North Oyster Bay Baymen's Assn. v Town of OysterBay
2015 NY Slip Op 06225 [130 AD3d 885]
July 22, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 2, 2015


[*1]
 North Oyster Bay Baymen's Association et al.,Respondents-Appellants,
v
Town of Oyster Bay, Respondent, and Frank M.Flower & Sons, Inc., Appellant-Respondent, et al.,Defendant.

Ettelman & Hochheiser, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Gary Ettelman of counsel),for appellant-respondent.

Warren S. Hecht, Forest Hills, N.Y. (Darren Berger of counsel), forrespondents-appellants.

Leonard Genova, Town Attorney, Oyster Bay, N.Y. (Matthew M. Rozea and DonnaSwanson of counsel), for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, for declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendant Frank M.Flower & Sons, Inc., appeals (1), as limited by its brief, from so much of an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.), entered July 5, 2013, as, uponconverting the action into a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, denied that branchof its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the first cause of action,and (2), as limited by its brief, from so much of a judgment of the same court enteredNovember 4, 2013, as, upon, inter alia, the order entered July 5, 2013, and a decision ofthe same court dated September 18, 2013, vacated a 30-year lease extension issued to itby the defendant Town of Oyster Bay on September 13, 1994, and remitted the matter tothe Town of Oyster Bay for the Town of Oyster Bay to conduct a clam density survey,and the plaintiffs, North Oyster Bay Baymen's Association, William E. Fetzer III, CraigOddo, William B. Painter, Frederick Menges, and James J. Schultz, cross-appeal, aslimited by their brief, from (1) so much of the order as granted those branches of theseparate motions of the defendants Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc., and the Town ofOyster Bay which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the third, fifth, sixth, andseventh causes of action, and (2) so much of the judgment as, upon the order, in effect,dismissed the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action.

Ordered that the appeal and cross appeal from the order are dismissed; and it isfurther,

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereofvacating the 30-year lease extension issued to the defendant Frank M. Flower and Sons,Inc., remitting the matter to the defendant Town of Oyster Bay for the Town of OysterBay to conduct a [*2]clam density survey, and, in effect,dismissing the seventh cause of action; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofaras appealed and cross-appealed from, with costs payable by the plaintiffs to thedefendants Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc., and the Town of Oyster Bay, theprovision in the order entered July 5, 2013, converting the action into a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78 is vacated, those branches of the separate motions of thedefendants Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc., and the Town of Oyster Bay which werepursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the seventh cause of action are denied, the order ismodified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County,for further proceedings on the complaint consistent herewith, and for the entry of ajudgment, inter alia, in favor of the defendant Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc., on thefirst cause of action declaring that the 30-year lease extension issued to the defendantFrank M. Flower & Sons, Inc., by the defendant Town of Oyster Bay on September13, 1994, pertains to lands that were "heretofore leased" as that term is used in section196-23 of the Town Code of the Town of Oyster Bay and therefore, the leased lands areexempt from the provision in section 196-23 of the Town Code of the Town of OysterBay which prohibits the Town of Oyster Bay from leasing underwater lands "where thereis an indicated presence of shellfish in sufficient quantity and quality and so located as tosupport significant hand raking and/or tonging and harvesting."

The appeal and cross appeal from the intermediate order entered July 5, 2013, mustbe dismissed, as the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of thejudgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issuesraised on the appeal and cross appeal from the order entered July 5, 2013, are brought upfor review and have been considered on the appeal and cross appeal from the judgment(see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The defendant Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter Flower), and itspredecessor in interest have been producers of shellfish, including clams and oysters,since 1887. In or about 1937, the defendant Town of Oyster Bay and Flower'spredecessor-in-interest executed certain underwater leases for shellfish cultivation. Theleases were subsequently assigned to Flower.

