Betz v Carbone
2015 NY Slip Op 01914 [126 AD3d 743]
March 11, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 29, 2015


[*1]
 Debra Betz, Respondent,
v
Carmela Carbone,Appellant.

Davis LLP, New York, N.Y. (Eric M. Davis of counsel), for appellant.

Bashian & Farber, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Andrew Frisenda of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action to recover damages for unjust enrichment and conversion, the defendantappeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), dated April3, 2014, which denied her motion to vacate a judgment of the same court datedNovember 18, 2013, entered upon her failure to answer the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

To vacate a judgment entered upon her failure to answer the complaint, thedefendant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default and apotentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; EugeneDi Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. ofQueens v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 120 AD3d 1322, 1323 [2014]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vHampton, 119 AD3d 856 [2014]). While the court has discretion to accept lawoffice failure as a reasonable excuse, a pattern of willful default and neglect should notbe excused (see Vardaros vZapas, 105 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2013]; Bazoyah v Herschitz, 79 AD3d 1081, 1081 [2010];Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 569 [1997]).

Here, the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default ininterposing an answer. Her prior attorney did not adequately explain his failure tointerpose an answer even though opposing counsel agreed to an overall extension ofapproximately 11/2 months to do so (see White v Daimler Chrysler Corp., 44 AD3d 651, 652[2007]; Rodriguez v Ng, 23AD3d 450, 451 [2005]; John G. Trautwein Fish Co. v Gerland, 201 AD2d862, 863 [1994]). Furthermore, the prior attorney's claims of law office failure to explainthe default in opposing the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment wereinsufficient to justify the additional delay of approximately 41/2 months inmoving to vacate the default judgment after the court granted the plaintiff's motion(see Vardaros v Zapas, 105 AD3d at 1038; Heidari v First Advance Funding Corp., 55 AD3d 669, 670[2008]; Ortega v Bisogno& Meyerson, 38 AD3d 510, 511 [2007]). In view of the lack of areasonable excuse, it is unnecessary to consider whether the defendant demonstrated theexistence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Vardaros v Zapas,105 AD3d at 1038; Maida vLessing's Rest. [*2]Servs., Inc., 80 AD3d 732[2011]; O'Donnell vFrangakis, 76 AD3d 999 [2010]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to vacate thejudgment entered upon her failure to answer the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Hall, Roman,Cohen and Barros, JJ., concur.


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