Angielczyk v Lipka
2015 NY Slip Op 07388 [132 AD3d 1380]
October 9, 2015
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2015


[*1]
  Thomas D. Angielczyk, Appellant, v Richard P. Lipka,Respondent.

Michael J. Stachowski, P.C., Buffalo (Michael J. Stachowski of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.

Barth Sullivan Behr, Buffalo (Alex M. Neurohr of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Erie County Court (Sheila A. DiTullio, J.), dated March19, 2014. The order affirmed a judgment of the Buffalo City Court.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this small claims action in Buffalo City Courtseeking damages in the sum of $5,200 for the diminution in value of his 1996 JaguarXJR (Jaguar) allegedly caused by an accident in which defendant's wife, who wasdriving defendant's vehicle, backed the vehicle into the Jaguar in a parking lot. After ahearing, City Court awarded judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, County Court(hereafter, court) affirmed. We affirm.

As an initial matter, we note that, by commencing this action upon a small claimunder UCCA article 18, plaintiff waived his right to appeal, except to the extent that hemay "appeal on the sole grounds that substantial justice has not been done between theparties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UCCA 1807). "[A]small claims judgment may not be overturned simply because the determination appealedfrom involves an arguable point on which an appellate court may differ; the deviationfrom substantive law must be readily apparent and the court's determination clearlyerroneous" (Coppola v Kandey Co., 236 AD2d 871, 871-872 [1997] [internalquotation marks omitted]; seePugliatti v Riccio, 130 AD3d 1420, 1421 [2015]; Schiffman v DeluxeCaterers of Shelter Rock, 100 AD2d 846, 846-847 [1984]). "Thus, judgmentrendered in a small claims action will be overturned only if it is 'so shocking as to not besubstantial justice' " (Coppola, 236 AD2d at 872; see Blair v FivePoints Shopping Plaza, 51 AD2d 167, 169 [1976]).

With the above principles in mind, we reject plaintiff's contention that this Court'sopinion in Franklin Corp. vPrahler (91 AD3d 49 [2011]) compels the conclusion that he is entitled tojudgment on his claim for damages based on the Jaguar's alleged diminution in value. Atthe hearing, plaintiff testified that, prior to the accident, the Jaguar was "basically alloriginal," that he had entered it in car shows and that, as a result of the accident, it haddiminished in value in the amount of $5,200. Plaintiff also submitted written appraisalsindicating that the resale value of the Jaguar had diminished as a result of the accident.Unlike the plaintiff in Franklin Corp., however, plaintiff submitted no evidencedemonstrating that the Jaguar appreciated in value from the time that he had purchased itto the time of the accident. We therefore conclude that the court properly determined thatFranklin Corp. is inapplicable to the instant case (cf. id. at 56-57), andthat the rule articulated in Johnson v Scholz (276 App Div 163 [1949]) isapplicable, instead: "The measure of damages for injury to property resulting fromnegligence is the difference in the market value immediately before and immediatelyafter the accident, or the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to restore it to its formercondition, whichever is lesser" (id. at 164; see PJI 2:311). In addition,"where, as here, there is no dispute that the repairs fully restored the vehicle to itscondition before the accident, and the only basis of the claim made by the plaintiff for the[*2]difference in value immediately before andimmediately after the accident is not that his automobile could not be fully repaired, but,rather, that after repair the resale value would be diminished because the car had been inan accident, 'the diminution in resale value is not to be taken into account' " (Parkoff v Stavsky, 109 AD3d646, 648 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 864 [2014]).

We have examined plaintiff's remaining evidentiary contention and conclude that it isnot properly before us because it has been raised for the first time on appeal (seegenerally Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 985 [1994]). In any event,that contention cannot serve as a basis for reversal of the small claims judgment herein(see Blair, 51 AD2d at 169; see also Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125,126-127 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 898 [2000]). Present—Centra, J.P.,Peradotto, Carni, Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.


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