The plaintiff North Oyster Bay Baymen's Association (hereinafter the Association) isa not-for-profit corporation organized to protect, promote, and preserve the hard clamindustry in and around Oyster Bay, and the plaintiffs William E. Fetzer III, Craig Oddo,William B. Painter, Frederick Menges, and James J. Schultz, individual members of theAssociation, are shellfish diggers holding digger's permits pursuant to section 13-0311(1) of the Environmental Conservation Law and chapter 196 of the Town Code of theTown of Oyster Bay (hereinafter the Town Code).

In 1991, the Association, Fetzer, and several individuals who are not parties to thisaction commenced an action (hereinafter the 1991 Action) seeking, inter alia, to voidFlower's leases. In 1992, the parties in the 1991 Action entered into a stipulation ofsettlement (hereinafter the stipulation of settlement). Pursuant thereto, Flower agreed,among other things, (1) to release approximately 400 acres of land from the leasedpremises for public use, (2) to provide one million clam seeds per year for planting onunleased shellfish beds in Oyster Bay Harbor and Cold Spring Harbor (hereinaftertogether the Bay), (3) to provide a specified number of "boat days" per year which wereto be used for bay management purposes, and (4) to perform predator control in the Bay.The plaintiffs in the 1991 Action agreed, inter alia, to discourage poaching from theleased land and to acquiesce to certain cultivation methods employed by Flower,including the use of mechanical dredges.

In September 1993, partially in connection with the stipulation of settlement, theTown made certain amendments to Town Code chapter 196, the Marine Life Ordinance.As relevant here, Town Code § 196-23, entitled "Leasing of Land,"provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]ith the exceptionof lands heretofore leased, any additional underwater lands shall not be leased wherethere is an indicated presence of shellfish in sufficient quantity and quality and so locatedas to support significant hand raking and/or tonging and harvesting" (Town Code§ 196-23 [emphasis added]).

In September 1994, after a public hearing, the Town Board unanimously approvedan application by Flower to renew the underwater leases at issue for a 30-year term.Attached to the [*3]resolution approving the extensionwas a map delineating the leased lands.

On June 22, 2011, the plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, for a judgmentdeclaring the leases between Flower and the Town null and void. The plaintiffs alsosought, among other things, specific performance of the stipulation of settlement,damages, and injunctive relief. In this regard, the plaintiffs asserted, in the amendedcomplaint, 11 separate causes of action.

Flower and the Town separately moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuantto CPLR 3211 (a), arguing, inter alia, that the allegations in the complaint failed to state acause of action, that the complaint should be dismissed based on the doctrine of resjudicata and/or as barred by the statute of limitations, that the plaintiffs lacked standing,and that certain causes of action were contradicted by the documentary evidence.

In the order appealed and cross-appealed from, the Supreme Court granted thosebranches of the separate motions which were to dismiss the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, andseventh causes of action. The Supreme Court denied those branches of the separatemotions which were to dismiss the first, second, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causesof action. At the same time, the Supreme Court converted the action into a specialproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see CPLR 103 [c]) and scheduled ahearing on the issue of "whether, based upon conditions within four months of June 22,2011, the Town's finding that there was not a sufficient presence of shellfish to supportsignificant hand raking or tonging was arbitrary." After the hearing, the Supreme Courtissued a decision dated September 18, 2013, in which it purported to vacate the 30-year"lease extension" issued to Flower by the Town in September 1994. A judgment wasentered on November 4, 2013.

Flower argues that the 30-year lease extension should not have been vacated and, ineffect, that the Supreme Court instead should have granted that branch of its motionwhich was to dismiss the first cause of action, which sought to void the leases, but raisesno arguments with regard to the Supreme Court's denial of those branches of its motionwhich were to dismiss the second, eighth, ninth, tenth, or eleventh causes of action. Onthe cross appeal, the plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the Supreme Court erred in grantingthose branches of the separate motions of the Town and Flower which were to dismissthe third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action.

