [*2]door of her apartment, where she and the unarmed victimengaged in a struggle. At one point during the altercation, defendant lunged toward thevictim and stabbed her in the abdomen. The victim returned to her apartment and a 911call was made. A responding police officer found a knife in defendant's bathroom sinkand, thereafter, emergency responders located the victim on the floor of her bedroomwith a severely eviscerated bowel.
Defendant testified that the victim had previously engaged in threatening conducttoward her and that, on the night of the incident, she heard the victim state on her cellphone that she was going to kill defendant. Defendant further averred that, although shepulled out her knife in order to compel the victim to leave her apartment, when the victimrefused to leave and engaged in a physical fight, defendant stabbed the victim. Overall,given its opportunity to observe the witnesses, the jury could reasonably infer that, ingrabbing a knife before engaging in a fight with the victim, defendant intended toseriously injure the victim (see Penal Law § 125.20 [1]; People v Perry, 95 AD3d1444, 1445 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1000 [2012]). Moreover, despitedefendant's testimony that her actions were justifiable in light of the victim's assaultiveconduct inside defendant's home and in the presence of her children, we defer to thejury's "superior opportunity to assess credibility" and its ultimate rejection of defendant'sjustification defense (People vSpencer, 89 AD3d 1156, 1157 [2011]; see People v Vanderhorst, 117 AD3d 1197, 1199-1200[2014]; People v Brooks, 32AD3d 616, 616-617 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 844 [2007]). Thus, we do notfind the conviction to be contrary to the weight of the evidence.
We do, however, find merit in defendant's assertion that County Court's erroneousSandoval ruling requires a reversal. The People sought the court's permission tocross-examine defendant about a previous guilty plea to a charge of harassment in thesecond degree based upon defendant's physical altercation with another woman,maintaining that such questioning would be useful to, among other things, impeachdefendant's credibility. Despite defendant's objection that such line of questioning wouldhave no probative value, the court allowed the proposed cross-examination, stating thatsuch evidence of defendant's previous assault was "relevant" to "show that [defendant]can be physically aggressive" and, additionally, that such proof would speak todefendant's anticipated testimony that she had acted in self-defense. The court went on toindicate that the admission of such evidence would not unduly prejudice defendantinasmuch as the prior incident did not involve a weapon or result in serious physicalinjury.
Based upon County Court's authorization, the People cross-examined defendant attrial about the previous altercation, suggesting that defendant had instigated the fightand, further, emphasizing that defendant punched the woman with a closed fist, causingher to lose a tooth. Moments later, the People resumed its questioning about thealtercation with the victim, asking defendant whether she baited the victim to come up toher apartment knowing that she would use a knife in a fight with the victim. As thequestions regarding defendant's prior assault bore no relation to defendant's credibility,but rather served solely to illustrate defendant's propensity to initiate fights so that shecould physically attack other people, we find that County Court abused its discretion inallowing such inquiries (compare People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 207-208[2002]). Accordingly, as defendant's guilt was not overwhelmingly established by theproof presented at trial and we "cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that theerror might have contributed to defendant's conviction," the judgment must be reversedand the matter remitted for a new trial (People v Mitchell, 57 AD3d 1308, 1311 [2008]; see People v Elmy, 117 AD3d1183, 1187 [2014]; Peoplev Brown, 114 AD3d 1017, 1020 [2014]).
Finally, although there is some evidence suggesting that defendant's requestedjustification charge may have been warranted, in light of the instant disposition, we neednot [*3]decide the issue. Nor do we find it necessary toconsider defendant's challenge to the sentence imposed by County Court.
Lahtinen, J.P., Garry and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, onthe law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Schenectady County for a newtrial.