Matter of Lyons v Superintendent of State Police
2015 NY Slip Op 04892 [129 AD3d 1238]
June 11, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Seamus Lyons, Petitioner, vSuperintendent of State Police, et al., Respondents.

Law Office of Terrance P. Dwyer, Poughkeepsie (Terrance P. Dwyer of counsel), forpetitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), forrespondents.

Lahtinen, J.P. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination ofrespondent Division of State Police Hearing Board which found petitioner guilty ofmisconduct.

An internal investigation by the State Police regarding missing evidence resulted inmisconduct charges against petitioner, a State Trooper, for allegedly failing to obey alawful order to truthfully answer questions and knowingly making a false entry in officialrecords. Following a disciplinary hearing, respondent Division of State Police HearingBoard found petitioner guilty of the two charges and recommended 60 days unpaidsuspension, one year of probation and a letter of censure. Thereafter, a police captainshowed petitioner a determination already signed by respondent Superintendent of StatePolice that terminated petitioner's employment, and the captain told petitioner that he had10 minutes in which to resign or he would be terminated. Petitioner resigned.

Petitioner subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to bereinstated. Respondents moved to dismiss asserting that petitioner's decision to resignresulted in no final agency determination. In January 2014, Supreme Court denied themotion, finding that there had been a final agency determination given the proof thatpetitioner had been shown a termination letter already signed by the Superintendent andthen allowed only 10 minutes to [*2]either resign or hewould be fired. Respondents' motion to reconsider was denied in May 2014 and,thereafter, an order was entered in August 2014 transferring the case to this Court forreview of the substantial evidence question.

Initially, we consider respondents' argument that, since petitioner resigned, there wasno final agency action over which the Court has jurisdiction. Although a resignation"would ordinarily be beyond our review, exceptions exist where . . . theresignation was allegedly ineffective and involuntary" (Matter of Melber v New York StateEduc. Dept., 71 AD3d 1216, 1217 n [2010] [citation omitted]). It is undisputedthat the Superintendent had signed a written decision terminating petitioner'semployment. Significantly, the document was handed to petitioner and he was then toldthat he had 10 minutes to accept an "option" of resigning. Under the narrowcircumstances, petitioner was effectively terminated by a final agency action when hewas handed the signed termination document.

Turning to the merits, our review is limited to whether the agency's determination issupported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Revella v Felton, 60 AD3d 1184, 1185[2009]). Credibility determinations are for the administrative factfinder when conflictingproof is presented (see Matter ofBassett v Fenton, 68 AD3d 1385, 1387 [2009]; Matter of Tessiero v Bennett,50 AD3d 1368, 1369 [2008]). Petitioner and a police investigator were assigned totransport cocaine and marihuana that had been seized and then to secure the illegalsubstances in an evidence locker at a police lab. However, the evidence was lost. Duringthe ensuing investigation, petitioner gave statements and made factual claims that werecontradicted by, among other things, proof provided by EZ Pass records, electronic keyrecords, and cell phone records. Petitioner contended that he had interacted with aninvestigator at the lab where the lost evidence was to be delivered, but records reflectedthat such investigator was not working on that date and, moreover, an investigator whowas working stated that petitioner had not been at the lab. Despite various monitoringsystems that were in place at the lab, there was no indication that petitioner or theinvestigator who accompanied him were at the lab or accessed the evidence locker on theday in question. Efforts by police to recreate the routes and times that petitioner claimedhe traveled revealed that the routes could not be traveled as claimed by petitioner.Although petitioner offered explanations for some of the many discrepancies, this createda credibility question which was resolved against him. Substantial evidence supports theadministrative determination.

With regard to the penalty, we have observed that "a State Trooper holds a positionof great sensitivity and trust and a higher standard of fitness and character pertains topolice officers than to ordinary civil servants" (Matter of Bassett v Fenton, 68AD3d at 1387-1388 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). In lightof findings of repeated false statements where the underlying matter implicated missingevidence, together with the failure to accept responsibility even when confronted withcontrary documentary proof, we cannot say that the penalty shocks our sense of fairness(see id. at 1388; see alsoMatter of Salatel v New York State Police, 98 AD3d 1214, 1216 [2012]).

McCarthy, Garry and Rose, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.


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