Initially, as Flower correctly contends, the Supreme Court erred in vacating the30-year lease extension issued to it by the Town in September 1994. In the first cause ofaction in the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the Town hadleased the land without the benefit of an "accurate map" and that the land that Flowerwas harvesting from contained shellfish in sufficient quantity and quality so as to supporthand raking and/or tonging and harvesting, in violation of Town Code§ 196-23. The plaintiffs sought, among other things, a judgment declaringthe leases null and void.

To the extent that the first cause of action was based on the allegation that the leaseextension was issued without the benefit of an "accurate map," any such claim shouldhave been dismissed as barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to causesof action seeking to rescind a lease (see CPLR 213; 35 Park Ave. Corp. vCampagna, 48 NY2d 813, 814 [1979]). As Flower points out, the claim that the leasewas invalid because it was based on a map that was inaccurate had to be raised within sixyears of the execution of the lease (see 35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna, 48NY2d at 814; Poledar Realty v Christ, 171 AD2d 603, 605 [1991]). As theplaintiffs did not commence this action until 2011, this cause of action wastime-barred.

To the extent that the first cause of action sought a judgment declaring that thesubject land was leased in violation of Town Code § 196-23, because theland contained shellfish in sufficient quantity and quality so as to support hand rakingand/or tonging and harvesting, it was not improper for the Supreme Court to deny theseparate motions to dismiss. Generally speaking, " '[a] motion to dismiss adeclaratory judgment action prior to the service of an answer presents for considerationonly the issue of whether a cause of action for declaratory relief is set forth, not thequestion of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration' "(Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 [*4]AD3d 520, 524[2013], quoting Matter ofTilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d 1148, 1150 [2011][internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rockland Light & Power Co. v City ofNew York, 289 NY 45, 51 [1942]; see also Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY CivPrac ¶ 3001.13 [2d ed 2004]). As such, "where a cause of action is sufficient toinvoke the court's power to 'render a declaratory judgment . . . as to therights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy' (CPLR 3001;see CPLR 3017 [b]), a motion to dismiss that cause of action should be denied"(Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d at 1150; seeMinovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d at 524; DiGiorgio v 1109-1113 Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC, 102AD3d 725, 728 [2013]).

Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court may reach themerits of a properly pleaded cause of action for a declaratory judgment where" 'no questions of fact are presented [by the controversy]' " (Matter ofTilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d at 1150, quoting Hoffman vCity of Syracuse, 2 NY2d 484, 487 [1957]; see Minovici v Belkin BV, 109AD3d at 524; DiGiorgio v 1109-1113 Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC, 102 AD3dat 728). Under such circumstances, the motion to dismiss the cause of action for failureto state a cause of action "should be taken as a motion for a declaration in the defendant'sfavor and treated accordingly" (Siegel, NY Prac § 440 at 770 [5th ed 2011];see Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d at 524; DiGiorgio v 1109-1113Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC, 102 AD3d at 728; Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. vTown of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d at 1150).

Here, as a matter of law, Flower and the Town were entitled to a declaration in theirfavor with regard to the first cause of action. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledgedthat the ordinance at issue was adopted on September 14, 1993, that the leases at issuewere "renew[ed]" and "extended" on September 13, 1994, and that the "original lease"was signed in 1937. Under these circumstances, and considering the plain andunambiguous language of the ordinance at issue (see generally Matter of Charter Dev. Co., L.L.C. v City ofBuffalo, 6 NY3d 578, 581 [2006]; Rosner v Metropolitan Prop. & Liab.Ins. Co., 96 NY2d 475, 479 [2001]), although those branches of the separate motionswhich were to dismiss the first cause of action were properly denied, since the rights ofthe parties could be determined as a matter of law, the Supreme Court should haveinstead entered a judgment declaring that the 30-year lease extension issued to Flower bythe Town on September 13, 1994, pertained to lands that were "heretofore leased" as thatterm is used in Town Code § 196-23 and that, as such, the lands are exemptfrom the provision in Town Code § 196-23 which prohibits the Town fromleasing underwater lands "where there is an indicated presence of shellfish in sufficientquantity and quality and so located as to support significant hand raking and/or tongingand harvesting" (Town Code § 196-23; see 11 King Ctr. Corp. v City of Middletown, 115 AD3d785, 787 [2014]; Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d at 524).

