| Rabenstein v Suffolk County Dept. of Pub. Works |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06905 [131 AD3d 1145] |
| September 23, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Caroline Rabenstein, Individually and as Guardian ofthe Person and Property of Abraham Rabenstein, an Incapacitated Person,Respondent, v Suffolk County Department of Public Works et al.,Appellants. |
Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, N.Y. (John M. Denby of counsel), forappellants.
Pearlman, Apat, Futterman, Sirotkin & Seinfeld, LLP (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac& De Cicco, LLP, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Jillian Rosen], of counsel),for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appealfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), entered June 19,2013, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Abraham Rabenstein allegedly sustained personal injuries when the vehicle he wasdriving on Health Science Center Road collided with a bus owned by the defendantCounty of Suffolk and operated by the defendant Peggy Costello at the intersection ofHealth Sciences Drive in the Town of Brookhaven. It is not disputed that trafficproceeding on Health Science Center Road was controlled by a flashing red light andtraffic traveling on Health Sciences Drive was controlled by a flashing yellow light. AfterCaroline Rabenstein commenced this action as guardian of the person and property ofAbraham Rabenstein, and individually, the defendants moved for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1113 (b) requires that a vehicle entering anintersection controlled by a flashing yellow signal proceed with caution. Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1113 (a) provides that a driver facing a red flashing signalmust stop before entering the intersection, and that the right to proceed is subject to therules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign. A driver who fails to yield theright-of-way after stopping at a stop sign is in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1142 (a) and is negligent as a matter of law (see Melendez v County ofNassau, 56 AD3d 736, 737-738 [2008]; Exime v Williams, 45 AD3d 633 [2007]; Gergis v Miccio, 39 AD3d468 [2007]). However, "[t]here can be more than one proximate cause of anaccident" (Cox v Nunez, 23AD3d 427, 427 [2005]; seeJones v Vialva-Duke, 106 AD3d 1052 [2013]). Moreover, a driver travelingwith the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening ofthe accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident (see Arias v Tiao, 123 AD3d857, 858 [2014]; Todd vGodek, 71 AD3d 872 [2010]).
[*2] Here, in support of their motion, the defendants made a prima facie showing ofentitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint (see O'Brien v Couch, 124AD3d 975, 976 [2015]; Groboski v Godfroy, 74 AD3d 1524, 1525 [2010]).However, in opposition thereto, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whetherCostello took reasonable care to avoid the subject accident (see Vehicle andTraffic Law §§ 1113 [b]; 1180 [a], [e]; Shea v Judson, 283 NY393, 398 [1940]; Doctor v Juliana, 277 AD2d 1013, 1014 [2000]). Accordingly,the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur. [PriorCase History: 2013 NY Slip Op 31293(U).]