| Quinones v 9 E. 69th St., LLC |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 07487 [132 AD3d 750] |
| October 14, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Michael Quinones, Respondent, v 9 East 69thStreet, LLC, et al., Defendants, and Uberto, Ltd., et al., Appellants. (And Third-PartyActions.) |
Jones Hirsch Connors Miller & Bull P.C., New York, N.Y. (Mark D. Wellman,James P. Connors, and Daniel W. Levin of counsel), for appellants.
Dinkes & Schwitzer, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Jeffrey B. Bromfeld of counsel),for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for violation of Labor Law§§ 200, 240 and 241 (6), the defendants Uberto, Ltd., and UbertoConstruction, Inc., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Queens County (Sampson, J.), entered January 30, 2013, as denied thatbranch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel the plaintiff tocomply with certain discovery demands, and granted that branch of the plaintiff's crossmotion which was for a protective order as to the information sought in the subjectdiscovery demands.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
CPLR 3101 (a) (1) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter materialand necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." The terms "material andnecessary" in this statute "must 'be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, uponrequest, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial bysharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity' " (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23NY3d 32, 38 [2014], quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d403, 406 [1968]). At the same time, a party is "not entitled to unlimited, uncontrolled,unfettered disclosure" (Geffnerv Mercy Med. Ctr., 83 AD3d 998, 998 [2011]; see Foster v Herbert SlepoyCorp., 74 AD3d 1139 [2010]; Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531 [2007]).It is the burden of the party seeking disclosure " 'to demonstrate that the methodof discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonablycalculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims' " (Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d417, 418 [2004], quoting Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,150 AD2d 420, 421 [1989]).
Here, the disputed material sought in the subject discovery demands is privileged,inasmuch as the defendants Uberto, Ltd., and Uberto Construction, Inc. (hereinaftertogether the Uberto defendants), seek medical records and mental health records,including such records that may be contained in criminal records (see CPLR4504, 4507; Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278, 287 [1989]). The plaintiff,however, does not seek damages for emotional or psychological injury, and he thereforedid not place his mental condition in issue (see Alford v City of New York, 116 AD3d 483, 484[2014]; [*2]Salazar v 521-533 W. 57th St. Condominium, 84AD3d 927 [2011]; Wojtusiak v Elardo, 43 AD3d 436 [2007]). Further, theplaintiff does not expressly seek damages for loss of enjoyment of life, and his claim fordamages for pain and suffering related to his physical injuries does not warrantdisclosure of the subject records, as their potential relevance has not been shown (seeAlford v City of New York, 116 AD3d at 484; Salazar v 521-533 W. 57th St. Condominium, 84 AD3d927 [2011]).
With respect to the demand for medical records referable to certain drugs that wereallegedly prescribed and treatment that was purportedly rendered to the plaintiff forhepatitis, although the plaintiff placed in controversy his medical condition, the Ubertodefendants failed to show that any such records were material and necessary to thedefense of the action (see Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d at 287; see also Farkas v Orange RegionalMed. Ctr., 97 AD3d 720, 722 [2012]).
Further, the Uberto defendants did not show that the subject records are otherwiserelevant to issues of liability, causation, or damages in light of, inter alia, the evidencealready in the record in this case (see Budano v Gurdon, 97 AD3d 497, 499 [2012];Manley v New York City Hous. Auth., 190 AD2d 600 [1993]). Accordingly, theSupreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of theUberto defendants' motion which was to compel the production of the subjectrecords.
In light of the privileged nature of the subject records and the lack of theirdemonstrated relevance, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretionin granting that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was for a protective order asto the materials sought in the subject discovery demands (see Jet One Group, Inc. v HalcyonJet Holdings, Inc., 111 AD3d 890, 892 [2013]; Montalvo v CVS Pharm., Inc.,102 AD3d 842 [2013]; Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531 [2007]).Mastro, J.P., Leventhal, Duffy and Barros, JJ., concur.