Valiando v Catalfamo
2016 NY Slip Op 02882 [138 AD3d 1271]
April 14, 2016
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 1, 2016


[*1]
 Patrick J. Valiando et al.,Appellants,
v
Michelle M. Catalfamo et al.,Respondents.

Jacobowitz and Gubits, LLP, Walden (Kara J. Cavallo of counsel), forappellants.

Alan B. Brill, PC, Suffern (Lynn Beesecker, Cornwall, of counsel), forrespondents.

Lynch, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Work, J.), enteredSeptember 17, 2014 in Ulster County, which, among other things, denied plaintiffs'motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and (2) from a corrected order ofsaid court, entered May 22, 2015 in Ulster County, which, among other things, deniedplaintiffs' motion to renew.

Plaintiff Patrick J. Valiando and his spouse, derivatively, commenced this actionseeking damages for injuries he sustained when his vehicle—a dump truck towinga flatbed trailer carrying a shed—collided with the vehicle driven by defendantMichelle M. Catalfamo at the intersection of Plains Road and State Route 300 in theTown of Shawangunk, Ulster County. Immediately prior to the collision, Valiando wastraveling westbound on State Route 300; Catalfamo was traveling southbound on PlainsRoad. Travel was controlled by a flashing yellow light on State Route 300 and by aflashing red light on Plains Road. Following joinder of issue, plaintiffs moved forsummary judgment on the issue of liability. Supreme Court agreed with defendants thatthere were issues of fact with regard to Valiando's comparative negligence and deniedplaintiffs' motion for summary judgement. Plaintiffs filed a motion to renew or rearguepursuant to CPLR 2221 (d) and (e), and, in response, Supreme Court issued a correcteddecision and order, but did not change its determination. Plaintiffs now appeal.

As the driver approaching an intersection controlled by a flashing yellow light,Valiando was obligated to proceed through the intersection with caution (seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 1113 [b]; Rabenstein v Suffolk County Dept. of Pub. Works, 131 AD3d1145, 1145-1146[*2][2015]; Colaruotolo vCrowley, 290 AD2d 863, 864 [2002]). Valiando testified at his examination beforetrial that he was driving approximately 35 miles per hour down a hill on State Route 300towards the intersection with Plains Road. As he approached the intersection, he lookedto both the right and the left, but did not see any vehicles until he saw Catalfamo'svehicle in the intersection a "half a second" prior to the collision. Catalfamo testified thatshe stopped before entering the intersection but did not see Valiando's vehicle until shewas in the intersection and it was just a few feet away from her. As it is not disputed thatCatalfamo was obligated to stop before proceeding into the intersection and to yield theright-of-way to Valiando (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1113 [a];Rabenstein v Suffolk County Dept. of Pub. Works, 131 AD3d at 1145-1146; Horton v Warden, 32 AD3d570, 572 [2006]), we find that plaintiffs' submissions were sufficient to demonstrateprima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue ofliability.

In opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, defendants claimed thatthere were issues of fact with regard to whether Valiando used reasonable care prior toentering the intersection. Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to defendants asthe nonmoving party, as we must (see O'Brien v Couch, 124 AD3d 975, 977 [2015]), weagree. There can be "more than one proximate cause of an accident" (id. [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see Rivera v Fritts, 136 AD3d 1249, 1251 [2016]). Here,although Valiando had the right-of-way, such a driver "may nevertheless be found tohave contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable careto avoid the accident" (Rabenstein v Suffolk County Dept. of Pub. Works, 131AD3d at 1146). As noted by Supreme Court, Valiando testified at his deposition that hisview of Plains Road on the side that Catalfamo entered the intersection was obstructedby some trees and bushes. Similarly, Catalfamo recalled at her deposition that when shestopped at the intersection, her view from Plains Road towards the path of Valiando'stravel on State Route 300 was obstructed with "shrubbery and such." She testified thatshe stopped at the intersection approximately 10 feet from the stop sign, commented toher passenger that the visibility was poor, then looked left and right "a few times" beforefirst inching, then driving into the intersection. Catalfamo did not see Valiando's truck,which she characterized as approaching "fast," until she was already in the intersection.According to Valiando, the front passenger side of his truck struck the driver's side ofCatalfamo's car, near the front wheel. Inasmuch as both drivers testified with regard totrees and brush blocking the view at the intersection of Plains Road and State Route 300,and in consideration of Valiando's claim that he never saw Catalfamo's vehicle beforeshe entered the intersection, defendants have raised a factual question with regard towhether Valiando failed to approach the intersection with caution, and whether suchfailure was a proximate cause of the collision (see id.; O'Brien v Couch,124 AD3d at 977; compare Colaruotolo v Crowley, 290 AD2d at 864).

Next, we find that Supreme Court properly denied plaintiffs' motion to reargue andrenew. "A motion for leave to reargue . . . shall be based upon matters offact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the priormotion" (CPLR 2221 [d] [2]; see Matter of Karnazes, 133 AD3d 1027, 1027-1028[2015], appeal dismissed 27 NY3d 974 [Apr. 5, 2016]). "A motion for leave to renew . . . shall bebased upon new[ly discovered] facts not offered on the prior motion that would changethe prior determination . . . and . . . shall contain reasonablejustification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion" (CPLR 2221 [e]).Here, plaintiffs' motion was based on certain photographs and an affidavit by a nonpartywitness. Assuming, without deciding that such evidence was newly discovered, it doesnot resolve the issue of Valiando's comparative negligence. Similarly, on the motion toreargue, which was granted, Supreme Court properly adhered to its prior determinationbecause, despite the corrected description of Valiando's testimony, these factualquestions remained.

[*3] McCarthy, J.P.,Egan Jr. and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and corrected order are affirmed,with costs.


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