| Matter of Sand Land Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofSouthampton |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02372 [137 AD3d 1289] |
| March 30, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Sand Land Corporation et al.,Respondents, v Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Southampton et al.,Appellants. |
Kathryn V. Garvin, Acting Town Attorney, Southampton, NY, for appellant ZoningBoard of Appeals of Town of Southampton.
Lazer, Aptheker, Rosella & Yedid, P.C., Melville, NY (David Lazer andZachary Murdock of counsel), for appellants Joseph Phair, Margot Gilman, and AmeliaDoggwiler.
Eagan & Matthews, PLLC, East Hampton, NY (David E. Eagan and Brian E.Matthews of counsel), for respondents.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination ofthe Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Southampton dated June 21, 2012, which,after a hearing, vacated those portions of a determination and certificate of occupancyissued by the Chief Building Inspector of the Town of Southampton which found that theuse of the subject property for the processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and otherclearing debris into topsoil and mulch, and the storage, sale, and delivery of mulch,topsoil, and wood chips, constituted a preexisting nonconforming use, the Zoning Boardof Appeals of the Town of Southampton appeals, and Joseph Phair, Margot Gilman, andAmelia Doggwiler separately appeal, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, SuffolkCounty (Asher, J.), dated June 10, 2014, which granted the petition and, among otherthings, reinstated the certificate of occupancy in its entirety.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs payable tothe appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, the petition is denied, thedetermination dated June 21, 2012, is confirmed, and the proceeding is dismissed on themerits.
The issues in the parties' dispute are being litigated in his proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78 and also in an action for, among other things, injunctive relief (seePhair v Sand Land Corp., 137 AD3d &mdash, 2016 NY Slip Op 02341 [2016][decided herewith]).
Sand Land Corporation (hereinafter Sand Land) owns an approximately 50-acreparcel of real property in a residential zoning district in the Town of Southampton.Wainscott Sand & Gravel Corporation (hereinafter WS&G) owns and operatescertain mining and reclamation activities conducted on that property. In 2005, individualresidents of the Town who owned homes nearby (hereinafter collectively the neighbors),commenced an action, inter alia, to enjoin Sand Land from using the property for certainuses which, they alleged, violated the Town's zoning code.
In May 2010, while the neighbors' action was pending, Sand Land filed anapplication with the Town's Chief Building Inspector requesting a "pre-existingcertificate of occupancy" for [*2]the use of the propertyfor (1) the operation of a sand mine, (2) the receipt and processing of trees, brush, leaves,and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, (3) the receipt and processing of concrete,asphalt pavement, brick, rock, and stone into a concrete blend, and (4) the storage, sale,and delivery from the property of sand, mulch, topsoil, wood chips, and concrete blend.In support of its application, Sand Land, which asserted that the property had been usedcontinually for these operations since before the Town adopted its zoning code,submitted, inter alia, affidavits from eight individuals familiar with the site and itshistory. In opposition, the neighbors submitted various exhibits that, they insisted,conclusively refuted Sand Land's claim that the challenged uses predated the adoption ofthe zoning code.
In a determination dated July 18, 2011, the Town's Chief Building Inspector foundthat Sand Land was entitled to a preexisting certificate of occupancy for: "(i) theoperation of a sand mine, (ii) the receipt and processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves,and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, and (iii) the storage, sale, and delivery ofsand, mulch, topsoil, and wood chips." At the same time, however, the Chief BuildingInspector concluded that Sand Land was not entitled to a preexisting certificate ofoccupancy "[a]s it relates to the receipt and processing of concrete, asphalt pavement,brick, rock, and stone into concrete blend." The following day, the Chief BuildingInspector issued a certificate of occupancy certifying the preexisting use of the propertyfor "[t]he operation of a sand mine, the receipt and processing of trees, brush, stumps,leaves and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, and the storage, sale, and deliveryof sand, mulch, topsoil, and wood chips."
Sand Land did not appeal or cross-appeal from any portion of the Chief BuildingInspector's determination or certificate of occupancy. The neighbors, however, appealedto the Town's Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the ZBA). In that appeal, theneighbors argued that the evidence Sand Land had submitted to the Chief BuildingInspector did not support the Chief Building Inspector's finding of "pre-existing usestatus" with respect to receipt and processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and otherclearing debris into topsoil or mulch, and the storage, sale, and delivery of sand, mulch,topsoil, and wood chips.
Following a public hearing on the neighbors' appeal, the ZBA, in a determinationdated June 21, 2012, concluded that the evidence presented supported the finding that theoperation of a sand mine, including the storage, sale, and delivery of sand, constituted alegally established nonconforming use, and that it also supported the finding that thereceipt of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris was a preexistingaccessory use to the mining operation on the site. At the same time, however, the ZBAfound that the processing of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris intotopsoil or mulch, and the storage, sale, and delivery of mulch, topsoil, and wood chipswere "new uses" that were not preexisting and which were not a permitted expansion ofany legally established nonconforming use. Accordingly, the ZBA annulled thoseportions of the Chief Building Inspector's determination and certificate of occupancywhich approved such "new uses" as preexisting.
Thereafter, Sand Land and WS&G commenced this CPLR article 78 proceedingchallenging the ZBA's June 21, 2012, determination. Among other things, Sand Landand WS&G argued that it was irrational, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, andinternally inconsistent for the ZBA to conclude that the evidence established that theproperty could "receive" brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris, but that thesame evidence did not establish that these materials, once on the property, could be"processed" or sold.
