Matter of Cobleskill Stone Prods., Inc. v Town ofSchoharie
2015 NY Slip Op 01851 [126 AD3d 1094]
March 5, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 29, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Cobleskill Stone Products, Inc.,Appellant-Respondent, v Town of Schoharie et al.,Respondents-Appellants.

Stack Law Office, Syracuse (Rosemary Stack of counsel), forappellant-respondent.

Young Sommer LLC, Albany (David C. Brennan of counsel), forrespondents-appellants.

Peters, P.J. Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), enteredAugust 5, 2013 in Schoharie County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted respondents' motion forpartial summary judgment.

As more fully set forth in our prior decisions in this matter (112 AD3d 1024 [2013];95 AD3d 1636 [2012]), petitioner operates a quarry in the Town of Schoharie, SchoharieCounty, which has been in operation since the 1890s. Pursuant to respondent Town ofSchoharie's 1975 zoning ordinance, "[c]ommercial [e]xcavation or [m]ining" was apermitted use upon receipt of a special permit from the Town. In 2000, while thisordinance was in effect, petitioner purchased an additional parcel of real property to thesouth of the areas that it actively mined. Petitioner did not apply for a special permit, butsought to amend its Department of Environmental Conservation mining permit to includethe new parcel and other adjacent property that it owned which, at that time, wasunmined and unpermitted. During the pendency of that application, the Town adopted anew zoning ordinance, Local Law No. 2 (2005) of the Town of Schoharie (hereinafterLocal Law No. 2), which, among other things, prohibited mining in agricultural zones,where petitioner's property is located.

Petitioner then commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding anddeclaratory [*2]judgment action seeking, as is relevanthere, a judgment declaring that it has a vested right to quarry as a preexistingnonconforming use under Local Law No. 2 and any subsequently enacted prohibitoryzoning amendment. Supreme Court granted petitioner's motion for partial summaryjudgment on this cause of action. Upon appeal, this Court reversed Supreme Court'sjudgment, finding that questions of fact persisted as to whether petitioner had a vestedright to mine the southern property (95 AD3d at 1637-1639). On remittal, respondentsmoved for partial summary judgment on the same cause of action, alleging that petitionercould not establish a vested right to mine the southern property based on anonconforming use because it never sought or obtained a special permit, as required bythe 1975 zoning ordinance. Alternatively, respondents argued that the Town nonethelesswould have had a rational basis, supported by substantial evidence, to deny any specialpermit under the Town's 1975 zoning ordinance. Supreme Court granted respondents'motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the vested right cause ofaction,[FN1]prompting these cross appeals.[FN2]

We reverse. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly rejected the notion that "permits area prerequisite to establishing prior nonconforming use rights" (Buffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. vTown of Cheektowaga, 13 NY3d 88, 101 [2009]; see Jones v Town of Carroll,15 NY3d 139, 144 [2010]; Glacial Aggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire, 14 NY3d127, 137-138 [2010]; seealso Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 75 AD3d 978, 981 [2010]). Thus,although a special permit was required for mining operations between 1975 and 2005,petitioner's failure to obtain one does not, as a matter of law, preclude it fromestablishing that it has a vested right to mine on its property notwithstanding a current orfuture prohibitive zoning ordinance (see id.). Accordingly, Supreme Court erredin granting partial summary judgment to respondents dismissing the vested right cause ofaction based on petitioner's failure to obtain a special permit pursuant to the 1975 zoningordinance.

Further, we do not find that Supreme Court's subsequent judgment partially grantingthe petition and annulling Local Law No. 2 renders the instant appeal moot. Should anew zoning ordinance with the same prohibition against mining be enacted, a declarationthat petitioner had a vested right as against the earlier law would affect the rights of theparties (see Matter of City ofGlens Falls v Town of Queensbury, 90 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2011]).

Finally, respondents argue that they are nevertheless entitled to partial summaryjudgment on the additional and alternative ground that the Town would have had arational basis to deny any special permit under its 1975 zoning ordinance. Whilerespondents request that we remit the matter to Supreme Court to address this alternativeargument in the first instance, we [*3]decline to do soand instead reach such argument in the interest of judicial economy (see Faler v Haines, 104 AD3d1120, 1121 [2013]). Notably, the record contains no application for such a permitand, thus, there is no evidence regarding the purported basis upon which the Town coulddeny such application. Accordingly, respondents' claim in this regard is entirelyspeculative and nonjusticiable (see Matter of Association for a Matter of Association for a BetterLong Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 97 AD3d 1085,1087 [2012], mod on other grounds 23 NY3d 1 [2014]; see generally Matterof Wal-Mart Stores v Campbell, 238 AD2d 831, 832-833 [1997]; Matter ofDun-Rite Towing v Village of Tarrytown, 215 AD2d 654, 654 [1995]). The parties'remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined andfound to be lacking in merit.

McCarthy, Garry and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the cross appeal is dismissed,without costs. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, motiondenied and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistentwith this Court's decision.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:After Supreme Courtdismissed the vested right cause of action, it issued a judgment deciding some of theremaining causes of action and annulling Local Law No. 2. As a result, the 1975 zoningordinance is currently in effect in the Town. Although petitioner applied for a specialpermit pursuant to this ordinance in April 2014, the Town swiftly enacted a moratoriumon, among other things, special permits for mining that remains in effect.

Footnote 2:Inasmuch as SupremeCourt's order granted respondents' motion for partial summary judgment, they are notaggrieved and their cross appeal must be dismissed (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Covel v Town ofPeru, 123 AD3d 1244, 1246 n [2014]).


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