| Matter of Steven F. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 03244 [127 AD3d 536] |
| April 16, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Steven F., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Marcia Egger of counsel),for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Antonella Karlin of counsel),for presentment agency.
Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Peter J. Passidomo, J.), enteredon or about January 27, 2014, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon hisadmission that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute thecrime of sexual abuse in the first degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 12months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress his statements to the police."The record establishes that appellant was not questioned until after the police gaveMiranda warnings to both appellant and his mother" (Matter of Johnny H., 111AD3d 576 [1st Dept 2013]). The evidence established that appellant's waiver of hisMiranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, since, "in the presence ofhis mother," appellant "clearly and unequivocally stated that he understood each right,and gave no indication to the contrary" (Matter of Lyndell C., 23 AD3d 306 [1st Dept 2005]).Evidence of appellant's difficulties with comprehension in school does not warrant adifferent conclusion, especially since the interrogating detective had appellant state andwrite that he understood each warning before proceeding to the next one. Regardless ofwhether the best practice would have been to read from a juvenile version of theMiranda warnings containing supplemental explanations of the standardphrasings, the detective's failure to do so did not render appellant's waiver involuntaryunder the circumstances. Furthermore, the voluntariness of the statement was notundermined by any coercive interrogation (see Matter of Jimmy D., 15 NY3d 417, 424 [2010]). Thedetective's interrogation tactics, such as confronting appellant with incriminatingevidence and expressing disbelief in appellant's initial account, were not improper.Appellant's contention that the room in which he was questioned failed to comply withFamily Court Act § 305.2 is unpreserved, and we decline to review it in theinterest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find it unavailing (see Matter of Trayvon J., 103AD3d 413 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862 [2013]).
Probation was the least restrictive dispositional alternative consistent with appellant'sneeds and the community's need for protection (see Matter of Katherine W., 62NY2d 947 [1984]). The 12-month period of supervision was warranted by, among otherthings, appellant's underlying sexual conduct toward a very young child, his misbehaviorin school, his struggles with acceptance of responsibility, and the recommendation of theProbation Department (see e.g. Matter of Zion F., 92 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2012]). Inaddition, a six-month adjournment in contemplation of dismissal would not haveprovided sufficient supervision, because appellant was in need of a therapy program thatwas scheduled to last for one year (see Matter of Yonathan A., 70 AD3d 602 [1st Dept 2010]).We note that Family Court expressed a willingness to seal or [*2]vacate the finding against appellant upon his successfulcompletion of probation, which would foreclose any possibility that appellant might berequired to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction. Concur—Mazzarelli,J.P., Friedman, Manzanet-Daniels, Clark and Kapnick, JJ.