| Pugliatti v Riccio |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06398 [130 AD3d 1420] |
| July 30, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Venturina Pugliatti, Respondent, v Danny A. Riccio etal., Appellants. |
DeLorenzo Law Firm, Schenectady (Matthew J. Simone of counsel), forappellants.
Patrick O'Connor, Latham, for respondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a corrected order of the County Court of Schenectady County(Drago, J.), entered April 18, 2014, which affirmed a judgment of the Schenectady CityCourt in favor of plaintiff.
In 1981, Antonio Aliberti and Lucia Aliberti, the owners of a parcel of real propertylocated in the Town of Princetown, Schenectady County, divided the parcel and deededthe back portion of the property (hereinafter the rear parcel) to plaintiff. In the deed, theAlibertis granted plaintiff a right-of-way over a private driveway on the property thatthey retained (hereinafter the front parcel) so that plaintiff would have access to the road.In January 1982, plaintiff and the Alibertis executed a separate agreement (hereinafterthe 1982 agreement), which was duly recorded, wherein they agreed to share the costs ofmaintenance, repair and snow removal on the driveway. In 1983, the Alibertis conveyedthe front parcel to Vittorio Rizzo, who conveyed it to defendants. The 1982 agreement,however, was not incorporated into defendants' deed. Subsequently, in 2011, plaintiffrequested reimbursement from defendants for half of the cost that she had incurred tomaintain the subject driveway, a total of $4,785. When they failed to pay, plaintiffinitiated a small claims action in Schenectady City Court seeking such reimbursement.Following trial, City Court found that defendants had notice of the 1982 agreement andscheduled the matter for an inquest on damages. Defendants appealed from City Court'sjudgment and, upon appeal, County Court affirmed. Defendants now appeal to thisCourt.
Defendants argue that City Court did not render substantial justice between theparties because plaintiff failed to establish that the 1982 agreement was intended to runwith the land or [*2]that it touched and concerned theland. We disagree. "Appellate review of small claims is limited to determining whether'substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules andprinciples of substantive law' " (Rowe v Silver & Gold Expressions, 107 AD3d 1090,1091 [2013], quoting UCCA 1807). Accordingly, this Court will overturn such adecision only if it is clearly erroneous (see Stein v Anderson, 123 AD3d 1322, 1322 [2014]). Asrelevant here, to establish that the 1982 agreement ran with the land and was binding ondefendants, plaintiff was required to establish that "(1) the grantor and grantee intendedthe [agreement] to run with the land, (2) there is privity of estate between the parties tothe current dispute, and (3) the [agreement] touches and concerns the land" (O'Neill v Pinkowski, 92 AD3d1063, 1064 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).[FN*]
With regard to the intent of the original parties, the 1982 agreement provides that, inthe event of a subsequent conveyance, the property owner "will incorporate in the deedsof conveyance a clause to the effect that the new owners or owner agree and accept andsign the new deed for the purpose of agreeing to comply with the promise to contributean equal share to the maintenance of the paving, repair and/or cleaning of snow."Notably, the driveway is the only means of ingress and egress to the rear parcel, andplaintiff executed and recorded the 1982 agreement shortly after she obtained theproperty. Further, the agreement contemplates its own termination in the event that amunicipality accepts the right-of-way as a public road, which indicates that the originalparties intended the agreement to endure until it was no longer necessary. In light of thelanguage of the agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution, we find thatCity Court properly determined that the original parties intended the 1982 agreement torun with the land (see Harrisonv Westview Partners, LLC, 79 AD3d 1198, 1201 [2010]).
Turning to the touch and concern requirement, an agreement touches and concernsthe land "if it affects the legal relations—the advantages and theburdens—of the parties to the [agreement], as owners of particular parcels of landand not merely as members of the community in general" (Nicholson v 300 BroadwayRealty Corp., 7 NY2d 240, 245 [1959] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; accord Harrison v Westview Partners, LLC, 79 AD3d at 1202). Forplaintiff, as the owner of the rear parcel, to fully enjoy the benefit that the subjectright-of-way provides, there is a concomitant responsibility that the driveway bemaintained. In fairness, the burden of maintaining, repairing and clearing theright-of-way should rest upon the property that is benefitted by the improvements. In anapparent recognition thereof, the 1982 agreement creates "a covenant that the burden ofpaying the [proportionate] cost should be inseparably attached to the land which enjoysthe benefit" (Neponsit Prop. Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278NY 248, 260 [1938]). Accordingly, we affirm County Court's determination upholdingCity Court's judgment, which was not clearly erroneous and provided substantial justicebetween the parties according to the rules of substantive law (see UCCA 1807;DeLeon v Kalil, 126 AD3d1155, 1156 [2015]).
Garry, J.P., Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the corrected order isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *:The parties do notdispute that there is privity of estate. Notwithstanding, the deeds submitted into evidencedemonstrate a complete chain of title to the parties from a common grantor (seeMalley v Hanna, 65 NY2d 289, 291-292 [1985]).