People v Owens
2015 NY Slip Op 03270 [127 AD3d 561]
April 21, 2015
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 3, 2015


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Ricky Owens, Appellant.

Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Paul Wiener of counsel), forappellant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Nancy D. Killian of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Cassandra M. Mullen, J.), renderedAugust 16, 2010, as amended August 27, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, ofmanslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree,and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 17years, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reducing the sentence forcriminal possession of a weapon to a term of 31/2 to 7 years, and otherwiseaffirmed.

Overwhelming evidence supports the verdict against defendant. Unbiased eyewitnessJaime Lopez testified that he saw the fatal shooting of Jose Ibanez on December 28, 2006at approximately 2:15 p.m., and he identified defendant as the attacker. Detective LuisAponte, who arrived at the scene soon thereafter and gathered information from Lopezand other witnesses, testified that the day after the shooting he received a phone call fromIbanez's girlfriend, Sheila Sanchez, and later spoke with her in person.

Sanchez testified at trial about an incident that occurred almost two months beforethe shooting, on October 31, 2006, at about 2:30 p.m. She and her six-year-old son werein a costume store with Ibanez, when Ibanez was approached from behind by two blackmen, one who was shorter, more muscular, and had a lighter complexion than hiscompanion. The shorter man asked, "[H]ey Ibanez, do you remember me?" When Ibanezturned around, extending his hand for a handshake, this man began to punch him, and thetaller man joined in the attack. After Sanchez told the owner of the store to call thepolice, the two men left the store. Three or four minutes after they left, Ibanez made atelephone call. According to Sanchez's testimony, when she was interviewed the dayafter Ibanez was killed, she told the police about the Halloween incident, including adescription of the phone call. She did not name in her testimony the person whom shebelieved Ibanez had called.

Sanchez subsequently identified defendant's brother, Jason Owens, as the taller andless muscular of the two attackers. She did not identify the shorter man, who said, "[H]eyIbanez, do you remember me?"

Detective Aponte testified that as a result of his conversations with Sanchez, hecontacted the victim's cousin, Robert Pellerano, and that as a result of his conversationswith Pellerano and some further investigation, he arrested defendant.

Robert Pellerano testified that starting in about February 1998, he and his cousin JoseIbanez were both housed in a unit of Rikers Island, while defendant arrived at the sameunit in November 1998. Pellerano explained that Ibanez was the self-appointed "ownerof the house," meaning that he "r[a]n" the area, and all other inmates had to either obeyhis orders or be subject to negative repercussions. Pellerano testified that in lateDecember 1998 or early January 1999, a fight was supposed to take place betweenIbanez and another inmate, for which defendant was asked to act as a "holster" forIbanez, assigned to "get a shank" and provide it to Ibanez if Ibanez requested it.However, when the time came for the fight, defendant failed to obtain the weapon. Later,in front of the entire housing area, Ibanez kicked defendant in the face and tried to cuthim, [*2]but could not complete his attack because"[t]hey made us lock in," but defendant was left crying in front of his cell, in view of theother inmates.

Pellerano and Ibanez were both released from Rikers Island in April 1999. WhenPellerano subsequently returned to the same unit in June of 2000, it was defendant whowas "running" that prison area. Pellerano and defendant had a fight on one occasion,during which defendant was "trash talking" about Pellerano and Ibanez.

Pellerano was permitted to testify that he received a phone call from Ibanez onHalloween 2006, at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 p.m., and that the "name mentionedbetween [him] and Jose Ibanez" during the call was "Ricky Owens." Pellerano furthertestified that he relayed to Detective Aponte the conversation he had with Ibanez onHalloween 2006.

Detective Aponte also established that defendant was paroled from state custody onOctober 26, 2006, five days before the assault in the costume store.

Defendant contends that the part of Pellerano's testimony conveying that duringIbanez's telephone call to him, Ibanez told him that defendant was one of his assailants,was inadmissible both as violative of the Confrontation Clause and as hearsay.

Initially, we observe that the challenged testimony does not fall within the ambit ofthe Confrontation Clause because it was not "testimonial" (see e.g. People v Gantt, 48AD3d 59, 69-71 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 765 [2008]). However,the hearsay nature of Pellerano's testimony relating Ibanez's out-of-court statement toPellerano identifying defendant as his assailant—either by name or by anidentifying description that allowed Pellerano to name him—was not remedied byframing the query posed to Pellerano as seeking the "name mentioned between you andJose Ibanez" during the call.

We do not adopt the trial court's reasoning that the admission of this hearsayevidence was necessary to convey a coherent narrative of the relevant events or toeliminate the possibility of jury confusion about the extent of Pellerano's knowledge (see People v Beato, 124 AD3d516 [1st Dept 2015]). However, we find that the error was harmless under theapplicable standard of People v Crimmins (36 NY2d 230, 242 [1975]), whichprovides that error is reversible where "there is a significant probability, rather than onlya rational possibility, in the particular case that the jury would have acquitted thedefendant had it not been for the error or errors which occurred." We perceive no suchprobability that the jury would have acquitted without that challenged portion ofPellerano's testimony. The admissible evidence included Lopez's eyewitnessidentification, along with Pellerano's testimony regarding defendant's humiliation atIbanez's hands on Rikers Island, and the recovery of the murder weapon in defendant'sbrother's room. Further, even without the hearsay there was strong evidence thatdefendant was the second Halloween attacker, namely, a physical description consistentwith defendant's appearance; the evidence that the assailant asked Ibanez if he"remembered" him; and the identification of defendant's brother as the second man whoassaulted Ibanez. Indeed, the overwhelming evidence would satisfy the constitutionalharmless error standard as well.

As to the trial court's admission of testimony suggesting inferentially that theeyewitness identified defendant from a photo array, any error in that regard washarmless.

Defendant's claim pursuant to CPL 270.35 (1) and People v Buford (69NY2d 290, 298 [1987]) is unpreserved in light of his failure to request that the courtmake inquiry of the possibly unqualified jurors, despite having had ample opportunity todo so (see People v Hicks, 6NY3d 737, 739 [2005]; People v Gonzalez, 247 AD2d 328, 328-329 [1stDept 1998]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.

The court did not err in submitting the charge of manslaughter in the first degree tothe jury; there was a reasonable view of the evidence under which defendant intended toseriously injure the victim, but not to kill him.

Finally, it is undisputed that the seven-year term imposed for the weapon possessioncount was illegal. The People agree with defendant that, as reflected on the original andamended sentence and commitment sheets, the court mistakenly believed that defendantwas convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree—andsentenced him accordingly—when in fact he was convicted of criminal possessionof a weapon in the third degree. However, because a concurrent sentence was imposedon the weapon possession charge, [*3]its alteration willnot affect defendant's aggregate sentence. Accordingly, rather than remanding forre-sentencing on the third-degree weapon possession count, this Court simply modifiesthe sentence so as to impose the minimum term of 31/2 to 7 years on thatcount. Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, DeGrasse and Gische, JJ.


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