Matter of Meier v Village of Champlain Zoning Bd. ofAppeals
2015 NY Slip Op 05245 [129 AD3d 1364]
June 18, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Stephen J. Meier, Appellant, v Villageof Champlain Zoning Board of Appeals, Respondent.

Stephen J. Meier, Champlain, appellant pro se.

Justin R. Meyer, Plattsburgh, for respondent.

Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Muller, J.), entered October31, 2013 in Clinton County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner'sapplication for an interpretation of the Village of Champlain's Zoning Code.

Petitioner owns a residence in the Village of Champlain, Clinton County where,beginning in 2011, he kept several chickens. Pursuant to the Village of ChamplainZoning Code, petitioner's home is located in a residential district and, in 2013, theZoning Enforcement Officer for the Village, Michael Tetreault, notified petitioner that hewas not allowed to keep chickens at his residence as such use was considered agriculturaland not permitted in a residential zoning district. In response, petitioner applied torespondent for an appeal, seeking an interpretation of the Village Zoning Code and anappeal from Tetreault's decision. Following a meeting of respondent, petitioner'sapplication was denied and Tetreault's interpretation was affirmed. Petitionersubsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul respondent'sdetermination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition and petitioner now appeals.

We affirm. Generally, a zoning board's interpretation of a zoning law is affordedgreat deference and will only be disturbed "if it is irrational or unreasonable" (Matter of Mack v Board ofAppeals, Town of Homer, 25 AD3d 977, 980 [2006]; accord Matter of Subdivisions, Inc.v Town of Sullivan, 92 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d811 [2012]). However, "no [*2]deference is required ifthe question is merely the pure legal interpretation of an ordinance" (Matter of Salton v Town ofMayfield Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 AD3d 1113, 1114 [2014]; see Matterof Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 92 AD3d at 1185). Further, zoning lawsare "strictly construed against the municipality that enacted them and 'any ambiguity inthe language employed must be resolved in favor of the property owner' "(Matter of Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 92 AD3d at 1185, quotingMatter of Bonded Concrete v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Saugerties, 268AD2d 771, 774 [2000], lv denied 94 NY2d 764 [2000]; see Matter of Saltonv Town of Mayfield Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 AD3d at 1114).

Here, Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-20 (B) states that thepermitted uses in an R1 residential district are "[o]ne- and two-family dwellings" and"[a]ccessory uses." The code allows for accessory uses that are "of a nature customarilyincidental and subordinate to the principal use or structure, such as garages, outbuildings,swimming pools, energy collection devices and the keeping of domesticated animals"(Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-16). The code also defines"agriculture" as "[t]he use of land for agricultural purposes, including tilling of the soil,dairying, pasture, apiculture, arboriculture, horticulture, floriculture, viticulture, forestry,animal and poultry husbandry and the necessary accessory uses for packing or storing ofproducts" (Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-16). The code furtherstates that "[a]ny use not listed as permitted [w]ithin a [z]oning district is assumed to beprohibited in that [z]oning district" (Village of Champlain Zoning Code§ 119-191).

Insofar as petitioner seeks an interpretation of the Village of Champlain ZoningCode to determine whether the keeping of chickens fell within a permissible accessoryuse or an impermissible agricultural use, the question before us is purely legal. In thisregard, respondent affirmed Tetrault's interpretation of the code as classifying thekeeping of chickens as an agricultural use and determined that such use was notpermitted in a residential zone. Because poultry husbandry is included in the definition ofagriculture (see Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-16), thisinterpretation was neither irrational nor unreasonable (see Matter of Salton v Town ofMayfield Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 AD3d at 1114-1115; Sarris v Town of Clifton Park,38 AD3d 981, 983 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 814 [2007]). Accordingly,reversal is not warranted.

Petitioner's remaining contentions, to the extent that they are properly before us, havebeen examined and found to be without merit.

McCarthy, J.P., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.


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