The Supreme Court agreed with Sand Land and WS&G, vacated those portionsof the ZBA's June 21, 2012, determination which found that the processing of trees,brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris, and the sale of mulch, topsoil, and woodchips were not protected as preexisting nonconforming uses, and, among other things,reinstated, in its entirety, the certificate of occupancy issued by the Chief BuildingInspector. The ZBA and the neighbors appeal. We reverse the judgment, deny thepetition, confirm the ZBA's determination, and dismiss the proceeding on the merits.
"A use of property that existed before the enactment of a zoning restriction thatprohibits the use is a legal nonconforming use, but the right to maintain a nonconforminguse does not include the right to extend or enlarge that use" (Matter of McDonald vZoning Bd. of Appeals [*3]of Town of Islip, 31AD3d 642, 642-643 [2006]; see Matter of P.M.S. Assets v Zoning Bd. of Appeals ofVil. of Pleasantville, 98 NY2d 683, 684-685 [2002]; Matter of Toys "R" Us vSilva, 89 NY2d 411, 417 [1996]). Indeed, "[b]ecause nonconforming uses areviewed as detrimental to zoning schemes, public policy favors their reasonable restrictionand eventual elimination" (Matter of 550 Halstead Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town/Vil.of Harrison, 1 NY3d 561, 562 [2003]; see Matter of P.M.S. Assets v ZoningBd. of Appeals of Vil. of Pleasantville, 98 NY2d at 685; Matter of Steiert Enters., Inc. vCity of Glen Cove, 90 AD3d 764, 767 [2011]). " 'Further, in keepingwith the sound public policy of eventually extinguishing all nonconforming uses, thecourts will enforce a municipality's reasonable circumscription of the right to expand thevolume or intensity of a prior nonconforming use' " (Matter of Steiert Enters.,Inc. v City of Glen Cove, 90 AD3d at 768, quoting Matter of McDonald vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Islip, 31 AD3d at 643).
In general, "the determination of a zoning board regarding the continuation of apreexisting nonconforming use must be sustained if it is rational and supported bysubstantial evidence, even if the reviewing court would have reached a different result"(Matter of P.M.S. Assets v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Pleasantville, 98NY2d at 685; see Matter ofJacobsen v Town of Bedford Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 59 AD3d 622, 623 [2009];Matter of RJA Holding Inc. vTown of Wappingers Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 AD3d 724, 724 [2007]). Here,contrary to the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court, the findings as to preexistinguses were not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or internally inconsistenton the evidence presented. The ZBA properly concluded that the evidence supported theChief Building Inspector's findings that the operation of a sand mine, including thestorage and delivery of sand, constituted a preexisting nonconforming use, and that thereceipt of trees, brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris was a preexistingaccessory use to this mining operation. The evidence also supported the ZBA's finding,in effect, that Sand Land had not met its burden of proving that the processing of trees,brush, stumps, leaves, and other clearing debris into topsoil or mulch, and the storage,sale, and delivery of mulch, topsoil, and wood chips were not "new uses," or were apermitted expansion of any legally established nonconforming use (see Matter ofSteiert Enters., Inc. v City of Glen Cove, 90 AD3d at 768; Matter of McDonald vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Islip, 31 AD3d at 643). Indeed, considering therecord as a whole, it was reasonable for the ZBA to conclude, in effect, that these "newuses" constituted a "significant change" from the nonconforming sand mine operationand the accessory receipt of various yard debris. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred inannulling the ZBA's determination.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court concluded that the ZBA "improperly placedthe burden on Sand Land," we find no such error in the ZBA's analysis. As is undisputed,the owner of a property, generally speaking, "must establish that the allegedlypre-existing use was legal prior to the enactment of the prohibitive zoning ordinancewhich purportedly rendered it nonconforming" (Matter of Keller v Haller, 226AD2d 639, 640 [1996]; seeMatter of Cinelli Family Ltd. Partnership v Scheyer, 50 AD3d 1136, 1137[2008]; Incorporated Vil. of Old Westbury v Alljay Farms, 100 AD2d 574[1984], mod 64 NY2d 798 [1985]). Here, even though the Chief BuildingInspector found that Sand Land met this burden, when the matter went for review beforethe ZBA, the ZBA was authorized to consider the Chief Building Inspector'sdetermination de novo and make such a "determination as in its opinion ought to havebeen made in the matter" (Town Law § 267-b [1]; see Matter of BBJ Assoc., LLC vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Kent, 65 AD3d 154, 159 [2009]; Matterof Board of Architectural Review & Historic Preserv. of Vil. of Southampton vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Southampton, 279 AD2d 523, 524 [2001]). Whenpresenting the matter to the ZBA, the neighbors only had to show that the evidencesubmitted by Sand Land in support of its application was insufficient to demonstrate thatthe challenged uses existed on the subject property prior to the adoption of theprohibitive zoning ordinance (see Matter of Keller v Haller, 226 AD2d at 640; cf. Matter of Letourneau v Town ofBerne, 89 AD3d 1202 [2011]; Matter of Haberman v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of E.Hampton, 85 AD3d 1170 [2011]).
The remaining contentions of Sand Land and WS&G are without merit. Balkin,J.P., Chambers, Cohen and Maltese, JJ., concur.