| Matter of Martinos v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town ofBrookhaven |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02828 [138 AD3d 859] |
| April 13, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Dorothy Martinos,Appellant, v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Brookhaven et al.,Respondents. |
Bracken Margolin Besunder LLP, Islandia, NY (Linda U. Margolin of counsel), forappellant.
Annette Eaderesto, Town Attorney, Farmingville, NY (David Moran of counsel), forrespondent Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Brookhaven.
Cohen, Warren, Meyer & Gitter, P.C., Smithtown, NY (Evan M. Gitter andJustine Tocci of counsel), for respondent Miller Beach Surf Club, Inc.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Boardof Zoning Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven, dated July 13, 2011, which, after ahearing, granted the applications of Miller Beach Surf Club, Inc., for, inter alia, acertificate of existing use and an extension of nonconforming use, the petitioner appeals,as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, SuffolkCounty (Farneti, J.), dated May 5, 2014, as denied those branches of the petition whichwere to annul so much of the determination as granted the applications of Miller BeachSurf Club, Inc., for a certificate of existing use and an extension of nonconforminguse.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereofdenying that branch of the petition which was to annul so much of the determination ofthe Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven as granted the application ofMiller Beach Surf Club, Inc., for an extension of nonconforming use, and substitutingtherefor a provision granting that branch of the petition and annulling the determination;as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs ordisbursements.
In 2007, Miller Beach Surf Club, Inc. (hereinafter the Surf Club), submittedapplications to the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven (hereinafter theBZA) for, inter alia, certificates of existing use for a clubhouse, an office building, and aone-family dwelling located on its property, and for an extension of nonconforming usefor certain alterations made to the clubhouse, as well as two decks, an awning, a gazebo,and a detached storage shed. After a public hearing, the BZA granted the Surf Club'sapplications. In 2008, the petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking toannul the BZA's determination. The Supreme Court granted that petition, annulled thedetermination, and remitted the matter to the BZA for a new determination.
[*2] Following remittal, and after a public hearing in 2011,the BZA again granted the Surf Club's applications. The petitioner commenced thissecond CPLR article 78 proceeding, alleging that the BZA's determination was arbitraryand capricious. The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the petitionwhich were to annul so much of the BZA's determination as granted the Surf Club'sapplications for a certificate of existing use and an extension of nonconforming use. Thepetitioner appeals.
"The determination of a local zoning board is entitled to great deference, and will beset aside only if it is illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or irrational" (Matter of Waterways Dev. Corp. vTown of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 126 AD3d 708, 711 [2015]). "It isthe law of this state that nonconforming uses or structures, in existence when a zoningordinance is enacted, are, as a general rule, constitutionally protected and will bepermitted to continue, notwithstanding the contrary provisions of the ordinance" (Matter of Cinelli Family Ltd.Partnership v Scheyer, 50 AD3d 1136, 1137 [2008] [internal quotation marksomitted]). "However, the owner must establish that the allegedly pre-existing use [orstructure] was legal prior to the enactment of the prohibitive zoning ordinance whichpurportedly rendered it nonconforming" (Matter of Keller v Haller, 226 AD2d639, 640 [1996]).
Here, the Surf Club established that its existing use of the clubhouse, office building,and one-family dwelling was legal prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance whichrendered that existing use nonconforming (see Code of Town of Brookhaven§§ 85-16, 85-883; Matter of Keller v Haller, 226 AD2d 639[1996]; cf. Matter of Sampino v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Islip, 220AD2d 672 [1995]). Accordingly, the Surf Club established the existence of a legalnonconforming use, and it was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational for the BZA togrant the Surf Club a certificate of existing use.
However, the Surf Club's erection of the decks, the awning, the gazebo, and thedetached shed on its premises, and the completion of certain alterations to its clubhouse,constituted an impermissible extension of that nonconforming use, not a mere increase involume or intensity of the same nonconforming use (see Matter of 550 Halstead Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals ofTown/Vil. of Harrison, 1 NY3d 561 [2003]; cf. Matter of Piesco v Hollihan, 47 AD3d 938 [2008]). Assuch, the BZA's determination to grant the Surf Club's application for an extension ofnonconforming use violated Code of Town of Brookhaven § 85-883 (A)(2), which prohibits the extension of nonconforming uses. Accordingly, the portion ofthe BZA's determination which granted the Surf Club's application for an extension ofnonconforming use was arbitrary and capricious and should have been annulled by theSupreme Court.
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit. Hall, J.P., Cohen, LaSalleand Connolly, JJ., concur.