| People v Towns |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00532 [135 AD3d 974] |
| January 27, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v George Towns, Appellant. |
Patrick Michael Megaro, Bay Shore, NY, for appellant.
Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Tammy J. Smiley and DanielBresnahan of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Corrigan, J.), rendered December 23, 2014, convicting him of criminal possession of aweapon in the second degree (four counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree (three counts), menacing a police officer, assault in the second degree, tamperingwith physical evidence, resisting arrest, reckless endangerment in the second degree,criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (two counts), menacing in thesecond degree, and trespass, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's waiver of his right to appeal was knowingly, voluntarily, andintelligently made (see People vLopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Calvi, 89 NY2d 868, 871[1996]). The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal forecloses appellate review ofhis challenge to the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution (see People v Nash, 38 AD3d684 [2007]; People vWager, 34 AD3d 505 [2006]; People v Mydosh, 27 AD3d 580 [2006]), and the hearingcourt's suppression determination (see People v Jones, 131 AD3d 707 [2015]; People v Sanchez, 122 AD3d778 [2014]).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have granted his motion towithdraw his plea because it was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligentlysurvives the valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v Innocent, 132 AD3d 696, 696 [2015]; People v Hyland, 123 AD3d736, 737 [2014]; People vLofton, 115 AD3d 989, 989 [2014]). However, contrary to the defendant'scontention, the record demonstrates that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligentlypleaded guilty, and the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying,without a hearing, his motion to withdraw his plea (see CPL 220.60 [3];People v Upson, 134 AD3d 1058 [2d Dept 2015]).
The defendant was charged in one indictment with various offenses stemming fromthree separate incidents. By pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited his right to appellatereview of the denial of his motion to sever the counts of the indictment stemming fromeach incident from the counts stemming from the other incidents (see People v Gibbons, 27AD3d 483 [2006]; People v Reyes, 156 AD2d 397 [1989]; People vGrant, 140 AD2d 623 [1988]). Rivera, J.P., Dillon, Roman and Duffy, JJ.,concur.