People v Innocent
2015 NY Slip Op 07291 [132 AD3d 696]
October 7, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2015


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Peter Innocent, Appellant.

Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, N.Y., for appellant.

Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and JodiL. Mandel of counsel; Gregory Musso on the brief), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Firetog, J.), rendered November 3, 2011, convicting him of murder in the seconddegree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's waiver of his right to appeal was invalid (see People v Jackson, 114AD3d 807, 808 [2014]; People v Salgado, 111 AD3d 859 [2013]; People v Nugent, 109 AD3d625, 625-626 [2013]; People v Boustani, 300 AD2d 313, 314 [2002]). In anyevent, the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his plea of guilty survives a validwaiver of the right to appeal (see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 10 [1989]; People v Fontanet, 126 AD3d723 [2015]; People vGriffin, 119 AD3d 605, 606 [2014]).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant'smotion to withdraw his plea of guilty (see CPL 220.60 [3]; People vAlexander, 97 NY2d 482, 483-484 [2002]). Contrary to the defendant's contention,the court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to have counsel assigned by thecourt if he was financially unable to retain counsel did not render his guilty pleaunknowing or involuntary. A plea of guilty "will not be invalidated 'solely because theTrial Judge failed to specifically enumerate all the rights to which the defendant wasentitled and to elicit from him or her a list of detailed waivers before accepting the guiltyplea' " (People vTyrell, 22 NY3d 359, 365 [2013], quoting People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9,16 [1983]). Here, the defendant acknowledged that he understood that by pleading guiltyhe was waiving certain federal constitutional rights (see Boykin v Alabama, 395US 238, 243 [1969]). Furthermore, the defendant's contention that he was coerced intopleading guilty by his former attorney is belied by his statements during the pleaproceeding, in which he acknowledged under oath that he was satisfied with his counsel'srepresentation, that he had not been forced into pleading guilty, and that he was enteringthe plea of his own free will (seePeople v Bennett, 115 AD3d 973, 974 [2014]). The defendant's postpleaassertion of innocence based upon the affirmative defense of renunciation (seePenal Law § 40.10 [1]) is unsupported by the record (see People vOzarowski, 38 NY2d 481, 492 [1976]) and did not afford a basis for withdrawal ofthe guilty plea. Since the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty was premisedon unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations belied by the record, the Supreme Courtproperly denied the motion without conducting a hearing (see People v Shorter, 106AD3d 1115 [2013]; People v Haywood, 97 AD2d 446 [1983]; [*2]People v Douglas, 83 AD3d 1092, 1093 [2011]).Mastro, J.P., Hall, Sgroi and Duffy, JJ., concur.


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