| Matter of Whittier Health Servs., Inc. v Pospesel |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08690 [133 AD3d 1176] |
| November 25, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Whittier Health Services, Inc., DoingBusiness as Whittier Rehabilitation & Skilled Nursing Center, Petitioner, v KiraPospesel, as Commissioner of Social Services of Greene County, Respondent, and NiravR. Shah, as Commissioner of Health, Respondent. |
Law Office of M. Angelo Genova III, New York City (M. Angelo Genova III ofcounsel), for petitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), forNirav R. Shah, respondent.
Clark, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by orderof the Supreme Court, entered in Greene County) to review a determination of theDepartment of Health determining that a patient of petitioner was ineligible for certainMedicaid benefits.
After suffering an ankle injury, the individual relevant to this proceeding (hereinafterthe patient) was admitted to petitioner, a skilled nursing facility, which applied forMedicaid on her behalf in April 2012. Respondent Greene County Department of SocialServices (hereinafter DSS) found the patient ineligible for Medicaid coverage for apenalty period of 16.9 months [*2]based upon the sale ofher home in 2009 for less than fair market value and the withdrawal of approximately$34,350 from her bank accounts within the 60-month look-back period under SocialServices Law § 366 (5) (e) (1) (vi). The Department of Health (hereinafterDOH) affirmed that determination after a fair hearing. Petitioner then commenced thisproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 asserting that the determination was arbitraryand capricious, affected by an error of law and against the substantial weight of theevidence. After determining that questions of substantial evidence had been raised,Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court.
"In reviewing a Medicaid eligibility determination rendered after a hearing, thisCourt must 'review the record, as a whole, to determine if the agency's decisions aresupported by substantial evidence and are not affected by an error of law' " (Matter of Mallery v Shah, 93AD3d 936, 937 [2012], quoting Matter of Campbell v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. ofHealth, 14 AD3d 766, 768 [2005]; accord Matter of Loiacono v Demarzo, 72 AD3d 969,969-970 [2010]; Matter ofRogers v Novello, 26 AD3d 580, 581 [2006]). Pursuant to Social Services Law§ 366 (5) (e), the transfer of assets for less than fair market value within 60months preceding an institutionalized individual's application for medical assistance willresult in a penalty period of ineligibility (see Social Services Law§ 366 [5] [e] [3]; Matter of Swartz v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 AD3d1209, 1210-1211 [2012]). However, such transfer will not result in such a penaltyperiod where, as relevant here, there is a "satisfactory showing" that the individual"intended to dispose of the assets . . . at fair market value . . .[or] the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medicalassistance" (Social Services Law § 366 [5] [e] [4] [iii]; see Matter ofRogers v Novello, 26 AD3d at 581). In this regard, it is petitioner's burden todemonstrate Medicaid eligibility and it must "rebut the presumption that the transfer offunds was motivated, in part if not in whole, by . . . anticipation of a futureneed to qualify for medical assistance" (Matter of Mallery v Shah, 93 AD3d at937 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Conners v Berlin, 105 AD3d 1208, 1210[2013]).
Here, petitioner concedes that the patient sold her property to George Henderson for$23,122 within the 60-month look-back period, but contends that the patient obtainedfair market value when she sold her property. Upon our review of the record, we agree.The affidavits of Henderson and the patient's brother both indicate that the sale inquestion was an arm's length transaction. Specifically, Henderson averred that he is notrelated to the patient and that he "paid fair market value for the property given [its]dilapidated state" inasmuch as the house required significant repairs before it would evenbe habitable. These statements were corroborated by the patient's brother, who explainedthat the patient had been trying to sell the property for approximately two years and thatthe house, which sat vacant during that time, fell into an even further state of disrepair.The brother further indicated that Henderson's offer was the only offer that the patienthad on the property in the two years she had been trying to sell it. Additionally, therecord demonstrates that the land on which the patient's house was located—2.9acres—was valued at approximately $24,000 in 2011.
Because a recent arm's length sale is a more accurate indicator of actual market valueof the patient's property than the tax assessment records relied upon by DSS assigning avalue of $143,511 (see Matter of FMC Corp. [Peroxygen Chems. Div.] vUnmack, 92 NY2d 179, 189 [1998]; Matter of Eckerd Corp. v Gilchrist, 44 AD3d 1239, 1240[2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 707 [2008]), we find that petitioner successfullyrebutted any presumption that may have arisen under Social Services Law§ 366 (5) (e). The determination to the contrary was arbitrary and capricious(see Matter of Ward v City ofLong Beach, 20 NY3d 1042, 1044 [2013]) and erroneous as a matter of law(see Matter of FMC Corp. [Peroxygen Chems. Div.] v Unmack, 92 NY2d at189). Thus, DOH's [*3]determination is not supported bysubstantial evidence and must be annulled insofar as it penalized the patient for thedifference between the tax assessment value of the property and the sale price of theproperty. To the extent not specifically addressed, petitioner's remaining contentionshave been considered and found to be without merit.
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination ismodified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as denied benefits based upon thesale of the property, and, as so modified, confirmed.