| People v Hardy |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09299 [134 AD3d 955] |
| December 16, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Raynodel Hardy, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, NY (John B. Latella of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, AntheaH. Bruffee, and Davis, Polk & Wardwell LLP [Alan Tabak], of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Ozzi, J.), rendered May 24, 2013, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon ajury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establishthe defendant's guilt of assault in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (seePenal Law § 120.05 [1]). Contrary to the defendant's contention, theevidence was sufficient to establish that the complainant suffered a serious physicalinjury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00 (10) as a result of thebeating inflicted by the defendant (see People v Messam, 101 AD3d 407, 408 [2012]; People v Brown, 57 AD3d260, 261 [2008]; People v Hirschhorn, 231 AD2d 591, 591 [1996];People v Crawford, 200 AD2d 683, 684 [1994]; Matter of Patrick W.,166 AD2d 652, 653 [1990]). Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of theevidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 643 [2006]).
The defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the Supreme Court'sadmission of certain evidence relating to the complainant selling drugs for a drug dealerin his neighborhood, the friendship between the defendant and that drug dealer, and thedrug dealer's belief that the complainant was an informer who caused the police to searchthe drug dealer's apartment. This contention is without merit. The testimony of thecomplainant that he had sold drugs for the drug dealer was not evidence of unchargedcrimes subject to exclusion under the Molineux rule (People v Molineux,168 NY 264 [1901]), since evidence of the complainant's criminality in which thedefendant was not involved did not show criminal propensity on the part of the defendant(see People v Arafet, 13NY3d 460, 465 [2009]; People v Harris, 117 AD3d 847, 854-855 [2014],affd 26 NY3d 1 [2015]). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, theevidence of the friendship between the defendant and the drug dealer and the drugdealer's belief that the complainant was an informer, was admissible to establish thedefendant's motive and to complete the narrative of events surrounding the chargedcrimes (see People v Molineux, 168 NY at 293; People v Thornton, 105 AD3d779, 780 [2013]; [*2]People v Holden, 82 AD3d 1007, 1008[2011]).
The defendant's arguments regarding the prosecutor's alleged improper commentsduring summation are largely unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]). In any event, most of the challenged remarks were within the broad bounds ofpermissible rhetorical comment, a fair response to the defendant's summation, or faircomment on the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom (seePeople v Halm, 81 NY2d 819, 821 [1993]; People v Galloway, 54 NY2d396, 399 [1981]; People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110 [1976]; People v Williams, 123 AD3d1152, 1152 [2014], lv granted 25 NY3d 1173 [2015]). To the extent that anyremaining challenged remarks were improper, they were not so egregious as to havedeprived the defendant of a fair trial (see People v Williams, 123 AD3d at 1152).Mastro, J.P., Rivera, Leventhal and Duffy, JJ., concur.