| People v Badalamenti |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00384 [124 AD3d 672] |
| January 14, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Anthony Badalamenti, Appellant. |
Marianne Karas, Thornwood, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Madeline Singas, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Robert A. Schwartz andJason R. Richards of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Peck, J.), rendered November 4, 2009, convicting him of assault in the second degree(three counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (two counts), andendangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting hisconvictions of assault in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (seeCPL 470.05 [2]; People vHawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10[1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution(see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficientto establish the defendant's guilt of three counts of assault in the second degree beyond areasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independentreview of the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), wenevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses,hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383[2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing therecord here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of theevidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence arecording, made by the father of the infant victim, of a conversation between thedefendant and the child. On May 6, 2008, the infant's father called the infant's mother'scell phone, and the mother pressed the answer button, but did not speak. While the fatherwas on the line, but not engaged in any telephone conversation, he overheard thedefendant berating and threatening the infant, and the infant responding. The fatherrecorded the conversation between the defendant and the infant. The defendant contendsthat this recording violated Penal Law § 250.05 because neither thedefendant nor the infant consented to the recording.
Penal Law § 250.05 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is guiltyof eavesdropping when he [or she] unlawfully engages in . . . mechanicaloverhearing of a [*2]conversation." Penal Law§ 250.00 (2) defines "mechanical overhearing of a conversation" as "theintentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion, without the consentof at least one party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument,device or equipment." CPLR 4506 bars the use of eavesdropping evidence obtained byprivate individuals in violation of Penal Law § 250.05 (see People vCapolongo, 85 NY2d 151, 158-159 [1995]), as there is a strong public policy ofprotecting citizens against eavesdropping (id. at 160).
However, in Pollock v Pollock (154 F3d 601 [6th Cir 1998]), the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized a "vicarious consent" exemptionto the federal wiretap statute (18 USC § 2511), and held that when a parentor guardian can demonstrate a "good faith, objectively reasonable basis" to believe that it"was necessary for the welfare of the child" to record a conversation, a parent mayconsent to the recording on the child's behalf and be exempt from liability under thefederal wiretap statute (Pollock v Pollock, 154 F3d at 610; see also Thompsonv Dulaney, 838 F Supp 1535, 1545 [D Utah 1993]).
The New York eavesdropping statute is similar to the federal wiretap statute, in thatboth statutes require consent from at least one party to the conversation for the recordingto be lawful (compare Penal Law § 250.05 with 18 USC§ 2511 [2] [d]). Many state courts with similar eavesdropping or wiretapstatutes that have confronted this issue have also recognized a "vicarious consent"exemption (see Griffin v Griffin, 92 A3d 1144, 2014 ME 70 [2014];Commonwealth v F.W., 465 Mass 1, 986 NE2d 868 [2013]; State vWhitner, 399 SC 547, 732 SE2d 861 [2012]; State of Iowa v Spencer, 737NW2d 124 [Iowa 2007]; Allen v Mancini, 170 SW3d 167, 173 [Tex App, 11thDist 2005]; Smith v Smith, 923 So 2d 732 [La Ct App, 1st Cir 2005]; State ofArizona v Morrison, 203 Ariz 489, 491, 56 P3d 63, 65 [Ct App, Div 1 2002];D'Onofrio v D'Onofrio, 344 NJ Super 147, 780 A2d 593 [2001]; Silas vSilas, 680 So 2d 368 [Ala Civ App 1996]). Consistent with this authority, theAppellate Term, Second Department, also recognized a "vicarious consent" exemption toNew York's eavesdropping statute in People v Clark (19 Misc 3d 6 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d& 11th Jud Dists 2008]), relying on the common-law rule that infants are oftendeemed incompetent to act on their own behalf, and that a parent or guardian must act forthem.
While, as we have noted, Penal Law § 250.05 serves the strong publicpolicy goal of protecting citizens from eavesdropping, we are not persuaded that the NewYork Legislature intended to subject parents to criminal penalties when, "out of concernfor the best interests of their minor child, they record that child's conversations" (Stateof Iowa v Spencer, 737 NW2d at 134). Given the similarity between the federalwiretap statute and New York's eavesdropping statute, and recognizing that the"vicarious consent" exemption is rooted on a parent's need to act in the best interests ofhis or her child (see D'Onofrio v D'Onofrio, 344 NJ Super at 156, 780 A2d at598), we deem it appropriate to adopt it as an exemption to Penal Law§ 250.05.
Here, the People sufficiently demonstrated that the father had a "good faith,objectively reasonable basis to believe" that it was necessary for the welfare of the infantto record the conversation (Pollock v Pollock, 154 F3d at 610), such that hecould consent to the recording on the infant's behalf (see People v Clark, 19 Misc3d at 7-8; see also Pollock v Pollock, 154 F3d at 610; Thompson v Dulaney,838 F Supp at 1545). Accordingly, the "vicarious consent" exemption applies, andadmission of the subject recording was not barred by CPLR 4506.
The prosecutor made improper comments during summation, suggesting that themother would not have "put [the defendant] through this arrest, indictment, a trial, ajury," if he had not participated in the assault against the infant. Since the mother nevergave any testimony against the defendant, and did not initiate the arrest or prosecution ofthe defendant, the prosecutor's comments were not supported by the record, and were,indeed, misleading. Even so, those comments did not deprive the defendant of a fair trialsince the trial court immediately sustained the defendant's objection to them, and struckthem from the record (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 111 [1976]). The juryis presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions (see People v Baker, 14 NY3d266, 274 [2010]).
The other challenged comments by the prosecutor were fair comment on theevidence [*3]with the reasonable inferences to be drawntherefrom, were responsive to defense counsel's summation, or otherwise did not deprivethe defendant of a fair trial (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d at 109-110; People v Hawley, 112 AD3d968, 969 [2013]).
The defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failureto call certain individuals to testify is based, in part, on matter appearing on the record,and in part, on matter outside the record, and thus constitutes a "mixed claim" ofineffective assistance (People vMaxwell, 89 AD3d 1108, 1109 [2011]). In this case, it is not evident from thematter appearing on the record that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistanceof counsel (cf. People v Crump, 53 NY2d 824, 825 [1981]; People vBrown, 45 NY2d 852, 853-854 [1978]). "Since the defendant's claim of ineffectiveassistance of counsel cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside the record, aCPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety"(People v Addison, 107AD3d 730, 732 [2013]; People v Freeman, 93 AD3d 805, 806 [2012]).
Any "variance between the trial judge's charge to the jury, on the one hand, and theallegations of an indictment, on the other, may be considered harmless where there is nopossibility that the jury premised its determination of guilt upon a theory not contained inthe indictment" (People v Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245, 261 [1989]). Since, in thiscase, "under no rational view of the evidence" could the jury have convicted thedefendant based upon any uncharged theory, the error concerning the charge washarmless (id. at 262; seePeople v King, 116 AD3d 424 [2014]; People v Whitecloud, 110 AD3d 626, 626-627[2013]).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro sesupplemental brief, are without merit. Eng, P.J., Dillon, Duffy and Barros, JJ.,concur.