| Matter of Feilzer v New York State Div. of Parole |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06860 [131 AD3d 1321] |
| September 17, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Paul Feilzer, Appellant, v NewYork State Division of Parole, Respondent. |
Paul Feilzer, Sonyea, appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered February 5,2015 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denyingpetitioner's request for parole release.
Petitioner was convicted in 2012 of grand larceny in the second degree and grandlarceny in the third degree after he stole funds from an elderly woman while acting as herfinancial advisor. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 2 to 6 years. InSeptember 2013, he made his initial appearance before the Board of Parole seeking to bereleased to parole supervision. The Board denied his request and ordered him held for anadditional 24 months. Petitioner took an administrative appeal and, when it was notdecided within four months, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Followingjoinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.
Petitioner contends, among other things, that the Board failed to evaluate his requestfor parole release in light of the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law and toundertake a risk assessment that balanced all statutory factors and instead focused onlyupon the serious nature of his crimes. We disagree. The record reveals that, in addition tothe gravity of petitioner's crimes, the Board considered his lack of criminal history, cleandisciplinary record, program accomplishments, postrelease plans and certificate of earnedeligibility, as well as the sentencing minutes (see Matter of Hill v New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 AD3d1130, 1131 [2015]; Matterof Lackwood v New York State Div. of Parole, 127 AD3d 1495, 1495 [2015];Matter of Singh v Evans,107 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2013]). Significantly, in accordance with the 2011 [*2]amendments, the Board also considered the COMPAS Riskand Needs Assessment instrument and petitioner's completion of phase I of thetransitional accountability plan (see Executive Law § 259-c [4];Correction Law § 71-a). In evaluating a request for parole release, theBoard was not required to give each statutory factor equal weight (see Matter of Diaz v New YorkState Dept. of Corrections & Community Supervision, 127 AD3d 1493,1494 [2015]; Matter of Singh vEvans, 118 AD3d 1209, 1210 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 906 [2014])and could, in its discretion, place greater emphasis upon the serious nature of petitioner'scrimes (see Matter of Martinez vNew York State Bd. of Parole, 83 AD3d 1319, 1319 [2011]; Matter of Santos v Evans, 81AD3d 1059, 1060 [2011]). In view of this, and upon reviewing the record, we donot find that the Board's decision exhibits " 'irrationality bordering onimpropriety' " (Matter ofPartee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 901[2014], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [1980]). We have considered petitioner's remaining claims and find them to beunavailing. Therefore, we decline to disturb the Board's decision.
Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.