Matter of Salton v Town of Mayfield Zoning Bd. ofAppeals
2014 NY Slip Op 02362 [116 AD3d 1113]
April 3, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 28, 2014


In the Matter of Steven A. Salton, Appellant, v Town ofMayfield Zoning Board of Appeals, Respondent.

—[*1]Hodgson Russ, LLP, Albany (Christian J. Soller of counsel), for appellant.

Murphy, Niles & Greco, Johnstown (Carmel J. Greco of counsel), forrespondent.

McCarthy, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Aulisi, J.), enteredDecember 7, 2012 in Fulton County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent findingthat petitioner was conducting an unauthorized home occupation.

A code enforcement officer employed by the Town of Mayfield, Fulton Countyinformed petitioner that the Town deemed that he was operating a home occupationwithout authorization. The alleged home occupation consisted of petitioner running abusiness by keeping exotic animals, including three tigers and two leopards, on hisproperty under state and federal licenses that required his exhibition of the large cats, andallegedly collecting fees from people to view the animals. Respondent upheld the codeenforcement officer's determination, finding that petitioner's activities qualified as ahome occupation and did not predate the enactment of the zoning law. Petitionercommenced this proceeding to annul respondent's determination. Supreme Courtdismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals.[FN*][*2]

Courts should only overturn an action by azoning board of appeals if the action was arbitrary, capricious, illegal, irrational orunsupported by the record (seeMatter of Schaller v Town of New Paltz Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 108 AD3d821, 823 [2013]; Matter ofOhrenstein v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Canaan, 39 AD3d 1041,1041-1042 [2007]). Courts grant deference to a board's interpretation of an ambiguouszoning law, but no deference is required if the question is merely the pure legalinterpretation of an ordinance (see Matter of Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 92 AD3d1184, 1185 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 811 [2012]). Zoning regulationsmust be strictly construed against the enacting municipality and any ambiguity must beresolved in favor of the property owner (see id.; Matter of Ohrenstein vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Canaan, 39 AD3d at 1042; Matter of BondedConcrete v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Saugerties, 268 AD2d 771, 774[2000], lv denied 94 NY2d 764 [2000]).

Pursuant to the Town's Zoning Law, "[h]ome [o]ccupations are defined as businesseswhere the owner resides on the property and where the activities of the business areconducted inside the residence, a legally constructed accessory building, or at off-sitelocations" (Zoning Law [2008] of the Town of Mayfield § 202 [A] [42]). Anyoneconsidering a home occupation must present their concept to the Town Planning Boardfor approval (see Zoning Law [2008] of the Town of Mayfield § 202 [A][42]). The pertinent questions here are whether petitioner was operating a homeoccupation and, if so, whether his actions were grandfathered in by predating theenactment of the Zoning Law.

Petitioner lives on the same property that contains the cages holding the large cats.The record contains conflicting evidence regarding whether petitioner is operating abusiness. Petitioner asserts that he does not have any employees, file business taxes orhave business insurance, makes no profit and does not charge people to view the animals.On the other hand, he listed a business name on one of his license applications. Hisbusiness card—which displays the business name, with petitioner asowner—lists prices for adults and children to see the animals. This evidencesupports a finding that he is operating a business concerning the exhibition of theanimals.

Petitioner contends that the activities occur in the cages on his property, not in anybuilding on the property or any off-site location. There is no evidence in this record toshow that business activities are conducted "inside the residence" or "at off-sitelocations," so such activities must be conducted in "a legally constructed accessorybuilding" to fall within the ordinance (Zoning Law [2008] of the Town of Mayfield§ 202 [A] [42]). An "[a]ccessory [s]tructure" is defined as a building "which islocated on the same lot" as, and "the use of which is incidental to that of," a one- ortwo-family dwelling (Zoning Law [2008] of the Town of Mayfield § 202 [A] [1])."Building" is defined as a one- or two-family dwelling or portion thereof "intended to beused for human habitation" but also "shall include accessory structures thereto" (ZoningLaw [2008] of the Town of Mayfield § 202 [A] [10]). While cages would notgenerally be considered buildings, the Zoning Law contains a section on "[w]ord[u]sage" stating that "[t]he word 'building' includes the word 'structure' " (Zoning Law[2008] of the Town of Mayfield § 201). That provision clarifies any ambiguityconcerning the definitions of the relevant terms here, as a cage that is built into theground—like these cages apparently are—can be considered a structure, andthe cages are on the same lot as and incidental to the use of [*3]petitioner's residence (compare Faler v Haines, 104 AD3d 1120, 1120 [2013];Matter of Ohrenstein v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Canaan, 39 AD3d at1042-1043). The code enforcement officer did not assert that the cages were illegallyconstructed. Thus, as petitioner is carrying on business activities in legally constructedaccessory structures, he is operating a home occupation.

As to the timing, the record supports respondent's determination that petitioner'sbusiness activities did not predate the enactment of the Zoning Law on August 9, 2005.Petitioner asserts that he has possessed a macaw since the mid-1990s, but the animals atissue here are the large cats that are in outdoor cages. While petitioner asserts that heobtained his first tiger in July 2005, the record indicates that he did not apply for his statelicense until 2006, did not obtain his federal license until 2007, was cited by theDepartment of Environmental Conservation on August 3, 2005 for having a tiger withoutany permits and surrendered the tiger temporarily on August 15, 2005 while his courtcase was pending. He, therefore, did not lawfully have any large cats in his possessionwhen the Zoning Law was enacted on August 9, 2005. Accordingly, respondent'sdetermination that petitioner was required to comply with that ordinance had a rationalbasis, was supported by record evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal (see Matter of Pecoraro v Board ofAppeals of Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608, 613 [2004]; Matter ofCitizens Against Illegal Zoning v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Rochester, 276AD2d 897, 899 [2000]).

Petitioner's remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be withoutmerit.

Peters, P.J., Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *: We agree withrespondent's assertion that petitioner impermissibly included documents in the record thatwere not before respondent as part of its administrative review (see Matter of Center of Deposit,Inc. v Village of Deposit, 108 AD3d 851, 853 [2013]). Accordingly, we havenot considered pages 97-199 of the record.


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