| People v Stanford |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06267 [130 AD3d 1306] |
| July 23, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vJahteek Stanford, Appellant. |
Matthew C. Hug, Troy, for appellant, and appellant pro se.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Brittany L. Grome of counsel), forrespondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.), renderedOctober 18, 2012 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimesof murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree and assault in thefirst degree.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree,attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree. The chargesstemmed from a February 2011 incident at a social club in the City of Albany duringwhich one victim was fatally stabbed in the neck and a second was stabbed in the head.Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison as to the murder in the seconddegree conviction, and to prison terms of 25 years, followed by five years of postreleasesupervision, as to each conviction of attempted murder in the second degree and assaultin the first degree. Supreme Court directed that the sentences as to the convictions formurder in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree runconsecutively, and that the sentence as to the conviction for assault in the first degree runconcurrently with the two other sentences. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Defendant argues that the jury's verdict was not supported by legallysufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. Turning first to theconviction of murder in the second degree, a defendant is guilty of this crime when, as isrelevant here, he or she causes the death of a person after having acted with intent tocause that person's death (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). Accordingto the testimony at trial, the stabbings occurred during a birthday party in honor of afemale member of the club. Defendant went to the club that night [*2]with several individuals who had not been invited to thebirthday party, but nonetheless gained admittance. At some point during the evening, averbal dispute occurred between members of defendant's group and several of the invitedguests, among them Robert Smalls. At least one witness indicated that defendant andSmalls were the primary antagonists during this heated verbal exchange, and that the twohad to be separated before a physical fight began. While this proof of a potential motivedoes not establish an element of the crime, it "cannot be ignored in examining theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution" (People v Marin, 65NY2d 741, 745 [1985]; seePeople v Cushner, 46 AD3d 1121, 1124 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 809[2008]).
Surveillance footage of the subsequent physical fight reveals that one of defendant'sassociates was surrounded by hostile partygoers, including Smalls, when it began.Defendant did not have a weapon when he first arrived at the club but, as the meleebroke out, he can be seen exiting the club, reentering, and walking toward his compatriotin what he admitted was an attempt to help. By that point in time, the compatriot hadseparated himself from the large group and retreated to the foyer of the club, where hewas followed by Smalls. Defendant then came up behind Smalls, who turned around andfaced defendant. While the surveillance footage did not directly capture any blows beingexchanged, Smalls quickly backed away from the foyer and was soon seen clutching hisneck with his left hand. Defendant can thereafter be seen moving in the direction of thesecond victim, Ahmeen Lanier, and stabbing him in the head with a vicious overhandmotion. There is no question that the stabbings left Smalls dead and Lanier severelyinjured.
Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the People, and notingthat "the intent to kill may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and adefendant's actions," we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to support thesecond-degree murder conviction (People v Hamilton, 127 AD3d 1243, 1245 [2015], lvdenied 25 NY3d 1164 [June 30, 2015]). The attempted murder and assaultconvictions are similarly supported by legally sufficient evidence, notably, thevideographic evidence showing defendant rising to his feet, walking several yards anddeliberately stabbing Lanier in the head (see People v Salce, 124 AD3d 923, 924-925 [2015]).Defendant contended that he did not stab Smalls, and advanced a justification defensewith regard to his stabbing of Lanier. The jury was free to credit the above evidencedespite the presence of proof that could support a different result and, upon ourindependent review of the evidence, we cannot say that its verdict is against the weightof the evidence (see People vVanderhorst, 117 AD3d 1197, 1198-1200 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d1089 [2014]; People vFisher, 89 AD3d 1135, 1138 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 883[2012]).
We reject defendant's claim that Supreme Court committed reversible error indenying his challenge for cause as to a prospective juror who had prior dealings with oneof the People's witnesses. A challenge for cause as to a prospective juror is properlyraised if he or she has a "relationship [with a potential witness] of such [a] nature that itis likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict" (CPL 270.20 [1][c]). The existence of such an implied bias requires automatic exclusion even if, as here,"the prospective juror declares that the relationship will not affect [his or] her ability tobe fair and impartial" (People vFurey, 18 NY3d 284, 287 [2011]; see People v Branch, 46 NY2d 645,651 [1979]). "In determining whether a relationship is so close as to requiredisqualification, a court should consider factors 'such as the frequency, recency orcurrency of the contact, whether it was direct contact, . . . [and] the nature ofthe relationship as personal and/or professional' " (People v Hamilton,127 AD3d at 1246-1247, quoting People v Greenfield, 112 AD3d 1226, 1228-1229 [2013],lv denied 23 NY3d 1037 [2014]; see People v Furey, 18 NY3d at 287).Here, the prospective juror stated that she knew Michael Dailey, a physician whoprovided peripheral testimony at trial regarding the abortive [*3]efforts to treat Smalls after the fatal attack, as her husbandhad been treated by Dailey and she had previously cared for certain of his patients in herrole as a nursing aide. Under these circumstances, and stressing that the prospective jurorunequivocally stated that she could be fair and impartial in assessing Dailey's testimony,we do not find that her preexisting ties to Dailey rendered her unqualified to serve (see People v Molano, 70 AD3d1172, 1174 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 776 [2010]; see also People vClark, 132 AD2d 704, 705 [1987]).
Defendant's various claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the People'ssummation were not properly preserved for appellate review by specific objections attrial (see People v Simmons,111 AD3d 975, 980 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1203 [2014]). We declineto, as defendant urges, take corrective action in the interest of justice. Insofar asdefendant argues that the prosecutor improperly mocked defendant's account of havingdiscovered the knife on the floor after Smalls was stabbed, we find that the prosecutor'sremarks in this regard "constituted fair comment on" a central issue in the case (People v Fomby, 101 AD3d1355, 1357 [2012]). Moreover, although the prosecutor did engage in rhetoricconcerning the credibility of a witness whose testimony as to the physical interactionsbetween Smalls and defendant was contradicted by the surveillance footage, theprosecutor neither provided his own personal opinion of this witness' truthfulness (compare People v Forbes, 111AD3d 1154, 1158 [2013]) nor demanded that the jurors deem this witness crediblein light of her cooperation with the People in prosecuting defendant (compare People v Casanova,119 AD3d 976, 978-979 [2014]).
We reject defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel becausehis trial attorney failed to object to the purportedly improper remarks made by theprosecutor during summation; for the reasons set forth above, those comments were notimproper. Accordingly, the failure of defense counsel "to object [to those remarks] didnot amount to the ineffective assistance of counsel" (People v Thomas, 105 AD3d 1068, 1071-1072 [2013],lv denied 21 NY3d 1010 [2013]). Defendant argues in his pro se brief that histrial counsel should not have advised him to take the stand and testify consistently withthe theory that the stabbing of Lanier was justified. Given the strength of the evidencesupporting the conclusion that defendant stabbed Lanier while Lanier was in adefenseless position, we cannot say that counsel would have lacked a legitimate strategicreason for advising defendant to testify in accordance with a justification theory (see People v McCray, 102AD3d 1000, 1008-1009 [2013], affd 23 NY3d 193 [2014]).
Finally, we do not agree that the sentence imposed by Supreme Court was eitherharsh or excessive. Given the brutal nature of defendant's acts and his refusal to acceptresponsibility for them, we perceive no abuse of discretion or extraordinarycircumstances that would warrant a modification of the sentence (see People vThomas, 105 AD3d at 1072; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1215 [2012], lvdenied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US &mdash, 133 S Ct 791[2012]).
Garry, J.P., Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.