Boice v Hirschbihl
2015 NY Slip Op 04191 [128 AD3d 1215]
May 14, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 1, 2015


[*1]
 Florence J. Boice, Individually and as Executor ofEmma H. Boice, Deceased, Appellant, v Angelica Hirschbihl et al.,Respondents.

Dennis B. Schlenker, Albany, and Law Office of John D. Hoggan, PLLC, Albany(John D. Hoggan Jr. of counsel), for appellant.

Maynard, O'Connor, Smith & Catalinotto, LLP, Albany (Justin W. Gray ofcounsel), for respondents.

Clark, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered January9, 2014 in Columbia County, which, among other things, partially granted defendants'motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff and defendants own adjoining parcels of land in the Town of Germantown,Columbia County and share possession of a 15-foot-wide right-of-way over propertyowned by members of the McLean family (hereinafter the McLean property), whichallows the parties ingress and egress to their respective premises. At the time thatdefendants acquired their property, plaintiff's mother, Emma H. Boice (hereinafterdecedent), resided at the adjoining property. In 2002, defendants—purportedlywith decedent's permission and cooperation—installed an antique gate on theMcLean property within the area of the right-of-way and, the following year, constructeda small balustrade next to the gate. Following decedent's death in October 2008, plaintiffinherited the property and began to reside there.

[*2] Plaintiff commenced this action in November 2009sounding in, among other things,[FN1] wrongful interference, nuisance andtrespass, seeking punitive damages and a declaratory judgment compelling the removalof various obstructions that she alleges defendants created within the area of theright-of-way, including shrubbery and split rail fences, a stone retaining wall and theaforementioned balustrade and gate, which plaintiff claimed was often chained andlocked. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaintarguing, among other things, that there had been no unreasonable interference withplaintiff's use of the right-of-way. Supreme Court partially granted defendants' motion,finding that issues of fact existed as to whether defendants had chained and/or locked thegate on the right-of-way, thus interfering with plaintiff's use thereof. Plaintiff appealsfrom so much of the court's order as dismissed her other claims.

We affirm. It is well settled that "[t]he extent and nature of an easement must bedetermined by the language contained in the grant, aided where necessary by anycircumstances tending to manifest the intent of the parties" (Sambrook v Sierocki, 53 AD3d817, 818 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Raven Indus., Inc. vIrvine, 40 AD3d 1241, 1242 [2007]; Hopper v Friery, 260 AD2d 964,966 [1999]). Here, the easement specifically granted plaintiff and defendants the right of"ingress and egress and for electric, gas, water, sewer and similar services over, underand along [the] farm road" on the McLean property. Importantly then, "[a] right of wayalong a private road belonging to another person does not give the [easement holder] aright that the road shall be in no respect altered or the width decreased, for his [or her]right . . . is merely a right to pass with the convenience to which he [or she]has been accustomed" (Lewis v Young, 92 NY2d 443, 449 [1998] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]). In the absence of a demonstrated intent toprovide otherwise, an easement of ingress and egress may be narrowed, covered, gated orfenced off, " 'so long as the easement holder's right of passage is notimpaired' " (Thibodeauv Martin, 119 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2014], quoting Lewis v Young, 92NY2d at 449; accord Sambrook v Sierocki, 53 AD3d at 818). Although plaintiffunpersuasively contends otherwise, the aforementioned standard also applies where theparties share access to a common right-of-way and one party makes alterations thereon(see e.g. Williams v McNee,80 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2011]; see also 5-40 Warren's Weed, New York RealProperty § 40.70 [4] [2014]).

Aside from the question of whether defendants had chained and/or locked the gate,which presents a separate issue more appropriately reserved for the finder of fact (see e.g. STS Steel, Inc. v MaxonAlco Holdings, LLC, 123 AD3d 1260, 1262 [2014]), the record before ussupports the partial granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment. Moreparticularly, photographs in the record clearly demonstrate that the shrubbery and splitrail fences are not within the portion of the easement used for ingress or egress.Additionally, plaintiff herself testified that the shrubbery has never interfered with herright to ingress and egress from her property while the fence posts have merely createdan "uncomfortable turn." Likewise, a survey in the record demonstrates that the stoneretaining wall is not located within the area of the right-of-way and, according toplaintiff, has not yet impaired her ingress and egress.

Although it is undisputed that both the gate and balustrade are within the area of thecommon right-of-way, the record is nonetheless insufficient to create an issue of fact asto the [*3]impairment of plaintiff's use thereof. The gate,which apparently weighs 80 pounds on each side, bisects the easement beyond each ofthe parties' homes, separating the gravel portion used to approach the homes from thegrass-covered portion that curves and extends down an embankment behind plaintiff'sresidence. Plaintiff testified that she is able to open the gate and walk throughit—which she does approximately once each year.[FN2] Additionally, large vehicles, such asvans and pick-up trucks, are able to be driven through the gate, although such task doesrequire the driver to first exit the vehicle and open the gate if it happens to be closed.Inasmuch as plaintiff's testimony that larger vehicles—for example, a vehicle usedfor making pool repairs—may not be able to use the right-of-way to access the rearof her property should the need arise, we agree with Supreme Court that suchspeculation, without more, is insufficient to satisfy plaintiff's shifted burden. Thus, therecord before us supports the finding that plaintiff's use of the common right-of-way hasnot been impaired by defendants' construction of the gate or balustrade (see Lewis vYoung, 92 NY2d at 449-450; Williams v McNee, 80 AD3d at 1021;Sambrook v Sierocki, 53 AD3d at 818). Based on the record before us, dismissalof plaintiff's nuisance and trespass claims was also warranted (see Schillaci v Sarris, 122AD3d 1085, 1087-1088 [2014]). Accordingly, we find no reason to reverse the orderof Supreme Court.

Garry, J.P., Egan Jr. and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:In her opposition papersto defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff withdrew her claims sounding indevaluation of real property interests, forcible or unlawful entry upon property, andremoval, destruction and damage to trees.

Footnote 2:To be clear, walkingthrough the gate is only one of a variety of ways that plaintiff is able to access the rear ofher property on foot.


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