Invoking CPLR 103 (c), the Supreme Court erroneously converted this action into aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to determine whether "based upon conditionswithin four months of June 22, 2011, the Town's finding that there was not a sufficientpresence of shellfish to support significant hand raking or tonging was arbitrary." Wenote that there was no allegation or evidence that any such finding was made by theTown within four months of June 22, 2011. Indeed, even assuming that the Associationwas seeking review of the Town's 1994 resolution approving Flower's application toextend its leases, the approval of that extension was a discrete determination that wascomplete in September 1994 and any challenge claiming that it was made in an arbitraryfashion had to be brought within four months thereof (see CPLR 7803 [3];see generally Matter of Young v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, 221 AD2d975, 977 [1995]).

With respect to the cross appeal, the plaintiffs correctly argue that the Supreme Courtshould not have dismissed the seventh cause of action, in which they sought, amongother things, specific performance of Flower's obligations as set forth in the 1992stipulation of settlement. A "motion to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred bydocumentary evidence [will be granted] only where the documentary evidence utterlyrefutes plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter oflaw" (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]).Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, while Flower arguedthat the affirmation and documentary evidence it submitted demonstrated that it hadindeed complied with its annual obligations, the documentary evidence did not utterlyrefute the allegations and did not [*5]conclusivelyestablish a defense as a matter of law (see id. at 326; Bodden v Kean, 86 AD3d524, 526 [2011]).

Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, however, the Supreme Court properly dismissedthe sixth cause of action for lack of standing, as the plaintiffs were not a party to the leaseassignments executed by Flower and its predecessor in interest, which were completedprior to the Town's approval of Flower's application to extend the leases at issue (see generally Matter of Save thePine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 301[2009]).

The Supreme Court also properly dismissed the third and fifth causes of action,although not for the reasons stated in the order entered July 5, 2013. Insofar as the thirdcause of action reiterated the allegations contained in the first cause of action regardingthe accuracy of the map filed with the approval of the lease extension, such causes ofaction had to be brought within six years of the execution of the lease extension and arethus time-barred (see 35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d at 814). Thefifth cause of action, which was interposed only against the Town and alleged that theTown failed to comply with the certain terms of the 1992 stipulation of settlement,should have been dismissed, as the Town was not a party to that 1992 agreement (seeCPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

In sum, the Supreme Court erred in vacating the 30-year lease extension issued toFlower by the Town on September 13, 1994, in converting the action into a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, and, in effect, dismissing the seventh cause of action. Weremit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings on theamended complaint consistent with this decision and order, and since this is, in part, adeclaratory judgment action, for the entry of an appropriate judgment, inter alia,declaring that the 30-year lease extension issued to Flower by the Town on September13, 1994, pertains to lands that were "heretofore leased" as that term is used in section196-23 of the Town Code of the Town of Oyster Bay and that, as such, the leased landsare exempt from the provision in that section of the Town Code which prohibits theTown from leasing underwater lands "where there is an indicated presence of shellfish insufficient quantity and quality and so located as to support significant hand raking and/ortonging and harvesting" (see Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d at 524). Skelos,J.P., Dillon, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ.,concur.

Motion by the defendant Town of Oyster Bay, inter alia, to strike certain materialfrom the plaintiffs' brief on appeals and cross appeals from an order of the SupremeCourt, Nassau County, entered July 5, 2013, and a judgment of the same court enteredNovember 4, 2013, on the ground that it improperly raises arguments for the first time onappeal. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated January 12, 2015, themotion was held in abeyance and referred to the Justices hearing the appeals and crossappeals for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion, the papers filed in opposition thereto,and upon the argument of the appeals and cross appeals, it is

[*6] Ordered that the motion is denied. Skelos, J.P., Dillon,Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.


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