| Matter of Bounds v Village of Clifton Springs Zoning Bd. ofAppeals |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02274 [137 AD3d 1759] |
| March 25, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Tina Bounds, Appellant, v Village ofClifton Springs Zoning Board of Appeals et al.,Respondents. |
Underberg & Kessler LLP, Rochester (Ronald G. Hull of counsel), forpetitioner-appellant.
Leclair Korona Giordano Cole LLP, Rochester (Mary Jo S. Korona of counsel), forrespondent-respondent Village of Clifton Springs Zoning Board of Appeals.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the Supreme Court,Ontario County (Craig J. Doran, A.J.), entered January 29, 2015 in a proceeding pursuantto CPLR article 78. The judgment dismissed the petition.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmedwithout costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing her petition to annulthe issuance of a special use permit to respondent Mary Anna Morrow. The recordestablishes that, for over 45 years, Morrow and her husband operated a homeimprovement business out of a building located on their residential property in theVillage of Clifton Springs. Following the enactment of the Village of Clifton SpringsZoning Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance), the business became a "grandfathered"nonconforming business use. Following the death of Morrow's husband in 2011, aformer employee continued working out of the building and completing work for theMorrows' clients. As that work was winding down, Morrow reached an agreement withanother individual to permit him to operate an HVAC business out of the building, andthat business moved in and began operations. When Morrow applied for a buildingpermit to make nonstructural changes to the building to accommodate the HVACbusiness, the Code Enforcement Officer denied the building permit on the ground thatMorrow needed a special use permit. Morrow thus applied for a special use permit and,following public hearings, respondent Village of Clifton Springs Zoning Board ofAppeals (ZBA), granted the special use permit.
We reject petitioner's contention that the ZBA misapplied section 120-55 of theZoning Ordinance. Where, as here, the ordinance permits the ZBA to interpret itsrequirements (see Zoning Ordinance § 120-46 [B] [3])," 'specific application of a term of the ordinance to a particular property is. . . governed by the [ZBA's] interpretation, unless unreasonable orirrational' " (Matter ofLibolt v Town of Irondequoit Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 66 AD3d 1393, 1394[2009], quoting Matter of Frishman v Schmidt, 61 NY2d 823, 825 [1984]).Section 120-55 of the Zoning Ordinance provides, in pertinent part, that the ZBA maypermit "any nonconforming use of a structure" to "be changed to another nonconforminguse, provided that the [ZBA] . . . shall find that the proposed use is equallyappropriate or more appropriate to the district than the existing nonconforming use";however, "[w]hen a nonconforming use of a structure . . . is discontinued orabandoned for six (6) consecutive months or for eighteen (18) months during anythree-year period . . . , the structure . . . shall not thereafter beused except in conformity with the regulations of the district in which it is located"(Zoning Ordinance § 120-55 [C], [E]). The Zoning Ordinance does notdefine the terms "discontinued" and "abandoned." In such circumstances, an [*2]abandonment or discontinuance does not occur "unlessthere has been a complete cessation of the nonconforming use" (Matter of Marzella vMunroe, 69 NY2d 967, 968 [1987]; see Glacial Aggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire, 72 AD3d1644, 1646 [2010], appeal dismissed 16 NY3d 760 [2011]; Matter ofTown of Johnsburg v Town of Johnsburg Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 299 AD2d 796,799-800 [2002]; cf. Matter of Toys "R" Us v Silva, 89 NY2d 411, 420 [1996]).We conclude that the ZBA's determination that Morrow did not discontinue or abandonthe nonconforming business use of the property was a reasonable application of section120-55, and we therefore reject petitioner's related contention that Supreme Court erredin refusing to disturb that determination.
Contrary to petitioner's further contention, we conclude that the ZBA's determinationis supported by substantial evidence. We note that the ZBA's determination "must besustained if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence" (Toys "R"Us, 89 NY2d at 419). In that respect, " '[t]he duty of weighing the evidenceand making the choice rests solely upon the [administrative agency]. The courts may notweigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence isconflicting and room for choice exists' " (id. at 424, quoting Matter ofStork Rest. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 267 [1940]). "A record contains substantialevidence to support an administrative determination when reasonable minds couldadequately accept the conclusion or ultimate fact based on the relevant proof" (Matter of Brauch v Johnson,19 AD3d 799, 800 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Substantial evidenceis "more than mere speculation or conjecture, but less than a preponderance of theevidence" (Matter of Joseph vJohnson, 27 AD3d 563, 563 [2006]; see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v StateDiv. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]).
At the public hearings before the ZBA, Morrow stated that her late husband's homeimprovement business continued after his death in November 2011 and that, as ofSeptember 2013, she was still in the process of winding down the business. Morrowfurther stated that a former employee of the home improvement business continued towork out of the building on her property from November 2011 to January 2012, whenanother individual moved his HVAC business into the building. In light of that evidence,we discern no basis to disturb the ZBA's determination that there had not been adiscontinuance or abandonment of Morrow's nonconforming business use.
Finally, we reject petitioner's contention that Morrow's failure to present records ofongoing business activity constitutes a basis to set aside the ZBA's determination.Although it was appropriate for the ZBA to request such records (see generally Toys"R" Us, 89 NY2d at 423-424), Morrow's failure to produce them did not, as a matterof law, render the ZBA's determination arbitrary and capricious. Present—Smith,J.P., Peradotto, Carni, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.