| People v Briggs |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 03221 [138 AD3d 1355] |
| April 28, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vMichael Briggs, Appellant. |
Catherine A. Barber, Albany, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County(Drago, J.), rendered August 29, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty ofthe crimes of murder in the second degree and attempted burglary in the seconddegree.
On January 1, 2013, the victim, an 82-year-old former nun, was discovered in herapartment lying in a pool of blood with a kitchen knife protruding from her neck. Shedied as a result of asphyxiation caused by strangulation, but had also been stabbed andviolently attacked prior to her death under circumstances suggesting that she hadinterrupted a burglary. Defendant, who had absconded from parole supervision, wasarrested and charged in an indictment with multiple crimes, including murder in the firstdegree, arising from this tragic event. He was assigned counsel and, upon counsel'sadvice, pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and attempted burglary in thesecond degree in satisfaction of the indictment.[FN*] He also waived his right to appeal, bothorally and in writing.
New counsel was subsequently assigned and defendant moved to withdraw his guilty[*2]plea. County Court denied the motion. Thereafter, ahearing was conducted concerning the validity of defendant's prior convictions. At thehearing, defendant withdrew his challenge to the constitutionality of these convictionsand County Court ruled that he would be sentenced as a second felony offender. Inaccordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a second felony offender toconsecutive prison terms of 25 years to life on the murder conviction and five years onthe attempted burglary conviction, the latter of which was to be followed by five years ofpostrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
Initially, defendant contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance ofcounsel by both of the attorneys who were assigned to represent him during the course ofthe proceedings. He maintains that his first assigned counsel improvidently advised himto enter a plea of guilty and that his second assigned counsel failed to properly contestthe validity of his prior convictions, which affected the period of postrelease supervisionthat he would receive on the attempted burglary conviction under the terms of the pleaagreement. To the extent that defendant's ineffective assistance claims impact thevoluntariness of his guilty plea, they were properly preserved by his motion to withdrawthe plea (see People vMoore, 97 AD3d 850, 851 [2012]; compare People v Bethea, 133 AD3d 1033, 1034[2015]).
Turning to the merits, we note that, "[i]n the context of a guilty plea, a defendant hasbeen afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous pleaand nothing in the record casts doubt upon the apparent effectiveness of counsel" (People v Nieves, 89 AD3d1285, 1286 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Vonneida, 130AD3d 1322, 1322 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1093 [2015]; People v Jenkins, 130 AD3d1091, 1091 [2015]). Here, defendant's first assigned counsel zealously representedhim during the course of a combined Huntley/Wade hearing that took five days tocomplete and made appropriate pretrial motions. He based his plea recommendationupon the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt and secured a favorable plea thatexposed defendant to a lesser sentence than he would have received if he was convictedafter trial. Notably, defendant expressed his satisfaction with counsel's representation atthe time of entering his plea. Under the circumstances presented, we find that defendant'sfirst assigned counsel provided him with meaningful representation (see People v Beekman, 134AD3d 1355, 1357 [2015]; People v Burns, 133 AD3d 1045, 1047-1048 [2015]).
Defendant's second assigned counsel appeared on his behalf at the hearing toconsider the validity of two prior convictions from Nassau County that provided the basisfor his status as a second felony offender. A review of the hearing transcript disclosesthat, during an off-the-record discussion with counsel, defendant indicated that he did notwish to challenge the constitutionality of his prior convictions in County Court, butwould pursue this remedy in another court. Defendant confirmed the substance of thisdiscussion on the record and then admitted that he was the same person convicted inNassau County of the crimes of robbery in the first degree and burglary in the firstdegree. Thus, he waived any challenge to the constitutionality of his prior convictions(see People v Provencher,72 AD3d 1128 [2010]; People v Crippa, 245 AD2d 811, 812 [1997], lvdenied 92 NY2d 850 [1998]) and, under the circumstances presented, there isnothing to indicate that his second assigned counsel was ineffective in recommendingthat he do so.
Defendant's assertion that he was not aware of the period of postrelease supervisionthat would be imposed on the attempted burglary conviction based upon his status as asecond felony offender is simply not supported by the record. During the pleaproceedings, County Court specifically advised defendant that, under the terms of theplea agreement, five years of postrelease supervision would be imposed upon theattempted burglary conviction given his two [*3]priorviolent felony convictions, and defendant communicated his understanding to the court.Accordingly, defendant entered his guilty plea knowing the full implications of his statusas a second felony offender.
Defendant's final contention that the sentence is harsh and excessive is precluded byhis valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Brasmeister, 136 AD3d 1122, 1123[2016]).
Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed.
Footnote *:Defendant was initiallyrepresented by the Schenectady County Conflict Defender's office before assignedcounsel was substituted to represent defendant.